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Abstract
Committed To The Cause?
Violent and Financial Criminal Behaviors of Domestic Far-Rightists
By
Ashmini G. Kerodal.
Advisor: Professor Joshua D. Freilich
This study used factor analysis, logistic and multinomial logistic regression analysis to
evaluate the effects of an individual’s level of commitment to far-right extremism on his / her
criminal offending behavior. Agnew’s General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin’s
Differential Opportunity Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free /
movement spaces were used to address the three research questions: (1) What effect did
individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials
have on membership in a far-right group, (2) What effect did individual level stressors,
significant others, membership in an extremist group, and negative interactions with government
officials have on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism, (3) What effect did an
individual’s commitment to far-right extremism, and membership in extremist groups have on
his / her criminal behavior?
This study investigated whether strain factors alone influenced radicalization, or if there
was a combination of strain factors – including negative interactions with law enforcement – and
interactions with other extremists that influenced levels of commitment to rightwing extremism.
This study defined radicalization as “the process by which individuals become violent
extremists...[that is] individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to
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further political, social, or religious goals” (NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization
Solicitation, p. 4).
Commitment to rightwing extremism was conceptualized as commitment to far-rightist
norms, similar to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) definition of commitment to delinquent norms or
the extent of indoctrination into a deviant subculture. This variable drew on themes found in
previous research on extremism (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm,
2004, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, 2008). A factor analysis was used to check the
validity of the commitment to far-right extremism scale.
Another unique characteristic of this study was that its dependent variable of criminal
behavior included both violent (i.e., fatal) incidents and financial schemes. Data were obtained
from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), a Department of Homeland Security/STARTfunded project led by Dr. Joshua D. Freilich and Dr. Steven Chermak. Illegal violent incidents
and financial schemes committed by domestic extremist that resulted in criminal charged were
included in the ECDB. Violent incidents were defined as homicides, and financial schemes were
defined as “illicit financial operation[s] involving a set of activities [i.e. techniques] carried out
by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or other economic advantage through the use
of deliberate deception” (Belli, 2011, p. 64).
The study found that GST did not predict membership in extremist groups, but was
associated with a higher risk of committing a homicide. Group membership was predicted by
access to extremist groups and a possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs.
However, none of the theories explained levels of commitment to extremism. Instead,
differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud
Supremacists. Conspiracy Theorists were more likely to have been non-white and employed,
v

while Proud Supremacists were more likely to have been white males who experienced strain
and had extremist referent others. Finally, the presence of strain and a prior prison record were
associated with violent criminal behavior of DFRs. High levels of commitment to extremism,
female gender, and the absence of strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have prior negative
interactions with government officials) were associated with an increased risk of financial
offending behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study examined variables that influenced commitment to rightwing extremist
ideology, group membership and criminal behavior of Domestic Far-Rightists (DFRs) between
2006 and 2010. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, research on international,
transnational (e.g., Enders & Sandler, 2005; Sandler & Enders, 2004; Smilansky, 2004) and
domestic terrorism, perpetrated by radical Islamic fundamentalists (e.g., Jenkins, 2010; Vidino,
2009), has flourished, while research on the domestic far-right has been less frequently studied.
However, domestic extremists also pose a threat. Acts of domestic terrorism have been found to
outnumber transnational events by as much as 7 to 1 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan,
Fogg & Scott, 2006). Domestic extremists, including DFRs and Al Qaeda-inspired Islamic
extremists, have committed more than 700 financial schemes since 1990 (Freilich, Chermak,
Belli, Gruenewald & Parkin, 2014). These financial schemes resulted in financial losses in
excess of $650,000,000 (Freilich, et al., 2014). DFRs were responsible for close to 80% of these
financial schemes (Freilich, et al., 2014) and the majority of these financial losses.
DFRs have been known to engage in a range of political and criminal activities in
addition to acts of terrorism and terrorism-financing crimes. These activities aim to inspire social
and political change through both legal channels (e.g., writing petitions and lobbying) and illegal
means, such as acts of terrorism (Aho, 1990; Hamm, 1993; Simi, 2010; Smith, 1994). DFRs have
committed more than 370 homicides between 1990 and 2010 (Freilich, et al., 2014). These
homicide incidents were responsible for the deaths of more than 600 people (Freilich, et al.,
2014). This figure included deaths attributed to hate crimes and acts of terrorism. Approximately
10% of all DFR’s homicide victims were law enforcement personnel, correctional officers or
1

private security guards (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings indicated that DFRs posed an
additional threat to law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Simone Jr., 2010; Freilich &
Chermak, 2009; “Officer Safety and Extremists,” n.d.).
This study filled a gap in the terrorism literature by using factor analysis, logistic
regression analysis and multinomial logistic regression analysis to determine: (1) if individual
level stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with
government officials influenced membership in formal extremist groups; (2) if individual level
stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with
government officials influenced commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) the impact of
commitment to rightwing extremist ideology and group membership on criminal behavior.
Criminal behavior was operationalized as involvement in a homicide incident or in a financial
scheme. For the purpose of this study, homicide was defined as when a person purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently caused the death of another human being (MPC § 210.1) in
which at least one perpetrator was affiliated with the far-right (Freilich, et al, 2014; Gruenewald,
2011), and a financial scheme was defined as an “illicit financial operation involving a set of
activities [i.e., techniques] carried out by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or
other economic advantage through the use of deliberate deception” (Belli, 2011, p.64).
Agnew’s (2005) General Strain Theory (GST) of crime, Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960)
Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi, and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free / movement
spaces provided a theoretical framework for the study (a detailed discussion of these theories and
related concepts can be found in chapter 2).
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this project’s innovative
design measures DFRs’ commitment to extreme ideology on a continuum. Studies that have
2

looked at extremism and radicalization typically separate individuals into two categories:
radicalized or not radicalized. This method does not capture whether criminal behavior was
influenced by levels of commitment to an extremist ideology. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued
that fully indoctrinated members of a deviant subculture were more committed to the delinquent
norms of that sub-culture and less constrained by the beliefs and values of conventional society.
Although differential opportunity theory has been extensively tested in relation to youth gangs,
no previous study has attempted to empirically test Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) argument on farright (FR) groups. Instead, it was merely assumed that people who were more committed to an
extremist cause are also more willing to risk death, injury or criminal charges in support of that
cause.
Second, this project tested Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) on a random sample of
DFRs and with an individual level (micro) unit measurement. Previous studies on the DFR have
examined strain conditions by means of observation (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010)
and interviews (e.g., Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) in non-random
samples. This dissertation was the first quantitative examination of GST and terrorism that
utilized an individual level unit of analysis on a representative sample of DFRs.
The sample consisted of all known DFRs who were convicted of a violent or financial
crime that occurred (all or in part) between 2006 and 2010. The sample was obtained from the
US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which was created from open source documents. It could
be argued that since the media did not provide equal coverage to all crimes, the possibility of
missing cases and non-random selection would be a concern. However, Chermak, Freilich,
Parkin and Lynch (2011) found that when multiple open source documents were used, the
victim, suspect and incident information tended to be reliable. Therefore, Chermak, et al. (2011)
3

concluded that a sample drawn from a wide range of open source documents would be
representative of the population.
A key variable tested in this study was prior negative interactions with government
officials, which included law enforcement and court officials. Therefore, evidence-based
recommendations were formulated to reduce the radicalizing effects of negative interactions with
government officials. Prior research found that negative interactions with government officials
could have inspired far-rightists (or borderline far-rightists) to become more radicalized (Aho,
1990). This is likely to occur if far-rightists interpreted law enforcement behavior as evidence of
the validity of their rightwing extremist ideology.
Fourth, this study was the first to simultaneously examine violent and financial crimes
committed by extremists, in this case far-rightists. Previous studies on the criminal behavior of
DFRs have examined: (1) far-rightists who commit acts of terrorism (e.g., LaFree & Dugan,
2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006; LaFree, Morris & Dugan, 2010; Smith 1994); (2)
hate crimes (e.g., Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998; Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald & Pridemore,
2012; Hamm, 1993); and (3) general terrorism financing and other financial crimes (e.g., Belli,
2011). Therefore, a more complete picture of the criminal behavior of far-rightists was obtained.
DFRs have been charged with a range of criminal behavior, such as money laundering, hate
crimes, homicide, tax evasion and non-ideological or common crimes (Belli, 2011; Freilich, et al,
2014; Smith, 1994; Smith, Damphousse, Jackson & Sellers, 2002). Knowledge of the range of
criminal behaviors committed by the far-right was especially important as hard control measures
(i.e., crack downs) by law enforcement may have unintended consequences or a negligible effect
(Chermak, Freilich & Caspi, 2009a; Lum, Leslie & Sherley, 2006).
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This study examined all known far-rightists who were convicted of a homicide or
financial scheme that occurred during the years 2006 to 2010, as well as their non-extremist cooffenders. Non-extremist offenders were an important comparison group, since Aho (1990), Blee
(2002) and Chermak (2002) all mentioned the importance of ‘seekers’ (Aho’s term) as an initial
step in the radicalization process. (See literature review section for discussion.) Unlike
homicides, financial schemes could have lasted for prolonged periods. To have been included in
the study, at least a portion of the crime must have occurred during 2006 to 2010. The cut-off
point was set at 2010 to allow for sufficient time for the trial to conclude. Homicides and
financial schemes perpetrated for ideological or non-ideological motives were included in the
study, which facilitated comparisons between far-rightists who offend to obtain some
social/political end and far-rightists who were convicted of routine (non-ideologically motivated)
crimes. Results from the ECDB found that 40% of both financial schemes and homicide
incidents perpetrated by far-rightists were not motivated by their extremist ideology (Freilich, et
al., 2014). These findings suggest that both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated crimes
by DFRs should be analyzed to obtain an accurate picture of far-rightists’ criminal behavior
patterns and to create successful crime prevention policies (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010).
Data on prior offenses were used to determine patterns of far-rightists’ offending
behavior over the life-course and whether offending behavior was influenced by interactions
with government officials. The ECDB found that about 40% of DFRs who committed an
ideologically based homicide had also committed a prior crime, 90% of which were not
ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These data had intriguing implications, as they
suggested that interactions with law enforcement (e.g., arrest, trial and conviction) contributed to
individuals’ subsequent level of commitment to rightwing extremism and criminal behavior. If
5

interactions with law enforcement further radicalized DFRs, then a more strategic approach to
curtailing their financial and violent crime should be formulated.
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the American far-right movement. This overview
formed the basis for operationalizing a key variable for this study: commitment to rightwing
extremism. The discussion of the far-right is followed by the study’s theoretical framework:
Agnew’s General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin’s Differential Opportunity
Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free or movement spaces. Chapter 3
discusses the relevant literature about factors that contribute to membership in far-rightist
groups, commitment / indoctrination into those groups and the criminal behavior of DFRs.
Chapter 4 lists the study’s research questions and hypotheses, all firmly grounded in the
theoretical framework and literature that is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes the
methodology used in the study. In this chapter, detailed explanations of the variables, the sources
of data and sampling techniques, and statistical models used to test the research questions are
described. Chapter 6 presents the study’s findings for the three research models. These findings
are discussed in Chapter 7, along with the relevance of the study to the terrorism literature and its
limitations. The conclusion, which summarized the study’s findings, contribution to the literature
and recommendations, are presented in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The Far-right
Based on a systematic review of scholarly literature on right-wing extremism, Freilich,
Chermak and Caspi (2009a) defined the ideology the far-right movement as:
fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of
centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of
taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal
liberty, believe that one’s personal and/or national ‘‘way of life’’ is under attack and is either already lost or
that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is
from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and believe in the need to be prepared for an attack by
participating in paramilitary preparations, training and survivalism (p. 499).

Several researchers have argued that the FR should have been conceptualized as a social
movement – linked by hate sites, movement and other social events, ‘zines and music –with a
distinct sub-culture and ideological beliefs (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell &
Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Some of the characteristics of the far-right, described as a belief in freedom from undue
government intervention and the inviolability of constitutional rights, are present to a lesser
extent among mainstream conservatives. For example, the right to bear arms is conferred by the
Second Amendment to the US Constitution; taxation without representation in the British
Parliament was one of the causes of the American Revolution; and the phrase “life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness” was contained in the US Declaration of Independence. For that reason,
Freilich, et al. (2009a) cautioned that care must be taken to distinguish the far-right from
mainstream conservative movements and the Christian right.
7

One of the key distinguishing factors of the far-right is the belief in conspiracy theories.
Several authors have noted the importance of conspiracy theories to far-right ideology (Aho,
1990; Barkun, 1989, 1996; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Ezekiel, 1995; Freilich, et al., 2009; Kaplan, 1995a,
1997; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000). These conspiracy theories are diverse, complex and not
subscribed to by mainstream conservative movements, for example the New World Order
(NWO) and Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). According to Chermak (2002), the NWO is a
plan orchestrated by the UN and international bankers, leaders and organizations to create a
global nation and end the sovereignty of the US. Kaplan (1995a) described the ZOG as the belief
that both the federal government and predominant culture were controlled by a Jewish
conspiracy. Therefore, belief in conspiracy theories was a key indicator used to distinguish
DFRs from mainstream conservatives.
In addition to the belief in conspiracy theories, DFRs such as Christian Identity
adherents, Klan and Neo-Nazi group members also believe in white supremacy, i.e., the Godgiven right of the white/Aryan race to rule other races (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Berlet &
Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000), or are
opposed to race mixing in schools, communities or relationships (Blee, 2002; Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2006; Simi, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Ezekiel (1995) and Blee (2002) argued
that most people subscribe to a certain level of racist beliefs. Blee (2002) used Philomena
Essed’s concept of everyday racism to describe this phenomena. Blee (2002) argued that racist
groups transform everyday racism into extraordinary racism, which is an “ideology that
interprets and gives meaning to a wide variety of phenomena that seem unconnected to race,
ranging from the global economy and the growth of media monopolies to more immediate
8

personal issues such as the quality of family life, city services, and medical care" (2002, p. 76).
Blee’s (2002) description of the actual transformation process of everyday racism into
extraordinary racism is very similar to Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free spaces (see
section 2.3 below for discussion).
However, others have argued that the idea of white supremacy may not have been shared
by all DFRs (Barkun, 1996; Gruenewald, Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Wooden & Blazak, 2001).
Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2006) pointed out that while some DFRs subscribe to white
supremacist beliefs, others may be white separatists. White separatists believe that the Aryan
race should have separate economic and cultural lives from other racial groups. In addition,
Barkun (1996) noted that some militia groups claimed to accept non-white members. Some
DFRs consider racial minorities to be a minor concern and instead are anti-Semitic. However,
other researchers of rightwing extremism (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) have argued that
members of racist groups (i.e., the Klans, skinhead and neo-Nazi groups) are more concerned
with the threat posed by minorities and are socialized into anti-Semitism and belief in the ZOG
by movement leaders. Thus, extreme racism and/or anti-Semitism could also be used to
distinguish DFRs from mainstream conservative movements.
According to Ezekiel (1995), leaders and lieutenants in the domestic far-right tend to be
lifelong members of the movement, but may branch off to form new factions / groups. Members
also move between groups and may be loosely linked to multiple groups at the same time (Aho,
1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Ezekiel, 1995; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Vertigans, 2007).
Membership in the far-right movement could be divided into: (1) ordinary or casual members,
who are not fanatical, but instead are motivated by the thrill of being a member of the group
(Ezekiel, 1995; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011); (2) the loose cannon, who is easily motivated
9

toward violence and is radicalized, but could not see the big picture (Ezekiel, 1995); (3) the
terrorists; and (4) the senior members, which includes the leaders and lieutenants, who are
usually more educated than the other members (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990).
With the use of negative interactions with government officials and interactions with
extremist others, this study examined whether casual members evolved into loose cannons
(committed non-ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes) or terrorists (committed
ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes). This study also examined whether an
individual’s level of commitment to extremism was related to his/her criminal offending
behavior.
General Strain Theory (Agnew, 2001, 2005), Differential Opportunity Theory (Cloward
& Ohlin, 1960) and free or movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010) are
discussed in the next section. These theories provided a framework for selecting the research
questions, operationalizing the variables and selecting the data analysis techniques. Finally, an
illustration of the theoretical framework is presented.

2.2 General Strain Theory
In his General Strain theory (GST), Agnew (2005) attempted to explain all types of
criminal behavior. Agnew (2005) identified three types of strain: failure to achieve positively
valued goals, removal of positive stimuli / possessions,1 and presence of negatively valued
stimuli / adverse treatment by others. Merton (1938) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) argued
that there was an expectation that anyone could achieve success in America but that not everyone

1

Researchers (Hamm, 1993; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995) have examined the effects of loss of positive stimuli (e.g.,
parental divorce, loss of jobs) among skinheads, but this information could not have been reliably obtained using
secondary sources of data.
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had the opportunities to achieve success. Failure to achieve success (e.g., low status occupation),
removal or threat of the removal of positively valued stimuli (e.g., loss of employment) and
negative stimuli (e.g., arrest and conviction) could put strain on an individual (Agnew, 2005).
Furthermore, strain could result in anger, frustration and depression, which could increase the
likelihood that the person would commit a crime to reduce such negative affect (Agnew, 2005).
Agnew (2005) also differentiated between subjective and objective strain. Objective
stressors are disliked by most people (e.g., loss of employment), while subjective stressors are
disliked by the individual of interest to the researcher. Agnew (2005) also identified a third
category of strain: subjective interpretation of objective strain, e.g., someone with a high degree
of self-confidence may experience less emotional distress from a loss of employment when
compared to someone with a lower degree of self-confidence.
Agnew (2005) argued that the experience of strain was not a sufficient cause of criminal
behavior. In addition to the strain experienced, the individual must also be unable to cope legally,
believe the cost of crime (or being caught) is low and have a predisposition to criminal behavior.
Personality traits (such as self-confidence), intelligence, problem solving skills and access to
financial and social resources could also affect an individual’s ability to cope legally (Agnew,
2005). For example, an individual with a savings account and a strong social network would be
able to discover potential employment opportunities and utilize their savings to cover living
expenses in the interim. An individual who feels little guilt at the thought of committing a crime
and is unlikely to be penalized by family members or friends for engaging in criminal behavior
would have a higher propensity to engage in criminal behavior, since the cost of crime to the
individual would be low (Agnew, 2005).

11

An individual’s propensity to engage in crime after experiencing conditions of strain
could also be influenced by prior responses to criminal behavior, e.g., parental attention
subsequent to an arrest or warning could act as reinforcement and increase the propensity for
future offending behavior. This relationship is depicted in diagram 1.
Diagram 1: General Strain Theory

Strain
Loss of valued stimuli
Experience negative stimuli
Unable to achieve goals

Anger,
frustration
depression

Not able
to cope
legally

Predisposed
to crime
Cost of
crime
was low

Commit crime: to reduce strain; get
revenge on person that caused hurt or
venerable person; to reduce negative
emotions
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In 2010, Agnew extended GST to account for acts of terrorism and to explain why only a
few individuals who experienced strain resorted to terrorism. According to Agnew (2010), for
terrorism to occur strain must be: high in magnitude, perceived as unjust/undeserved2 and caused
by powerful others with whom the individual has weak ties (such as a government that no longer
represents one’s interests). Agnew hypothesized that these types of strain result in anger,
frustration and helplessness, which would lower inhibitions and ability to cope through
legitimate means. This may create pressure / incentive for criminal coping, which could include
both common crimes and acts of terrorism. However, the effects of strain, according to Agnew
(2010), could be mediated by whether the individual has beliefs favorable to terrorism and
offending behavior (see diagram 2 for a concise description of General Strain of Terrorism).
However, it is possible that GST and GST of terrorism may not provide a complete
picture of the causes of criminal and terrorism behavior of DFRs. Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960)
Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) explains how one may become susceptible to joining a
sub-cultural group. DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) also explains how beliefs favorable to
terrorism / crime and the skills required to commit such acts are acquired. DOT (Cloward &
Ohlin, 1960) will be discussed in the next section.

2

This was not directly examined in this study, since the data was obtained from secondary sources e.g., news
articles, court documents, watch groups.
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Diagram 2: General Strain of Terrorism

Collective Strain that were:
High in magnitude, unjust,
Inflicted by powerful others
and complicit civilians

Increased
negative
emotions &
lower social
control

Able to
cope legally

Collective
orientation
Social
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terrorism

Commit acts of terrorism depending on
subjective interpretation of strain; emotional
reaction of strain; and ability to engage in
terrorism, low cost of terrorism and
personal feelings towards terrorism
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2.3 Differential Opportunity Theory and Movement Spaces
In 1960, Cloward and Ohlin proposed Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) to explain
the development and persistence of delinquent sub-cultures and the effect of such subcultures on
the delinquent behavior of their members. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) posited that rejection of the
conventional social order and submersion into a deviant subculture is a four-step process.
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that the individual must first experience alienation, which
commonly occurs through failure or anticipated failure. The individual must then attribute the
blame for said failure to society. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that alienation is quite
possible in a society that “espous[es] equality of opportunity and universally high aspirations for
success…[but has] discrepancies in opportunities” (p. 108). If an individual meets the formal
criteria for success, but does not achieve success, feelings of injustice could occur. This is
dependent on the individual attributing blame for his/her failure to achieve success on an external
force, such as an unfair society. An individual who attributes blame internally would become a
retreatist (reject both the goals of society and the means of obtaining those goals) or ritualist
(abide by the socially accepted means of success but give up hope of achieving success). Such
feelings would diminish the individual’s belief in the legitimacy of the conventional social order
and reduce his/her commitment to the prevailing norms of society (See also Cloward and Ohlin
(1961) and Merton (1938) for further discussion).
In the second step, the alienated individual seeks out like-minded others (Cloward &
Ohlin, 1960). However, as there exist differential opportunities for success, so too are there
differential opportunities to deviate, and not all alienated individuals have access to deviant
subcultures (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Those who have access to deviant subcultures could
proceed to the third step, and have the opportunity to acquire the skills and mentoring necessary
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to deviate. The techniques for neutralizing are also acquired at this stage. The reaction of law
enforcement is crucial at this stage. If the justice system labels the individual as a criminal or
different from law-abiding people, feelings of alienation are exacerbated and bonds with the
deviant group are strengthened. Among extremists, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) referred
to this stage as unfreezing (loss of commitment to conventional ideology) and refreezing
(replacement of conventional values with extremist ideology). In the final step, the group
members must be allowed to interact with each other, to build cohesiveness and a “sense of
mutual dependence” (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960, p. 142).
Simi and Futrell’s (2010) account of free space or movement space effectively describes
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) fourth step. Movement spaces are physical or virtual spaces, in
which members of a socially unaccepted group are allowed to meet, interact and build
cohesiveness (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). The
interactions with other extremists in isolated movement or free spaces provides extremists with
the support and freedom required to “nurture oppositional identities that challenge prevailing
social arrangements and cultural norms” (Simi & Futrell, 2010, p. 3).Thus, movement or free
spaces facilitate socialization in extremist ideology, reduce commitment to conventional society,
and increase bonds with other extremists in the group, thereby increasing the individual’s
commitment to extremism (see also: Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2011; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Thus, goal blockage caused by the structural conditions of strain (Agnew, 2005, 2010) is
a necessary but not a sufficient cause of crime and deviance: the opportunity to learn the
prerequisite skills and abilities to engage in non-conforming behavior must also be present
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), as well as the freedom to interact separate from conventional society
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to form a different belief system (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak,
2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). These skills and knowledge, as well as the new belief system, are
obtained via interactions with a deviant subculture or gang (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell &
Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). However, as noted by Aho (1990), not everyone who
experiences conditions of strain would have access to rightwing extremist groups. Thus, they
would lack the opportunity to learn the skills necessary to commit terrorism or crime. This may
explain the fact that so few people who experience strain became members of extremist groups.
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) differentiated between beliefs (descriptions, or how one should
describe a situation), values (evaluations, or how one should evaluate a situation) and norms
(prescriptions of how one should behave in a situation). The authors argued that when a person
became indoctrinated into a deviant sub-culture, their beliefs and values would increasingly
contradict societal descriptions (i.e., beliefs) and prescriptions (i.e., norms) and their
commitment to the sub-cultural norms would increase. Thus, a fully indoctrinated member of a
sub-culture would be more committed to the norms of that sub-culture and less committed /
constrained by the norms of conventional society. Consistent with Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960)
argument, it was possible that membership in an extremist group would interact with conditions
of strain to create the motivation, justifications and knowledge required to engage in criminal
and terrorist behaviors. It was also possible that alienated individuals who join a far-rightist
group would obtain beliefs and values which would allow them to internally rationalize the
replacement of societal norms with the norms of the extremist group. If the group norms replace
societal norms, any guilt from contravening the laws of conventional society would be
neutralized.
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This study hypothesizes that rather than posing competing explanations of extremism,
GST explains how a person becomes susceptible to joining an extremist movement, while DOT
provides a framework for analyzing behavior after someone joins the movement. The
radicalization literature provides some justification for this theoretical framework. Radicalization
is defined as “the process by which individuals become violent extremists... individuals who
support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social, or religious goals”
(NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization Solicitation, p 4). Based on GST (Agnew, 2005,
2010), DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), and movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi &
Futrell, 2010), this study theorizes that the process from personal grievance to commitment to an
extremist ideology requires that the individual: (1) have virtual, electronic or physical access to
similarly situated others, (2) have movement or free spaces to interact with each other; and (3)
learn to identify with others who have similar personal grievances. This relationship is depicted
in the diagram below.
The relevant literature on extremist group membership, indoctrination into extremist subcultures and the criminal behavior of far-rightists will be reviewed in the next chapter. Many of
the studies utilized qualitative research techniques such as in-depth interviews and observation of
events and are frequently ethnographic in nature, while other studies utilized quantitative
designs. The information obtained from the quantitative studies provided the justification for the
variables and research questions posed by this study, while the qualitative studies were used to
structure the research models and operationalize the study’s variables. As this study’s unit of
analysis was at the individual or micro level, the literature review focused on research conducted
at this level.
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Diagram 3: Theoretical Framework
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MOVEMENT / FREE
SPACES (far-rightist themed
family gatherings, parties,
congress, music, internet,
private communites)

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
3.1. Membership in Extremist Groups
3.1.1. Strain & Membership in Extremist Groups. Support was found linking GST to
membership in the domestic far-right. Smith (1994) examined people and groups designated by
the FBI’s counterterrorism program as terrorists in the 1980s. Smith (1994) subdivided his
sample into far-rightists, far-leftists and single-issue terrorists. Many far-rightists, but not farleftists, in Smith’s (1994) study experienced a lack of economic opportunities. Only 12% had a
college degree and 33% had a GED equivalent or lower education (Smith, 1994). Most also had
earnings below the poverty line or were unemployed (Smith, 1994). This study did not directly
examine the effects of strain, nor did it establish causation between strain and membership in
extremist groups. However, while causation was not empirically established, Smith (1994) found
an association between strain conditions and membership in far-rightist groups.
Smith’s (1994) findings were supported by subsequent research (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995;
Hamm, 1993; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). Hamm (1993), who interviewed 36 skinheads, found
that 20 interviewees had parents with low socioeconomic statuses (blue collar background or
unemployed). Most of the skinheads were unemployed (N=5) or held blue collar jobs (N=20)
and only 10 were enrolled in college. Thus, not only did the skinheads experience strain, most
were not in a position to reduce their strain in the foreseeable future. However, Hamm (1993) did
not examine whether different levels of strain were experienced by skinheads and the general
population.
In an ethnographic study, Ezekiel (1995) found that members of a neo-Nazi group in
Detroit tended to have been high school or college dropouts, and were unemployed,
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underemployed or casually employed. Also using an ethnographic design that spanned from the
mid-1980s to late 1990s, Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that strain conditions, such as fears
of downward mobility and status frustration, were major contributing factors to young men’s
decision to join a skinhead group.
In contrast, Aho (1990) did not find any evidence of education theory (i.e., people with
lower levels of education were more likely than those with higher levels of education to join an
extremist group) in explaining membership in Idaho Christian Patriot groups. According to Aho
(1990), members in those groups had education rates similar to other Idahoans and Americans.
However, Aho’s (1990) sample consisted of extremists who did not engage in violent crime,
while Smith (1994) examined extremists who committed acts of terrorism and Hamm (1993)
compared far-rightists who did not offend with those who committed hate crimes. The
differences between the sample designs could have accounted for the different findings. It was
possible that extremists who engaged in acts of terrorism were different from extremists who
engage in civil disobedience or non-violent crimes. Thus, one would expect different educational
and employment backgrounds from both groups, i.e., one would expect to observe evidence of
strain among DFRs who commit violent crimes (Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994), but not among
DFRs who commit financial crimes or did not offend (Aho, 1990).
Another explanation for the discrepancy between Aho (1990) and Ezekiel’s (1995)
findings are that neither study used a random sample design. This was because of the difficulty
in obtaining access to closed groups. Random sampling is one of the pre-requisites for
generalizability of research findings. Aho (1990) used snowball sampling for his study. He
argued that the resulting sample was representative of the population of Christian Patriots in
Idaho, but non-random samples are rarely representative of the population of interest.
21

Furthermore, Aho (1990) interviewed both leaders and followers in the movement. It is possible
that different variables motivate movement leaders and movement followers to join an extremist
movement (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995). For example, leaders of the neo-Nazi movement
interviewed by Ezekiel (1995) tended to have higher levels of education than the followers in the
movement. Smith (1990) also noted a marked difference in the education levels of far-rightist
leaders and members in the movement. For instance, Richard Butler, former leader of the Aryan
Nation, was an engineer, as was Wilhelm Ernst Schmitt, former leader of one of the Sheriff’s
Posse Comitatus chapters. Thus, differences in education rates could have been missed by
including both movement leaders and followers.
Rather than strained individuals seeking out extremist groups as a means of reducing
their strain or finding individuals with similar life experiences to interact with, it was possible
that extremist groups targeted strained individuals for recruitment (Blazak, 2001; McVeigh,
2004; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). McVeigh (2004) argued that far-right groups use the rhetoric of
whites’ loss of economic status to Jews and ethnic minorities as a recruitment technique.
Blazak’s (2001) research supported McVeigh’s (2004) argument. Blazak (2001) interviewed
recruiters in the skinhead movement. He found that groups deliberately targeted boys who
experienced conditions of strain and that these recruitment efforts were often successful (Blazak,
2001).
In another publication discussing the data from Blazak’s (2001) study, the authors
concluded, “the recruitment of skinheads employs a systematic process based on identification of
social strain” (Wooden & Blazak, 2001 p. 144). Interestingly, studies that examined rank and file
group membership patterns of DFRs who engaged in criminal behavior (Hamm, 1993; Smith,
1994) found a consistent link between the experience of strain and membership in far-right
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groups. However, this relationship was not found for DFRs who led law-abiding lives. Studies of
non-criminal DFRs by Dobratz & Shanks-Meile (1996) and Aho (1990) did not find an
association between strain conditions and membership in extremist groups. Since the current
study was limited to DFRs and collaborators who engaged in a homicide or financial scheme, it
was hypothesized that individuals who experience individual level stressors would have been
more likely to join a far-rightist group, as compared to those who did not experience individual
level stressors.
3.1.2. Friends / Family & Membership in Extremist Groups. Individual level
stressors could make a person susceptible to anger, blaming external forces for the strain
experienced, and subsequently recruitment by far-rightist groups Blazak, 2001; Hamm, 1993;
McVeigh, 2004). However, access to the far-right opportunity structure is crucial to actual
recruitment (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011).
Christian Patriots surveyed by Aho (1990) tended to have significant others (e.g., work
colleagues, friends, family, pastors) in the far-right movement. Furthermore, people surveyed by
Aho (1990) mentioned that family members (approx. 35% of interviewees) and friends (approx.
21% of interviewees) were major influences in their decision to join the movement. The social
movement literature also found evidence of a link between prior relationship with extremists,
such as friends or family in the movement, and an individual’s decision to join an extremist
group (Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002).
A strategy used by extremist groups is to focus their recruitment efforts on friends and
family of existing and trusted members (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011;
Wooden & Blazak, 2001) or to utilize existing extremist friends and family as a means of
obtaining access to potential recruitees (Blazak, 2001; Chermak, 2002). Wooden and Blazak
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(2001) found that relatives of known skinheads were likely to have been targeted for recruitment
by skinhead leaders. Leaders and recruiters in extremist movements were generally skilled at the
use of rhetoric. Furthermore, friends and family members of existing extremists were susceptible
to this rhetoric, especially if this rhetoric fit with their world view (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001;
Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; McVeigh, 2004). They were also found to be susceptible to this
rhetoric if they had close relationships with existing extremist group members (Aho, 1990;
Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko,
2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990).
A friend or family member in the group is not always a prerequisite for group
membership. A group of extremist friends may join an extremist group at the same time. Several
researchers have found that individuals joined extremist movements along with a group of
friends, a romantic partner (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko,
2008, 2011) or family members (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990). However, not all people
with extremist significant others join the movement. It is possible that people with a higher
degree of tolerance for extremist views could have been more predisposed to joining an extremist
group (Chermak, 2002). Aho (1990) referred to the person who realized the world conflicted
with his/her personal standards and became motivated to change the world as a “Seeker.”
Seekers are people who already hold anti-government beliefs, i.e., are already radicalized to
some extent, and searching for ways to regain a sense of power over their lives (Aho, 1990;
Chermak, 2002). For Aho (1990), having loved ones or family in the movement, i.e., access to an
extremist opportunity structure, was not a sufficient motivator for an individual to join an
extremist group. The individual must have first undergone the internal shift to become a seeker.
The seeker theme also appeared in Blee’s (2002) book. Blee (2002) described several white
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supremacists’ accounts of their decision to join the movement as “a personal quest for racial and
political truth” (p. 53).
In addition to the internal shift to becoming a seeker, another common finding in the
literature was a strong social bond between recruitees and the existing group member. Several
researchers found that recruitees tended to join an extremist group when they felt admiration and
wanted to emulate significant others who belonged to the movement (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002;
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) referred to this
phenomenon as the “power of love” and noted that love of fellow group members could also
prevent an individual from leaving an extremist group. Therefore, the second hypothesis was:
individuals with extremist family / friends would have been more likely to join a far-rightist
group, when compared to those without extremist family / friends. DFRs who have extremist
family and friends would also have more access to far-right extremist opportunity structures,
compared to those without extremist referent others. Extremist family and friends need not be
current group members, as individuals tend to join extremist groups along with their extremist
referent others (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011;
Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990).
According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), both strain and access to extremist opportunity
structures are required for membership in subcultural gangs. Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993)
both found evidence of strain and extremist referent others among the far-rightists interviewed in
their studies. Other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) found evidence that
having extremist referent others was associated with membership in extremist groups. However,
these studies did not find evidence of higher levels of strain among group members, in
comparison to the general U.S. population (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Since
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the latter studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group
members and the current study examined criminal DFRs, a tentative corollary of hypothesis two
was: there was an interaction effect between the experience of strain and having extremist
referent others on the likelihood of membership in extremist groups.
3.1.3. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Membership in Extremist
Groups. Prior negative interactions with government officials, such as the police, court officials
or IRS officials (e.g., being audited by the IRS, denial of tax refund claim, lien placed on
property by IRS) could increase the likelihood that one could become a member of a far-rightist
group, especially if the behavior of the official is perceived as unwarranted (Aho; 1990;
Chermak, 2002). As mentioned previously, one of the defining features of the far-right is their
suspicion and rejection of the legitimacy of state and federal government (Aho, 1990; Blee,
2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, Chermak & Simone, 2009b;
Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010). Such a belief system could influence how
far-rightists (or seekers) interpret interactions with government officials, which could contribute
to the individual’s decision to join a far-rightist group.
Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that hard core racist skinheads were more likely than
nonracist skinheads (i.e., members of youth gangs not affiliated with the far-right) to have “been
in trouble with the police” (p. 139). This indicated that negative interactions with law
enforcement officials could have contributed to an individual’s decision to join a far-right group.
However, it was possible that the relationship between interactions with law enforcement
and membership in a far-right extremist group is more complex and thus more difficult to
measure. Several researchers have highlighted the radicalization effects of the standoffs at Ruby
Ridge and Waco in the early 1990s on DFRs and Seekers (Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996;
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Kaplan, 1997; Vertigans, 2007). Chermak (2002) described these incidents as “last straw”
events, which provided the impetus required for borderline DFRs to join the movement. Less
sensational interactions with law enforcement could have also convinced other far-rightists to
join the movement or create a more radical group. Thus, stories about other individuals with
whom the person identified could have encouraged him/her to join the movement. Further, there
was evidence to suggest that DFRs were aware of the radicalization effects of negative
interactions with government officials. Militia members interviewed by Chermak (2002) utilized
negative interactions with government officials in their recruitment rhetoric.
The route from interactions with law enforcement to membership in extremist groups
may also be indirect. Blazak (2009) estimated that about 220,000 prisoners are involved in racist
white prison gangs (e.g., Public Enemy Number 1, Nazi low Riders, Aryan Brotherhood, et
cetera) for protection and the support network they provide. Some members of racist prison
gangs eventually transition to membership in a racist group or return to the movement after
prison (“Dangerous Convictions,” 2002; Blazak, 2009). Blazak (2009) suggested that perhaps
prison gangs provide access to the movement opportunity structure, which Cloward and Ohlin
(1960) and Aho (1990) argued is required for recruitment into sub-cultural groups. This suggests
that the ideological motivation of the initial offense could be less important than the presence of
an extremist opportunity structure at the prison in which the individual is incarcerated.
Therefore, hypothesis three was that negative interactions with government officials,3 such as
civil action by the government, arrests and convictions, increase the likelihood that an individual

The literature suggests that police stops (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; “Deadly Domains,” 2003) and IRS audits
(Aho, 1990) could have also contributed to an individual’s decision to join a far-rightist group. However, this
information could have not have been reliably and systematically obtained from open source documents. Instead,
this study used civil action by government, specifically liens and injunctions, prior arrests and prior convictions as a
proxy measure of negative interactions with government officials.
3
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would become a member of a far-rightist group. One would expect DFRs without such prior
negative interactions with government officials to be lone wolves. Chermak, et al. (2010, p.1022)
defined a “lone wolf” as someone not affiliated with an extremist group, although s/he could
have visited on-line extremist websites and blogs.
Aho (1990) found that some members of Christian Patriot groups in Idaho joined because
of what they termed “unprovoked persecution” (p. 188) by local officials and tax officials, such
as tax audits and foreclosures. Aho (1990) noted that these experiences of persecution were then
described to friends or relatives in the far-right movement, who then invited the individual to a
movement activity or event. Some of these individuals in Aho’s (1990) study eventually joined
the movement, provided there was a strong relationship between the recruiter and recruitee. In
contrast, Aho (1990) noted that only 3% of interviewees attributed their membership in the
movement to legal persecution. Aho’s (1990) findings suggested that the combined effect of
having extremist friends / family and negative interactions with government officials could have
a greater impact on an individual’s decision to join an extremist group, than would negative
interactions with law enforcement in the absence of extremist friends / family members.
Therefore, based on Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) work and Aho’s (1990) findings on the
importance of access to the movement, a corollary of hypothesis three was: there was an
interaction effect between negative interactions with government officials and friends/relatives in
the movement on an individual’s decision to join an extremist group.

3.2. Commitment to Rightwing Extremist Ideology
3.2.1. Strain & Commitment to Extremist Rightwing Ideology. McCauley and
Moskalenko (2011) argued that both personal and group grievance could move a normal person
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without psychological issues towards political violence, i.e., could radicalize an individual.
Similar to strain, personal grievance is defined as when someone wrongs/harms the individual or
a loved one, resulting in anger and frustration and, in rare cases, political violence (McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2011). Basing their analysis on on the infrequency of lone wolf terrorists,
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievance by itself is unlikely to result in
radicalization or political violence. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), anger is a
fleeting emotion, while radicalization requires a more permanent shift in beliefs. However, if the
individual interprets the grievance as committed by a particular group (e.g., Jews or the ZOG)
against another group (e.g., the Aryan race) with which the individual positively identifies,
personal grievance could blend with group grievance to create a more abiding emotion than
anger: group identification. Group identification occurs when an individual who has a positive
identification with a group, begins to care about the group, feels joy when group members are
doing well and sadness when group members are persecuted (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).
It is not required that the individual be a member of a far-rightist group, but that s/he identify
positively with other far-rightists, (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). In other words, high levels
of commitment to extremism would be sufficient to ensure group identification, even in the
absence of membership in a formal extremist group.
Positive identification could be coupled with negative identification, i.e., when one feels
good when another person or group suffers. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that the
combination of these two phenomena, positive and negative group identification, could
radicalize an individual who experiences personal grievance, and in some cases, move the
individual to political violence. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2011) argument on how personal
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and political grievance could motivate an individual to engage in political violence is discussed
in the upcoming section on criminal behavior.
Hamm (1993) found evidence of feelings of personal grievance, i.e., strain and
marginalization, transitioning into political grievance, and thereafter increased commitment to
extremist ideology among racist skinheads. Based on the above discussion, hypothesis four was
that people who experience individual level stressors would have higher levels of commitment to
extremist ideology when compared to people who did not experience individual level stressors.
3.2.2. Friends/Family in Movement & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist
Ideology. Several ethnographic accounts (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell,
2010) paint a vivid picture of parents that socially isolate and immerse children in racist subcultures. According to Simi and Futrell (2010) primary socialization into the white power
movement occurs at the family level in free spaces. Socialization into the KKK and neo-Nazi
movement involves deliberate choices and behavior by parents: parents give children Aryan
names and movement-related clothing; they organize family activities and engage in rituals to
transmit the “ideals and practices of militant Aryan nationalism” (Simi & Futrell, 2004, p. 26).
Parents also utilize homeschooling to socialize children about far-rightist ideals in a setting that
is unchallenged by mainstream society, which further entrenches children into the movement’s
ideology (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Vertigans, 2007). Therefore,
not only are these children surrounded by racist imagery (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi
& Futrell, 2010), hate cartoons and comic books (Blee, 2002) and modified school books (Simi
& Futrell, 2010), they are not allowed access to contradictory worldviews. In other words, DFRs’
children are inundated with movement imagery and ideology by significant others. Therefore,
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they obtain definitions favorable to extremist ideology in excess of conventional beliefs, which
are then reinforced by their parents (Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Support for the Blee (2002) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) work was found by Wooden
and Blazak (2001), who interviewed both racist and nonracist skinheads. The authors found that
racist skinheads were more likely than nonracist skinheads to have family members who were
racist. This suggests that racist skinheads are socialized towards racist beliefs. However, Wooden
and Blazak (2001, p. 137) cautioned that their “findings should be viewed with some
reservations” since the results were based on a questionnaire administered to a sample of 32
respondents.
Similar to effects of extremist family members, having extremist friends may also
increase solidarity and commitment to the cause (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007). Friends share experiences and viewpoints, which
could gradually radicalize an individual if a close social bond, such as comradely or romantic
love, is present (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans,
2007). Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with significant others who were farrightists would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to those
without extremist friends or family members.
3.2.3. Membership in Extremist Groups & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist
Ideology. Similar to interactions with extremist friends and family, membership in an extremist
group could be a strong socialization tool. As noted previously, Cloward and Ohlin (1960)
theorized that boys who experienced strain or did not achieve their anticipated degree of success
may join a subcultural group if (1) they attributed the cause of their lack of success to an external
source and (2) had access to the group. However, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) noted that to
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become fully committed or indoctrinated into a subcultural group, the individual must: (1) lose
his/her commitment to conventional society, or become alienated; (2) the group must provide the
individual with techniques to deal with their guilt and fear (e.g., an alternate system of norms,
values and beliefs); and (3) s/he must have the freedom to interact with the group to design
collective solutions to his/her problems. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) defined norms as
prescriptions of how one should behave in a certain situation, beliefs as how one should describe
a situation and values as evaluations of a situation. Taken together, one’s norms, beliefs and
values could provide an indication of one’s commitment to society or a group.
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) used the term unfreezing to describe the process
whereby individuals lose their commitment to conventional norms, beliefs and values; and
refreezing to describe their replacement with new norms, beliefs and values. According to
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), unfreezing could free an individual to create various new
identities: development of an extremist identity and bonding with other extremist is one of the
possible options. Unfreezing could be caused by fear and pain (i.e., strain), or by a lack of ties to
conventional members of society (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011) and could free the individual
to form bonds with members of the extremist group.4 The unfreezing and refreezing process
could be exacerbated by the degree of isolation experienced by members of extremist groups.
According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), “isolated groups – terrorists groups, youth
gangs, religious cults, soldiers in combat – have unchecked power to determine value and

4

McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) identified 12 pathways to radicalization. In their analysis of case studies of
extremists, they found that individual level factors, group dynamic and nation/macro level factors could influence an
individual’s level or radicalization of commitment to an extremist cause. They argue that these factors often work
together, as rarely were individuals radicalized by only one factor. While many of these pathways involved
socialization into an extremist group, i.e., unfreezing and refreezing, the authors also recognized the importance of
early socialization to an individual’s subsequent propensity towards extremist beliefs.
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meaning…the unchecked value-setting power of an isolated group is a multiplier…in whatever
direction the group is likeminded” (pp. 138-139). Thus, isolation from conventional society and
solely interacting with the extremist group may result in powerful bonds with fellow extremist
group members. Such bonds build both group cohesion and group consensus, i.e., socialize
individuals into the norms, values and beliefs of the extremist group (Aho, 1960; Ezekiel, 1995;
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). According to Cloward and Ohlin
(1960), the more a new member internalizes the values and beliefs of the group, the greater
would be his/her commitment to the norms of the group.
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) theory referred to subcultural gangs. However, Aho (1990)
and McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008, 2011) research indicated that this socialization and
indoctrination process is also applicable to extremists. Aho (1990) found that new members first
emulate their significant others from the Christian Patriot movement, experience an increase in
self-esteem from emulating those significant others and eventually internalize their significant
other’s expressions, values and beliefs. In other words, indoctrination occurred after the
individual imitated the behavior of loved ones in movement and this behavior was reinforced by
others. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008, 2011) also noted that commitment by members of
extremist groups is positively influenced by comradely and romantic love, as individuals tend to
internalize the loved one’s radical beliefs. Love and identification with group members could
also increase an individual’s commitment to the group if they all face a common threat / enemy
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). Loss of fellow members caused by retaliatory action by
law enforcement may also increase commitment to extremism, especially if the group is isolated
from conventional society (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
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Interactions with other extremists could increase commitment to extremist ideology in
other ways: interactions with extremist group members could alter individuals’ perceptions of
situations or experiences, e.g., (re)attribute loss of job or earnings to a Jewish conspiracy or
affirmative action. Such current or retroactive interpretations could also increase group cohesion
and a sense of shared identity. It was therefore hypothesized that members of extremist groups
would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to non-members.
3.2.4. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Commitment to Extremist
Rightwing Ideology. As noted in the earlier discussion of the far-right, intense anti-government
beliefs and beliefs in conspiracy theories are defining features of the far right (Aho, 1990;
Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Gruenewald, 2011; Pitcavage, 2001). Such intense negative beliefs
could influence how individuals interpret interactions with government officials (Freilich &
Chermak, 2009). Sovereign Citizens’ belief in common law, their tendency to misinterpret the
law and to read obscure pseudo-legal writings by other far rightists could encourage them to be
confrontational in dealings with law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Shemtob, 2009b) and
government officials, such as the IRS (Aho, 1990; Potok, 2012). Confrontational attitudes could
lead to negative consequences, such as an arrest or citation (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Potok,
2012). This could be perceived as confirmation that the government is corrupt or no longer
working in the interest of the American people and thereby increasing far-rightists’ commitment
to extremism (Sprinzak, 1995). Sprinzak (1995) termed this a ‘conflict of legitimacy,’ one of the
stages in the delegitimization process, which he argued groups must have experienced before
they engaged in acts of terrorism. Sprinzak’s (1995) theory is discussed in more detail in the
section titled “Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Criminal Behavior.”
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Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that an individual’s interactions with law enforcement
could increase feelings of alienation and commitment to a delinquent subculture (see
“Theoretical Framework” above for detailed discussion). Therefore, it is possible that negative
interactions with law enforcement, e.g., prior arrests or convictions, could further entrench an
individual in the extremist group of which s/he was a member. Freilich and Chermak (2009) used
a case study approach to illustrate how a routine police stop to issue a speeding ticket escalated
into a chase and shootout at the DFR’s residence, which exacerbated the individual’s antigovernment beliefs. Freilich and Chermak (2009) argued that DFRs’ anti-government ideology
and paranoia about government infringement of personal liberties could interact with police
behavior (e.g., surrounding a far rightist’s home with weapons drawn) and act as confirmation of
their extremist beliefs, essentially radicalizing DFRs.
Similarly, Kaplan (1995b) found that interactions with law enforcement increased
individuals’ commitment to extremism. Kaplan (1995b) noted that the use of force and physical
violence against rescuers (e.g., persons who belong to the anti-abortion movement) increased
their commitment to the cause. Kaplan (1995b) theorized that police violence could have been a
product of jail overcrowding, police cynicism from having dealt with violent criminals, and the
rescuers’ refusal to cooperate e.g., to give their names, refusal to leave the station without other
members, or pay fines. Thus, it was not the actions of the police per se that increased rescuers
commitment to the norms and values of the rescue movement, but an interaction between
rescuers’ behavior, the situation and the police reactions to both (Freilich & Chermak, 2009;
Kaplan, 1995b). In other words, extremist beliefs impact on a person’s perception and increase
the likelihood that they would act in a confrontational manner with government officials. Such
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confrontational behaviors could increase the likelihood of an arrest or conviction and act as a
confirmation of extremist beliefs (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Kaplan, 1995b).
It is also possible that a non-extremist could become radicalized by interactions with law
enforcement (Chermak, 2002) and government officials (Aho, 1990). Civil action by the
government against an individual could increase the individual’s commitment to rightwing
extremist ideology. Aho (1990) noted that several members of the Idahoan Christian Patriots
cited negative interactions with the IRS – such having funds withdrawn from personal or
business accounts to cover their outstanding taxes – as confirmation of a government that was no
longer concerned with the interests of true patriots/Americans. Aho (1990) argued that policies
or actions by government officials to enforce obedience to laws (e.g., personal property
auctioned to cover tax liability) that borderline far-rightists consider invalid or unfair (e.g., the
federal taxation system) could radicalize the individual. The radicalization effect of government
actions that are perceived as unjust could also be applicable to people who are merely suspicious
of the government (Aho, 1990). Therefore, based on this escalation effect, it was hypothesized
that individuals who experience negative interactions with government officials would have
higher levels of commitment to rightwing extremist ideology, compared to those without such
negative interactions. This study defined prior negative interactions by government officials as
civil actions by the government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions from the date
of the offense included in the study.
Kaplan (1995b) also used excerpts of interviews describing police officers’ sexual and
physical abuse of arrested female rescue members to argue that such actions are important to the
formation of rescuers’ apocalyptic worldview. Such physical and sexual abuse of female
rescuers, as well as the use of police brutality to control arrested rescuers, increased their
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commitment to their cause (Kaplan, 1995b). Thus, it is possible that there is an interaction effect
between having extremist friends / family and prior negative contact with law enforcement on
commitment to extremism. Thus, a corollary of the above hypothesis was that there was an
interaction effect between having extremist others and negative interactions with law
enforcement on an individual’s level of commitment to extremism.

3.3. Criminal behavior
3.3.1. Levels of Commitment to Rightwing Extremism & Criminal Behavior. Many
individuals with extreme beliefs are law-abiding citizens, as possession of extremist beliefs does
not necessarily lead to criminal behavior (Freilich, et al., 2009a; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007).
However, it was possible for someone with extremist beliefs to engage in criminal acts as: (1) an
expression of those beliefs; (2) a way to finance activities to inspire social / political change; or
(3) an attempt to inspire social and/or political change (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010;
Smith, 1994). A person’s extremist beliefs could influence his/her commitment to the extremist
cause and subsequent behavior, but not all people with extremist beliefs are motivated to act on
those beliefs (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) sub-divided
radicals into activists and terrorists. They describe “activists” as people who engaged in political
activities to inspire social and/or political change and “terrorists” as radicals willing to use
terrorism as a tactic to achieve social and/or political change (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011).
They noted that while some activists move towards violence because of friendship, romantic or
group loyalty or government persecution of self or loved ones, other activists do not transition to
illegal activities (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011).
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Although some academics claim that extremists tend to specialize in extremist offending
(e.g., Gottfredson & Hirshi, 1990), research suggests that extremists engage in a variety of
criminal behavior (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b; Chermak, et al., 2010; Gruenewald, et al.,
2009; Smith, 1994; Smith, et al., 2002). DFRs engage in routine crimes, preparatory crimes or
acts of terrorism (Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994). Routine crimes are non-ideological in
nature, e.g., bank robbery for profit. Crimes committed for the purpose of funding or acquiring
materials for future terrorist attacks are referred to as “preparatory crimes” (Belli, 2011;
Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994) and can be conceptualized as a hybrid of ideological and
non-ideological motives, while the preparatory crime itself is motivated by profit, the ultimate
aim is to use the materials/funds to obtain some ideological end. Acts of terrorism are usually
conceptualized as violent crimes committed to attain some ideological purpose, i.e., a social,
political or religious change, e.g., bombing the IRS to protest federal taxes. However,
preparatory crimes and acts of terrorism can both be classified as ideological crimes.
Smith (1994) noted that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1982 to 1989
were quite diverse and included both financial and violent crimes, e.g., racketeering, possession
of weapons, racketeering-influenced and corrupt organization (i.e., RICO conspiracy), stolen
property, robbery and burglary, treason, mail fraud and homicide. A more recent study by Smith,
et al. (2002), which utilized data from the American Terrorism Study, confirmed these findings.
Smith, et al. (2002) found that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1980 to 1998
followed a similar pattern to Smith’s (1994) study. Although prosecutors have discretion to
select which charges to file against suspects, charges must be supported by evidence. Thus, the
range of federal charges against DFRs indicated that extremists who offend commit a variety of
violent and financial crimes.
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3.3.1.a. Scheme/incident ideology. Far-rightists commit crimes for non-ideological as
well as ideological reasons (Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Chermak, et al., 2010;
Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald, et al., 2009). According to Gruenewald (2011), homicides
committed by DFRs can be acts of terrorism (i.e., committed to inspire social, political or
religious change), hate crimes (i.e., motivated by the victim’s race, religion, ethnicity, or
nationality) or routine in nature. Both terrorist incidents and hate crimes are ideologically
motivated (Hamm, 1993, 2004), while routine homicides are non-ideologically motivated. Using
data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) for the years 1990 to 2006, Gruenewald
(2011) found that about a quarter of homicides committed by far-rightists were motivated by
profit and some were motivated by a combination of profit and ideology. In other words, farrightists’ violent offending behavior are motivated by a variety of reasons (Gruenewald, 2011).
Far-rightists also commit financial crimes for a variety of reasons. According to Smith
(1994), far-rightists engaged in petty theft and robbery for the purpose of funding their terrorist
activities and operations. Far-rightists also engaged in financial crimes purely for profit or purely
for ideological purposes. Using data from the ECDB for the year 2004, Belli (2011) found that
tax evasion was the most prevalent financial crime committed by far-rightists in 2004.
Furthermore, 77% of the sampled far-rightists were motivated by extremist ideology and 23%
were motivated by a combination of profit and extremist ideology. Thus, an individual farrightist may commit a financial crime for multiple reasons. There is also a risk that ideologically
motivated financial crimes could escalate into violent crimes e.g., a standoff with law
enforcement (Belli & Freilich, 2009; Freilich, et al., 2009).
3.3.1.b. Suspect ideology. Several authors have noted that DFRs who call themselves
Patriots consider many amendments to the Constitution and laws enacted by the federal
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government to be been unconstitutional, such as the Internal Revenue Code (Aho, 1990; Belli &
Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007). This latter belief could foster legal fundamentalism (i.e., plain
text interpretation of law), the tendency to create/rely on common law courts, acts of civil
disobedience and criminal behavior (Aho, 1990). Highly committed far-rightists engage in
crimes such as tax evasion, filing fraudulent tax returns and filing fraudulent liens as an
expression of their anti-government beliefs (Aho, 1990; Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009;
Vertigans, 2007) or because they believe federal tax laws are invalid/unconstitutional (Aho,
1990). Belli (2011) suggested that financial crimes could be the “ultimate form of [non-violent]
anti-government protest” (p.107), in which case one would expect that more committed farrightists would be more likely to engage in ideologically motivated financial crimes and would
do so more frequently when compared to less committed far-rightists. Based on the above
discussion, it was hypothesized that people with strong extremist beliefs are more likely to
commit an ideological crime, i.e., a crime that would further their extremist goals. Such behavior
includes crimes committed for a purely ideological purpose, as well as preparatory crimes
committed to acquire funds and/or materials to commit an ideological crime(s). A corollary of
this hypothesis was that people with lower levels of extremist belief are more likely to engage in
routine crimes (i.e., a homicide or financial scheme that was not intended to further any
ideological goal).
3.3.2. Strain & Criminal Behavior. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011),
personal grievance is one of the mechanisms by which an individual could be persuaded to
engage in political violence. Personal grievance extends the concept of strain to any kind of
discomfort, in addition to goal blockage. Similar to Agnew’s (2005, 2010) assertion that the
experience of strain causes emotional reactions of anger and frustration, McCauley and
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Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievances may trigger feelings of anger, which could
led to aggression. According McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), for political violence to occur,
the personal grievance (e.g., being audited by an IRS agent) must become political.5 In other
words, the anger must be focused against a group that is perceived as the perpetrators of injustice
(e.g., the federal government), rather than the individual who initially triggered the personal
grievance (e.g., the IRS agent).
According to Agnew (2001, 2005, 2010), people who do not have legal avenues to reduce
the anger caused by strain and hold definitions favorable to deviant behavior in excess of those
favorable to conforming behavior may turn to crime and/or terrorism to reduce their feelings of
anger and frustration. Hamm (1993) found that skinheads who engaged in violence against nonwhites, whom he termed ‘terrorists,’ were more likely to have parents who had low socioeconomic status, as compared to non-terrorist skinheads, which supported Agnew’s (2005)
theory. DFRs labeled by the FBI as terrorists and prosecuted in the 1980s for terrorism and other
crimes experienced greater degrees of economic strain in terms of lower education and
occupational success when compared to left-wing and single-issue terrorists (Smith, 1994).
However, several researchers and academics have argued that the far-rightist movement draws
membership from various socio-economic status (SES) classes (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2006; Schlatter, 2006; Vertigans, 2007). When these findings were juxtaposed, they
suggest that while the far-rightist movement cuts across class boundaries, the members who had
experienced conditions of strain were more likely to engage in crime and terrorism, as compared
to members with a higher SES. A possible explanation for this is that strained members of the

5

McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that political grievance could have become personal i.e. one could have
become radicalized by observing persecution of a group one identifies with, rather than personally experiencing
persecution, but this was outside the scope of this study.
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far-right could have fewer legal avenues for coping and/or a lower potential cost associated with
criminal offending, e.g., loss of status or occupation (Agnew, 2005). Based on the above
discussion, it was hypothesized that DFRs who experienced strain were more likely to commit an
ideologically motivated crime when compared to DFRs that have not experienced individual
level stressors.
3.3.3. Extremist Friends/Family & Criminal Behavior. Extremist friends and family
can contribute to a fellow extremist’s criminal behavior in several ways. As mentioned by
Cloward and Ohlin (1960), most people accept conventional norms and values as legitimate, and
an internal change in norms and values is necessary before their conscience allows them to
contravene conventional norms, e.g., norms against using extreme violence for a purpose other
than self-defense. This internal change can be accomplished via socialization by friends and
family (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that
individuals acquire both the skills and the internal justifications necessary to deviate through
interactions with their peers. This is the third step in the indoctrination process, according to
Cloward and Ohlin (1960). For a more detailed explanation on the indoctrination process, see the
Theoretical Framework section.
Although Cloward and Ohlin (1960) referred to socialization by a subcultural group into
deviance and crime, their analysis is applicable to less formal friendship groups. Therefore, it is
possible that an individual can be socialized through interactions with extremist friends and/or
family into believing that acts of crime and terrorism are morally permissible (Futrell & Simi,
2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). In other words, an individual can
be radicalized as a result of interactions with extremist friends. Such a shift in norms and values
can motivate an individual to commit a crime or act of terrorism. According to McCauley and
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Moskalenko (2011), such a process occurs when personal grievance (i.e., one’s own experiences
of loss, suffering or strain) merges with group grievance (i.e., similar experiences by friends or
referent others).
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that individuals who are not themselves
radicalized can commit acts of terrorism or crimes as a result of their devotion or love for
extremist friends and significant others. The authors cited accounts of extremists who recognized
the illogic or hopelessness of continuing in the movement but continued to participate in criminal
and non-criminal movement activities. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that
extremists’ criminal behaviors are motivated by their feelings for loved ones who are
incarcerated or killed as a result of their extremist activities. Thus, the intermediate step of
radicalization is not necessary; love or devotion to extremist friends and significant others could
also influence an individual to offend (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).
In addition to motives of love or devotion, non-extremists also offend with extremist cooffenders because of a desire for profit or financial gain. Belli (2011) reported that about 32% of
people involved in ideological or a combination of ideological and profit motivated financial
schemes in 2004 were motivated by profit / greed, and were non-extremists. In addition,
Gruenewald (2011) found that 56% of homicides committed by far-rightists from 1990 to 2006
involved multiple perpetrators (compared to 16% of typical homicide incidents that occurred in
the same time period). Many of the homicide incidents that involved at least one far-rightist were
motivated by profit (40%) or were not directly related to the extremist movement (20%). While
care must be taken to not conflate the ideological motivation for a crime with the ideological
motivation of the suspect, Gruenewald’s (2011) and Belli’s (2011) findings suggest that formal
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or informal group dynamics, as well as personal considerations such as greed, could motivate a
non-extremist to offend with extremist colleagues.
As mentioned previously, individuals tend to join extremist groups with friends and
subsequently became indoctrinated into the extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin,
1960; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). This finding suggests that
at least one member of the social group is initially more extreme and/or convinces the others to
join. It is also likely that these individuals continue to interact with and be influenced by their
more extreme friends in the movement. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that devotion
to friends influences devotion to the extremist group, which would in turn strengthen love and
friendship bonds with friends, especially if the group faces threats from external forces.
Therefore, based on the above discussion, it was hypothesized that people with extremist family
or friends are more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crimwhen compared to people
that did not have extremist family members or friends.
3.3.4. Group Membership & Criminal Behavior. Neutralization of guilt associated
with criminal and terrorist behaviors could also be accomplished via socialization by a group
(Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and
Ohlin (1960) argued that people who attributed their lack of success to an external force would
experience alienation. However, such feelings of alienation may decline if those people receive
collective support from like-minded individuals, i.e., a gang or sub-cultural group (Cloward &
Ohlin, 1960). As feelings of alienation increase, the alienated individuals would become more
dependent on the reassurance and validation provided by fellow group members and increasingly
committed to the norms, values and beliefs of the subcultural group (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).
According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), commitment to the group’s norms could both fluctuate
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and co-exist with belief in the legitimacy and moral validity of conventional norms until an
individual is fully indoctrinated into the group. When this indoctrination process is complete, the
individual would no longer be bound by the norms and values of conventional society.
Furthermore, if the group’s norms, values and beliefs justify criminal behavior, then the
individual’s guilt from contravening the laws of society would be neutralized (Cloward & Ohlin,
1960). Therefore, the individual would be free to engage in criminal or terrorist behaviors.
As a result of this troublesome ‘guilt’ issue, lone wolves, far-rightists who belonged to
informal groups and far-rightists who belonged to formal extremist groups would engage in
different types of offending behavior. Extremists who belong to formal groups would receive
both the socialization and the isolation from conventional society (i.e., free space) necessary to
create and nurture oppositional identities and to build group cohesion (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960;
Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Thus, it is possible that far-rightists who belong to
extremist groups are less likely to experience guilt from committing an act that conventional
society labels as terrorist (i.e., considered beyond the pale). Aho (1990) noted that in a specific
chapter of the Golden Mean Society, a Christian Patriot group in Idaho, almost all members
committed tax crimes, such as filing frivolous tax returns or failing to file federal tax returns.
Admittedly, tax crimes were not quite beyond the pale. However, the prevalence of tax crimes
committed by the Golden Mean Society suggests that the group socializes its members to engage
in tax crimes, recruits people who are predisposed to committing tax crimes, or a combination of
the guilt reducing effects of group socialization and predisposition exists.
Research on violent crimes committed by DFRs also supports Simi and Futrell’s (2010)
ideas on the utilization of free/movement space by extremist groups to build oppositional
identities and minimize guilt associated with contravening society’s norms. Hamm (1993), in his
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study of 36 skinheads, found that only seven had not been involved in a violent incident in the
last two years, and the remaining 29 skinheads had committed about 120 acts of violence within
the past two years. However, Hamm’s (1993) research did not establish whether the degree of
violence demonstrated by skinheads was different from that of ordinary criminals. Using ECDB
data from 1990 to 2008, Gruenewald and Pridemore (2012) found that ideologically motivated
homicides by far-rightists were more likely to involve multiple perpetrators and to have been
more brutal and use intimate weapons (e.g., fists, boots, knives) when compared to ordinary
homicides committed by non-extremists in that same period. Although no mention was made of
membership in extremist groups, these differences between ideologically motivated homicides
committed by far-rightists and routine homicides suggest the presence of (formal or informal)
group dynamics.
Hamm (1993) and Gruenewald and Pridemore’s (2012) research supports Blee’s (2002)
argument that the “core of the white supremacist culture is violence” (p. 174). When this culture
of violence is combined with the degree of social isolation experienced by DFRs (Blee, 2002;
Kaplan, 1995a; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010), the likely result is the breakdown of
conventional values and norms, i.e., reduced internal barriers to engage in acts of violence.
In contrast, lone wolves do not experience the socialization into an oppositional identity
and the subsequent guilt neutralizing effect described by Simi and Futrell (2010). Thus, they may
be more likely to engage in non-violent extremist behavior or non-terroristic violent behavior,
both of which are considered less morally repugnant than terrorism (i.e., ideologically motivated
violent crimes). It is also possible that the issue is not a matter of guilt, but of resources: it is
easier for groups to obtain the resources necessary to engage in acts of terrorism, while lone
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wolves and extremists who are not members of formal far-rightist groups may be forced to
confine their ideological protests to less costly endeavors (Chermak et al., 2010).
Several authors (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b) have suggested that lone wolves,
far-rightists who belonged to informal groups and far-rightists who are members of an
established extremist group have different patterns of offending behavior. These include
spontaneous and planned attacks carried out by a single extremist. Chermak, et al. (2009b)
argued that far-rightists who belong to established extremist groups are more likely to engage in
acts of terrorism, while lone wolves or far-rightists that belong to informal groups are more
likely to engage in non-terrorist crimes or financial crimes.
Several studies lend support for Chermak and colleagues’ (2009b) thesis. Gruenewald
(2011) examined far-rightists who committed a homicide classified as violent and non-terrorist
and found that most perpetrators did not belonged to a formal extremist group. In fact, slightly
less than 40% of homicides committed by far-rightists were committed by people who belonged
to an extremist group (Gruenewald, 2011). However, most of the far-rightists who were not
members of an extremist group acted with other offenders, i.e., as part of an informal group. In
contrast, all the perpetrators of acts of terrorism studied in Smith (1994) and Smith, et al. (2002)
were affiliated with formal extremist groups. The absence of lone wolf attacks in these studies
was probably due to definitional issues, since the FBI definition of terrorism was used, which
excludes lone wolf attacks (See Chermak, et al., 2009b).
Additional support for Chermak and colleagues’ (2009b) argument was provided by Belli
(2011), who found that most far-rightists (57.9%) who engaged in financial crimes such as tax
avoidance, money laundering and pyramid schemes did not self-identify with any specific farrightist group. In addition to committing financial crimes, which do not require group resources,
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lone wolves also engage in acts of terrorism. Spaaij (2010) used the RAND-MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base to support his argument that acts of lone wolf terrorism in the US increased in
the last three decades. Spaaij (2010) hypothesized that this increase was due to the popularity of
Tommasi6 and Louis Beam’s7 ideas of “leaderless resistance” among the domestic far-right.
According to Spaaij (2010), almost 42% of all the acts of terrorism that occurred in the US from
1968 to May 2007 were committed by lone wolves. Thus, despite the fact that lone wolf attacks
are increasing, most acts of domestic terrorism in the US were committed by people affiliated
with an extremist group and with access to financial and other support by the group.
One must note, however, that Spaaij’s (2010) data included attacks committed by the farleft and radical Islamic adherents, who are fundamentally different from DFRs. Rather than the
guilt reducing effects of group socialization or diffusion of responsibility from acting as part of a
group, Spaaij (2010) found that there was a greater degree of mental illness8 among the lone
wolves, as compared to terrorists who belonged to an extremist group (far-right, far-left or
radical Islamic). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) also argued that there tends to be a greater
prevalence of psychopathology among lone wolves, as compared to terrorists who belong to an
extremist group. This was supported by a subsequent study by Gruenewald, Chermak and
Freilich (2013a). Using ECDb data, Gruenewald, et al. (2013a) found a higher incidence of
reported mental illness among FR lone wolves (40% of lone wolves sampled), compared to other
DFRs (8% of other DFR sampled). Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2013b) also found
6

Tommasi was the cofounder of the National Socialist Liberation Front, an American have far rightist group, which
ended with his death. Tommasi believed anyone could have been a government or watch group informant, and as
such, revolutionary action would have to come from the sole individual, acting on his own (Kaplan, 1997).
7
Louis Beam published an essay titled “Leaderless Resistance,” (Kaplan, 1997; Spaaij, 2010). Kaplan (1997) also
argued that William Pierce’s Hunter, Richard Kelly Hoskins’ Vigilantes of Christendom and David Lane’s Wotan
was Coming also contributed to the idea of leaderless resistance and lone wolf terrorism among the DFRs.
8
Due to the use of open source information, this study was unable to measure mental illness with any degree of
reliability. Therefore, this variable was omitted from the analysis.
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significantly higher levels of mental illness among FR loners (people who offend alone and did
not have any ties to formal or informal extremist groups) compared to members of formal and
informal extremist groups who offend with others or offend alone.
While lone wolves tend to be motivated by a combination of psychopathology caused by
personal grievance and political grievance (Freilich & Chermak, 2012; McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2011; Spaaij, 2010), DFRs who belonged to extremist groups tend to be motivated
by a combination of ideology and greed (Belli, 2011; Gruenewald, 2011; Smith, 1994).
Gruenewald’s (2011) study of homicides committed by DFRs found that 42% were ideologically
motivated, while 24% were motivated by a desire for profit. Likewise, Belli (2011) found that
23% of DFRs who committed a financial scheme in 2004 were motivated by a combination of
profit and ideology and 77% were motivated purely by ideology, i.e., a desire to express their
ideological dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. Therefore, based on Gruenewald
(2011), Belli (2011) and Spaaij’s (2010) findings, it was hypothesized that more financial crimes
have been committed by lone wolf DFRs, and more violent crimes have been committed by DFRs
who were members of an extremist group.
3.3.5. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Criminal Behavior.
According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), alienated individuals’ initial acts of defiance are usually
minor, but the response of the justice system could further worsen feelings of alienation. This
could create a “vicious cycle of norm-violation, repression, resentment and new and more
serious acts of violation” (p. 127).
3.3.5.a. Prior arrests and criminal behavior. According to the Anti-defamation League
(ADL), many militia members and sovereign citizens drive vehicles without a license, drive
without valid license plates, valid registration or insurance because they believe they have a
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constitutional or God-given right to do so (Pitcavage, n.d.). Since DFRs tend to fear government
encroachment on civil liberties (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham,
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Pitcavage, 2001; Simi,
2010), it is possible that police stops for such non-violent protest actions could escalate into a
dangerous incident (Chermak, et al., 2010; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Pitcavage, n.d.). Using
ECDB data for 1990 to June 2009, Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) found that 49 law enforcement
officers were killed by far-right extremists, and 22% of those incidents resulted from a traffic
stop.
3.3.5.b. Prior arrests, commitment to rightwing extremism and criminal behavior.
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) distinguished between people with extreme views who
engaged in non-violent political action (i.e., activism) and illegal/violent action (i.e., radicalism).
The authors found that although many activists never engaged in radicalism, one of the factors
that could cause this transition is repression of non-violent political action by government actors.
Thus, a routine stop for a minor violation (e.g., driving without a valid license plate) that results
in an arrest could act as confirmation of one’s anti-government extremist beliefs and further
radicalize a far-rightist. Although McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that extreme
beliefs did not necessarily result in criminal or terrorist behaviors, they conceded that people
who engaged in ideologically motivated criminal acts tended to have higher levels of extremist
beliefs (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Based on Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko
and McCauley’s (2009) claims, it seems possible that actions by law enforcement officials in
such situations that are perceived as unjust by a DFR could propel the individual from mere
activism to criminal or terrorist behavior. Sprinzak (1995) also argued that DFRs with strong
beliefs in the sanctity of their constitutional rights, such as militia members, could resort to
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terrorism if pushed by society or (perceived) aggressive action by law enforcement or other
government agencies.
3.3.5.c. Prior convictions, commitment and criminal behavior. Radicalization could also
occur in prison, via interactions and socialization into an extremist prison gang (“Dangerous
Convictions,” 2002; Blazak, 2009). Research on far-rightists involved in ideologically based
homicides found that 40% had committed a previous crime, most of which (90%) were not
ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings support Cloward and Ohlin’s
(1960) argument and Blazak’s (2009) prison radicalization thesis, i.e., prior arrests and
convictions could radicalize an individual and increase that likelihood that the individual would
commit a subsequent ideological crime.
3.3.5.d. Criminal behavior, interactions with government officials and terrorism. Strict
adherence to the original Constitution without appreciation for the social and political context
within which it was created also contribute to DFRs’ intense protectiveness of their rights to bear
arms (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al. 2009). In addition, intense
suspicion of State and Federal government actors, such as State/federal law enforcement officers,
judges, and IRS agents (Belli, 2011; Chermak, 2002) also contribute to DFRs’ protectiveness of
their right to bear arms. According to Sprinzak (1995), such beliefs could lead DFRs to commit
criminal acts, as well as acts of terrorism, in certain situations.
In his theory of split delegitimization, Sprinzak (1995) argued that the radicalization
process of American far-rightists starts with a Conflict of Legitimacy. At this stage, DFRs believe
that their opposition (ZOG, minorities, or Jews, depending on the far-right group to which the
person belonged) is illegitimate and should be eliminated or segregated. Most crimes, Sprinzak
(1995) argued, are likely to be committed against non-whites in the population, as DFRs try to
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reestablish the status quo by reinforcing discriminatory practices and mechanisms in society
(e.g., hate crimes). Spontaneous acts of violence could erupt during conflicts with government
authority, such as the cases mentioned by Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) but critiques of
government policies and civil protests are more likely to occur (Sprinzak, 1995).
If the government does not intervene to protect the “legitimate” citizenry, DFRs could
begin to perceive government policies as soft, unfair or an infringement of their civil rights and
liberties. This could trigger a Crisis of Confidence in the prevailing authority, i.e., the federal
government, and DFRs could lose faith in the government, its policies and agents. At this stage,
DFRs would no longer feel bound the government’s laws and rules (Sprinzak, 1995). However,
most violent actions would be perpetrated against the hated ‘other.’ Sprinzak (1995) termed this
phenomenon “split delegitimization,” since both the hated other and government would be
targets of violence.
However, Sprinzak (1995) argued that this split could end if DFRs begin to believe that
the government is overtaken by the original hated other (i.e., ZOG). According to Sprinzak
(1995), if this occurred, violence will be perpetrated primarily against the government. Sprinzak
(1995) referred to this phenomenon as the ‘disappearance of the split,’which can be triggered by
excessive compliance measures by government agents (e.g., the IRS, police, as in the Randy
Weaver incident) and subsequently result in acts of terrorism. Therefore, based on Sprinzak
(1995), Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) arguments, it was
hypothesized that negative interactions with government officials (i.e., civil action by the
government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions) would increase commitment to
rightwing extremism, which would subsequently increase the likelihood that a far-rightist would
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commit an ideological crime. DFRs who have not had such interactions should have lower levels
of commitment to extremism and would be less likely to commit an ideological crime.
The research models and questions will be presented in the following chapter. First, the
full research model is depicted and described. This will be followed by detailed explanations of
the research questions and hypotheses that were based on the information presented in the
current chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH MODEL, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
4.1. Research model
The study tested the model in stages. The first research question examined predictors of
membership in rightwing extremist groups. The second research question evaluated explanatory
variables of commitment to rightwing extremism. The third research question assessed predictors
of criminal behavior. In the last model, which examined the criminal behavior of DFRs,
membership in an extremist group and commitment to extremism were used as independent
variables.
Diagram 4: Full Model

Individual level
Stressors

Extremist friend /
family

Membership in
extremist group

Criminal
behavior

Commitment to
rightwing
extremism
Prior negative
interactions with
government
officials

Individual level stressors, extremist friends/ family members and negative interactions
with government officials were conceptualized as possible predictors of membership in a
rightwing extremist group. The reviewed literature indicated that individual level stressors,
extremist friends/ family members, negative interactions with government officials and
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membership in a rightwing extremist group could have influenced commitment to rightwing
extremism. It was also hypothesized that individual level stressors, negative interactions with
government officials, membership in a rightwing extremist group and commitment to rightwing
extremism would have influenced the criminal behavior of DFRs. Finally, it could have also
been possible that people with low (or no) commitment to rightwing extremism could have
engaged in criminal behavior due to the influence of extremist friends/ family members. These
direct and mediator effects were depicted in diagram 4.
As stated previously, many DFRs do not engage in criminal behavior. Since the sample
consisted of DFRs convicted of a violent or financial crime and their co-offenders, the results are
generalizable only to these two groups. Furthermore, as little research on non-extremists who
offended with DFRs exists, few hypotheses specified a directional (or any) relationship with the
dependent variables. Thus, much of the analysis concerning the non-extremists was of an
exploratory nature. This section discusses the study’s conceptual framework. The research
questions and related hypotheses will be outlined next.

4.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research question 1: Among DFRs, what effect, if any, did individual level stressors, the
presence of significant others, and prior negative interactions with government officials have on
membership in a rightwing extremist group?
H1: Based on GST, DFRs who experience individual level stressors were more likely than DFRs
who did not experience individual level stressors to join a far-rightist group.
H2a: According to DOT, extremist friends would provide access to extremist groups. Also,
according to other researchers (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley &
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Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990), individuals tended to join
extremist groups with their extremist friends / family. Therefore, DFRs who had far-rightist
significant others were more likely than those without extremist friends / family to join a farrightist group.
H2b: According to DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), both strain and access to extremist
opportunity structures are prerequisites for membership in subcultural gangs. Findings have been
inconsistent as Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993) both found evidence of strain and extremist
referent others among the far-rightists who joined groups in their studies, but no such interaction
effects were found in other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Since the latter
studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group members and
the current study examines criminal DFRs, an interaction effect between the experience of strain
and having extremist referent others was hypothesized on membership in extremist groups.
H3a: Based on the postulates of GST and DOT, negative interactions with government officials
(e.g., court officials and the police) should increase the likelihood that a DFR would experience
feelings of strain and alienation, which they may try to alleviate by becoming a member of farrightist group. Therefore, DFRs that experienced negative interactions with government officials
were more likely than DFRs who had not had such negative interactions with government
officials to join a rightwing extremist group.
H3b: However, it was possible that membership in extremist groups was contingent on access.
Therefore, it was hypothesized that there was an interaction effect between negative interactions
with government officials and having extremist friends/family with membership in an extremist
group.
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Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, group
membership and negative interactions with government officials have on an individual’s
commitment to rightwing extremism?
H4: According on GST, people who experienced individual level stressors had higher levels of
commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people who had not experienced individual
level stressors.
H5: Based on the postulates of DOT and free spaces, people with significant others who were
far-rightists had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people
without extremist friends or family members.
H6: According to DOT and free spaces, interactions with other extremists should have an
indoctrination effect. Therefore, members of extremist groups had higher levels of commitment to
extremist ideology when compared to non-members.
H7a: According to DOT, the behavior of law enforcement and courts could increase a strained
person’s feelings of alienation and reduce his/her commitment to conventional norms. These
feelings of alienation could provide an opportunity for conventional norms to be replaced with
extremist values and beliefs. Therefore, individuals who experienced negative interactions with
government officials had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to
those who have not had such experiences.
H7b: Based on Kaplan’s (1995b) findings and DOT, there was an interaction effect between
having extremist others and negative interactions with law enforcement on levels of commitment
to extremism.
Research question 3: What effects, if any, did an individual’s commitment to far-right
extremism and extremist group membership have on his/her criminal behavior? Were the effects
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of these two IVs moderated or exacerbated by individual level stressors, significant others, group
membership and interactions with law enforcement?
H8a: People with strong extremist beliefs were more likely than people with lower levels of
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically motivated crime.
H8b: People with lower levels of extremist belief were more likely than people with strong
extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-ideological) crimes.
H9: Based on GST and GST of Terrorism, individuals who experienced individual level stressors
were more likely than those who have not experienced individual level stressors to commit an
ideologically motivated crime.
H10: Based on the socialization effect of family and friends, it was hypothesized that individuals
who had extremist family/friends were more likely than individuals who did not have extremist
family/friends to commit an ideologically motivated crime. This relationship should be valid,
irrespective of the individual’s own level of commitment to extremism.
H11a: Based on the socialization effects of deviant groups and free spaces, it was hypothesized
that DFRs who belonged to an extremist group were more likely than lone wolves to commit
violent crimes.
H11b: Based on Chermak, et al. (2009b) and Belli’s (2011) arguments, it was hypothesized that
lone wolves were more likely than extremist group members to commit non-violent/financial
crimes.
H12: Since far-rightists did not recognize any authority above the local level, it was
hypothesized that individuals who had negative interactions with government officials were more
committed to rightwing extremism and consequently more likely to commit an ideological crim
when compared to those who did not have such negative interactions with law enforcement.
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Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications
HYPOTHESIS
JUSTIFICATION
Individuals that experience individual level GST, DOT
stressors were more likely to join a farrightist group, compared to those who did
not experience these stressors.
Individuals that had significant others who
DOT: extremist friends could have provided
were far-rightists were more likely to join a access to extremist groups / extremist
far-rightist group, when compared to those
opportunity structures.
who lack such access to extremist
opportunity structures.
There was an interaction effect between
GST: negative interactions with government
strain and extremist friends / family on
officials (e.g. court officials and the police)
membership in extremist groups.
increased feelings of strain and alienation.
Aho (1990).
Individuals that experienced negative
Aho (1990): negative interactions with
interactions with government officials were government officials could have created
more likely to join a rightwing extremist
‘Seekers’
group, when compared to those who did not
have these interactions.
Individuals who had both negative
DOT: extremist friends/family provided
interactions with government officials and
access to extremist opportunity structures.
extremist friends/family were more likely
than those that did not to join an extremist
group.
Individuals who experienced individual
GST: strain resulted in feelings of anger,
level stressors had higher levels of
frustration and depression.
commitment to extremist ideology, when
McCauley and Moskalenko: If the person
compared to people who did not experience attributed the cause of the strain to a group,
such stressors.
rather than an individual, this could have
increased a person’s commitment levels.
Individuals with significant others who
DOT and free spaces: interactions with
were far-rightists had higher levels of
other extremists in informal settings should
commitment to extremist ideology, when
have had an indoctrination effect.
compared to people without extremist
friends or family members.
Members of formal extremist groups had
DOT and free spaces: interactions with
higher levels of commitment to extremist
other extremists in a group setting should
ideology, when compared to non-members. have had an indoctrination effect.
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Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications continued…
HYPOTHESIS
JUSTIFICATION
7a Individuals who experienced negative
DOT: the behavior of law enforcement and
interactions with government officials had
courts could have increased a strained
higher levels of commitment to extremist
person’s feelings of alienation and reduced
ideology, when compared to those who did his/her commitment to conventional norms.
not have such experiences.
Consequently, there would be an
opportunity for conventional norms to be
replaced with extremist values and beliefs.
7b There was an interaction effect between
DOT
extremist friends / family and negative
interactions with government officials on
commitment to extremism.
8a People with strong extremist beliefs were
Consistent with ideological & antimore likely than people with lower levels of government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli &
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007).
motivated crime.
8b People with lower levels of extremist belief Consistent with ideological & antiwere more likely than people with strong
government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli &
extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non- Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007).
ideological) crimes.
9
Individuals that experienced individual
GST; GST of Terrorism: strain increased
level stressors were more likely than those
feelings of anger and commitment to the
who did not experienced individual level
cause, which may have increased the
stressors to commit an ideologically
likelihood of committing an ideologically
motivated crime.
motivated crime
10 Individuals who have extremist
The socialization effects of sub-cultural
family/friends were more likely to commit
groups and free spaces
an ideologically motivated crime.
11a Individuals who belonged to an extremist
The socialization effects of deviant groups
group were more likely than lone wolves to and free spaces would have increased the
commit violent crimes.
likelihood that group members would
commit a homicide
11b Lone wolves were more likely than
Chermak, et al. (2009) and Belli’s (2011)
extremist group members to commit nonresearch findings
violent/financial crimes.
12 Individuals who have negative interactions
DFRs would not recognize any authority
with government officials were more
above the local level and have anticommitted to rightwing extremism and
government beliefs. Such beliefs extend to
consequently were more likely than those
officers of the court, law enforcement
who had not had such interactions to
officers and tax officials. DOT: negative
commit an ideological crime
interactions with government officials could
have solidified a person’s deviant selfconcept; thereby increasing likelihood s/he
would violate society’s laws.
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This chapter presented the three research models examined in the study. A summary of the
study’s hypotheses and their justifications were also provided in Table 1 above. The sample
design and methods used to answer these research questions will be described in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND METHODS
5.1. Data source
This study used individual level data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)
(see: Freilich, et al. 2014). The ECDB was created in several stages, which will be outlined
below.
5.1.1. Identification of incidents: Incidents were first identified from existing terrorism
databases (such as the RAND-MIPT, American Terrorism Study and Global Terrorism
Database), official sources, personal informants, scholarly and journalistic articles, and watchgroup reports (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin & Lynch, 2012; Freilich & Chermak, 2009;
Gruenewald, 2011). These incidents were then searched using 30 open-source search engines:
Lexis-Nexis; Proquest; Yahoo; Google; Copernic; News Library; Westlaw; Google Scholar
(both articles & legal opinions); Amazon; Google U.S. Government; Federation of American
Scientists; Google Video; Center for the Study of Intelligence; Surf Wax; Dogpile; Mamma;
Librarians’ Internet Index; Scirus; All the Web; Google News; Google Blog; Homeland Security
Digital Library; Vinelink; The Bureau of Prison’s inmate locator; Individual State Department of
Corrections (DOCs); Blackbookonline.info. The searched cases were then assigned to trained
coders. Training involved a combination of instructions by a trained coder and practice coding a
previously coded case. The second training step also provided a measure of inter-rater reliability,
in addition to its role as a training mechanism. The coder then conducted follow-up targeted
searches to locate missing data. Next, the data from the search file were entered into an ACCESS
database. Cases were also periodically re-searched and updated in the database. For a more
detailed discussion see: Freilich, et al., (2014) and Gruenewald (2011).
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The ECDB has several advantages compared to other terrorism databases. Unlike other
databases (e.g., ATS), the ECDB’s inclusion criteria is not limited to the federal government’s
definition of terrorism. The ECDB also includes both state and federal crimes, which provides a
more complete picture of far-rightists’ criminal behavior (Chermak, et al., 2010; Chermak, et al.,
2012; Gruenewald, 2011). Triangulation of measures (i.e., multiple sources) is used both to
identify incidents and code incidents. Although Andrew Silke (2001) argued for a movement
away from open source information when conducting research on terrorism, this study
compensated for the limitations of open source materials (e.g., publicity effects, i.e.,
inconsistencies in coverage of different incidents, and source effects, i.e., inconsistencies within
a source) by triangulation of measures (for a discussion on using multiple sources to uncover
publicity and source effects, see: Chermak, et al., 2012). Sources of information were ranked
according to Sageman’s (2005) decreasing order of reliability (See also: Freilich, et al. (2014) for
details). This ranking of sources of information increased the reliability of the data, while
triangulation of measures facilitated convergent validation, which strengthened confidence in the
study’s results.
Possible limitations of the database include a risk of under-inclusion or missing cases,
especially for financial schemes. Homicides committed by members of the far-right tend to
attract a high degree of media attention and are less likely than financial crimes to be omitted
from the ECDB (for a more detailed discussion on selectivity bias see: Chermak, et al., 2012).
Despite these factors, the ECDB is the most appropriate data source for this study because its
universe is wider than that found in other terrorism databases. State and federal level offenses are
included in the database, as well as violent and financial crimes perpetrated by the far-right and
non-extremist co-offenders. Many of the variables used in this study are also contained in the
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database, which reduced the time needed to create the study’s dataset. For example, the ECDB
uses various sources to infer subjects’ commitment to far-rightist ideology, and the reliability of
these sources is ranked to maximize validity and accuracy of this variable. Furthermore,
protocols exist to ensure inter-rater reliability between coders, to minimize selectivity bias and
reduce missing cases. The unique strengths of the ECDB far outweighed the limitations
associated with secondary data analysis. These data were cleaned and verified prior to
conducting analysis for this study, which involved a 3-stage plan (see next section).

5.2. Sample, Data Coding & Verification Process
The sample was first extracted from the ECDB. People in the database must have been
formally charged with a homicide or financial crime at the state or federal level, and at least
some portion of the offense must have occurred in one of the 50 states. Unlike homicides, which
tend to occur at a certain point in time, financial schemes generally occur over a period of time
(Belli, 2011). To have been included in this study, at least a portion of the financial scheme must
have occurred during 2006 to 2010. This period was selected (1) to allow for a sufficiently large
sample size to ensure a reasonable degree of statistical power, (2) to minimize the effects of
social factors excluded from the study, (3) and to exclude pending trails/cases.
The sample consisted of DFRs charged with a homicide (N= 142) or financial scheme
(N=103), and non-far-rightist co-offenders charged with a homicide (N= 27) or financial scheme
(N=33). The original intent was to include convicted people only. However, because of the
limited sample size and number of IVs in the study, omitting the acquitted suspects would have
resulted in loss of statistical power and unreliable parameter estimates. Conviction status was
controlled for in the statistical models when possible. Conviction status was set at “1” or yes for
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research questions 1 and 2. Thus, the effect of the IVs on the DV is interpreted as conditional on
conviction.
Table 2: Sample of crimes and suspects charged with a homicide or financial crime
during the period 2006 to 2010
Type of crime
Financial
Homicide
Total

Number of DFRs
suspects indicted
103
142
245

Number of nonextremist indicted
33
27
60

Total number of
suspects
136
169
305

Non-extremists who offended with an extremist co-offender were coded as “zero” on the
extremist commitment scale (see next section for details). This was used as a comparison group
of criminals who could have also been Seekers (Aho, 1990). Non-extremists were compared to
(1) far-rightists who committed an ideological crime and (2) far-rightists who committed a nonideological crime.
Next, the 30 free open source web engines identified in the previous section were
(re)searched to identify new information. In addition, criminal history records of individuals in
the sample were obtained from a pay-per-view website, BeenVerified.com. The information
obtained from the updated searches and criminal history records was then entered into an Excel
file and transferred to SPSS and Stata for analysis.

5.3. Variables
This study used a cross-sectional design to examine the criminal behavior of DFRs and
their non-extremist co-offenders. This study had three dependent variables: membership in an
extremist group, commitment to rightwing extremism and crime committed. Research models
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were created to explain each of the three dependent variables. However, since the research
literature indicated that membership in an extremist group and commitment to extremism may
influence criminal behavior of DFRs (see literature review section), the variables membership in
an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were then used as independent
variables in the final model, which explained the criminal behavior of far-rightists.
The variable, membership in an extremist group, was defined as whether the individual
was part of a formal extremist group at the time of the offense. Formal groups typically have a
clear hierarchal structure and goals, while informal groups have no clear leadership structure.
This variable was coded: 0=no evidence that the suspect belonged to formal extremist group;
1=at least one source that indicated the individual was a member of an extremist group. Since a
group of friends who are extremists could have been coded as both an (informal) group and the
presence of extremist friends / family, there was a risk of autocorrelation between the variables.
To mitigate this risk, membership in informal group was excluded from the group membership
variable and coded as the presence of extremist friends. The Southern Poverty Law Center’s
(SPLC) website was primarily used to ascertain whether a group was classified as extremist or
merely right wing. Members of right wing groups were not coded as belonging to an extremist
group. Consensus in the media or by law enforcement was also used to determine whether a
group was coded as extremist. This variable was also included as an independent variable in the
final research model.
The second dependent variable, commitment to rightwing extremism, was
operationalized similarly to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) concept of indoctrination into a deviant
subculture but drew upon: (a) the unique ideology common to the far-right (conspiratorial,
xenophobic, anti-government, anti-tax, survivalist and anti-gun control beliefs); (b) participation
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in far-rightist sub-cultural activities, e.g., attended movement activities, wrote or disseminated
movement materials, wrote letters to the editor, etc.; and (c) self-identification as a far-rightist.
According to Cloward & Ohlin (1960; also see: Freilich, et al., 2009b), an individual who
subscribes to numerous rightwing extremist beliefs could be considered as more indoctrinated
into the far-right culture compared to someone who subscribes to fewer rightwing extremist
beliefs. Therefore, this individual would be more committed to rightwing extremist ideology,
when compared to someone who held fewer rightwing extremist beliefs. Likewise, continuous
participation in many movement activities suggests integration and indoctrination into far-right
extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004;
Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Rather than summing up an individual’s score to determine his/her commitment to
extremism, a factor analysis was used to identify the relevant factors that contribute to
commitment to far-right extremism (also see Field, 2013, pp. 665-719). Individual’s scores were
then tallied for each factor identified. Finally, each individual’s scores were summed up for the
factors to determine his/her overall commitment to extremism score. The results of the factor
analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. Similar to membership in extremist groups, the commitment
to extremism score was also used as an independent variable in the third research question. A
summary of the indicators used to create the commitment to extremism factor is provided in
table 3.
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Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology
Value Indicator
Explanation of indicator
0
No evidence of
“Believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to
conspiratorial
national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one’s
beliefs
personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack and is either
already lost or that the threat is imminent” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p.
372) e.g. Belief in New World Order or ZOG; demonizing the UN;
SSN & IDs used to track people; foreign troops in US; the economy
was controlled by America’s enemies; end times was near; two
1
Evidence of
seedlines - Jews were offspring of Satan; Creativitiy: Catholicism
conspiratorial
denounced as a ‘cult-religion’ and it was the holy responsibility of
beliefs
each generation to fight for the white race (Aho, 1990; Barkun,
1989, 1996; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Kaplan, 1995a, 1997; Kimmel &
Ferber, 2000)
0
No evidence of
“but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious
xenophobic
group” (Freilich et alet al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. believe children
beliefs
should have been home schooled to avoid race mixing; violently
opposed to mixed marriages/relations; racial segregation; US was a
white nation; refer to imprisoned white supremacists as ‘prisoners of
war;’ restriction of immigration to white Europeans; hate/bias
comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime; hate/bias
1
Evidence of
material left at crime scene; presence of racist clothing, zines, music
xenophobic
and tattoos* (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Perry & Blazak, 2010;
beliefs
Blee, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan,
1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Krouse, 2010; Simi, 2010; Simi &
Futrell, 2010).
0
No evidence of
“Suspicious of centralized federal authority” (Freilich, et al., 2009b,
anti-government p. 372) e.g. Excessive erosion of civil liberties; government violates
beliefs
the Constitution & excessively legislates citizens lives; plain text
1
Evidence of anti- interpretation of law & belief in common law courts (Aho, 1990;
Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Ezekiel,
government
1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010).
beliefs
0
No evidence of
“reverent of individual liberty…be free of taxes” (Freilich, et al.,
anti-tax beliefs
2009b, p. 372) e.g. 16th Amendment not ratified; federal tax was
voluntary; wages & tips were not income; only foreign source of
income was taxable; an individual was not a person according to the
IRC; only federal employees were subject to federal tax; the IRS
1
Evidence of anti- was a private corporation (Aho, 1990; Belli & Freilich, 2011;
tax beliefs
Chermak, et al., 2010; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham,
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Kaplan, 1995;
“The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments”, 2012; “The Tax
Protest Movement”, n.d.).
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Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology continued
Value Indicator
Explanation of indicator
0
No evidence of
“A belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by
survivalist beliefs
participating in paramilitary preparations, training and
survivalism” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. stockpiling
1
Evidence of
weapons, medical supplies and food and weapons training
survivalist belief
necessary (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Kaplan, 1995a, 1995b;
Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).
0
No evidence of
“reverent of individual liberty… especially their right to own
anti-gun control
guns” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) Right to bear arms not
beliefs
limited by legislation (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham,
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b).
1
Evidence of antigun control beliefs
0

1

1
-1

No evidence of
participation in
movement
activities
Evidence of
participation in at
least 1 movement
activity
Self claim
Self denial

e.g. operated hate site, wrote or disseminated extremist
books/essays/letters to the editor, organized or attended movement
activities, recruited others (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak,
2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010)

e.g. I am a far-rightist/tax-protester/Patriot
e.g. I am not an extremist

The third dependent variable, crime committed, was measured as a violent incident or
financial scheme, which was further subdivided into ideologically motivated homicide, nonideologically motivated homicide, ideologically motivated financial scheme and nonideologically motivated financial scheme. Crimes committed to advance the goals of the
extremist group / movement or motivated by extremist ideology were classified as ideological.
When there was no evidence that the crime that had any link to the movement, the crime was
coded as non-ideological.
This study utilized the classical Weberian approach to action, which conceptualized
action as a reflection of the subjective meaning attached to the behavior by the actor (Campbell,
1998; Weber, 1998). In other words, it assumed a certain degree of consistency between the
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actor’s internal state (i.e., beliefs) and his/her action, even if the actor was unaware of this
connection, i.e., included both rational and affective actions (Weber, 1998). Therefore, this study
assumed that an individual’s motive to commit an act (i.e., ideological or non-ideological crime)
would have been consistent with his/her subjective meaning of the situation (i.e., commitment to
rightwing extremism). However, the reverse would not have been true, as this study did not
assume that action implied a specific subjective meaning to the actor. Thus, while motive (for an
action) was ascertained from an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism, to assume that
someone who committed a hate crime was a white supremacist would have been circular
reasoning.
Since this study conceptualized motive to engage in an action as emanating from the
permanent internal state of the individual, i.e., his/her commitment to far-right extremism, there
was some overlap between the variables. According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), indoctrination
into a subculture tends to fluctuate until the norms, values and beliefs of the subculture replaced
conventional norms, values and beliefs. After an individual is indoctrinated into the subculture,
their commitment to the subculture could be conceptualized as a permanent internal state, i.e., a
permanent change in the individual’s belief systems (Cloward & Ohlin, 1990). However, the
behavior or crime committed is an event that occurred in time, i.e., not permanent, albeit a
product of an individual’s commitment to far-right extremism (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998).
Thus, ideological motive for committing a crime and commitment to far-right extremism are
separated by a time dimension, i.e., commitment to extremism occurs first and is relatively
permanent; the behavior is motivated by commitment and is a temporary event. However, motive
and ideology could also be interconnected constructs: leaving white supremacist symbols and
graffiti at the crime scene, self-claim of being a DFR, and stating one’s intension to commit a
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hate crime on a website were used as evidence of the individual’s commitment to far-right
extremism and ideological motive for the crime (see Table 4).
Table 4: Operational Definition of Crime Committed
Classification
of Crime
Ideologically
motivated
homicide

Operational definition
Convicted of causing the death of
another human for an ideological or
movement related purpose

Ideologically
motivated
financial
scheme

Convicted of carrying out an illicit
financial operation for an ideological
or movement related purpose

Nonideologically
motivated
homicide

Convicted of causing the death of
another human for no an ideological
or movement related purpose

Nonideologically
motivated
financial
scheme

Convicted of carrying out an illicit
financial operation for no an
ideological or movement related
purpose

Indicators / Source
hate/bias/anti-government comments
or statements made by perpetrator on
or before crime; hate/bias/antigovernment material or graffiti left at
crime scene; perpetrator was a
member of an extremist group and
extremist group was involved in the
crime; perpetrator wrote bias-related
emails; perpetrator created websites;
hate/bias/anti-government materials
representative of an organized hate
group left at crime scene; extremist
group claimed responsibility for the
crime (Campbell, 1998; Flanagan &
O’Brien, 2003; Kaplan & Moss, 2003;
Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009;
Krouse, 2010; Weber & Runciman,
1998).
Evidence of economic motive for
incident and no evidence of the proindicators listed above (Kaplan &
Moss, 2003).

Indictments and court documents are the most reliable source to establish an individual’s
motive for committing a crime. However, searches of open sourced documents unearthed few
indictments. Further, court documents were obtained for some suspects. Personal statements and
statements by co-offenders were also used to establish motive for a crime (e.g., if a co-offender
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stated the suspect hated sexual orientation minorities and shouted anti-gay slurs during the crime,
this offense was coded as ideologically motivated).
In situations where there were no statements made by the sampled DFRs about their
motivation for committing a crime, this study attributed motivation for a crime based on
circumstantial evidence prior to the commission of the offense. Similar to the system used by the
courts and FBI to determine bias in hate crime cases, evidence of the suspect’s prior ideology or
belief was used to determine whether a crime was ideologically or non-ideologically motivated,
e.g., hate/bias/anti-government comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime,
hate/bias/anti-government material left at crime scene, whether perpetrator was a member of an
extremist group and involvement of the hate group in the crime (Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009;
Krouse, 2010). The FBI’s method for determining if an offense was a hate crime was also
consistent with Weber’s conceptualization of motive and action (Cambell, 1998; Weber, 1998).
Also in keeping with hate crime legislation (Flanagan & O’Brien, 2003; Kercher, Nolasco &
Wu, 2009) crimes in which there was mixed motive (i.e., a combination of ideological and nonideological motives) were classified as ideologically motivated crimes.
In situations where conflicting reports were given about the motivation of sampled
individuals, Sageman’s (2005) decreasing order of reliability was used to classify the crime as
ideological or non-ideological. Sageman (2005) ranked information in decreasing order of
reliability according to the source: appellate court decisions; government documents; trial
transcripts; corroborated information by key informants; uncorroborated information by key
informants; and statements from people without direct access to the event/information (e.g.,
other media reports, watch-group reports, personal views expressed in blogs, websites, editorials
and other opinion pieces). See also Freilich, et al. (2014).
72

Independent variables included individual level stressors, friend or family member in the
movement, and prior negative interactions with government officials. Individual level stressors
included low education, low income, low status job and abuse. Initially this variable was
conceptualized as a 6-point scale, however, because if the high proportion of missing values, this
variable was recoded as a binary variable. A degree of resiliency was assumed on the part of
suspects. People 18 years old and older without a high school education were coded as having
low education. Similarly, financial debt, homelessness and incarceration (prisoners rarely earned
income and those who worked in prison earned a negligible income) were used as evidence of
low income. Finally, abuse by a parent and bullying at school were used as evidence of abuse.
For persons with college degrees and / or full-time occupation, this variable was coded as “0.” If
no mention was made of the suspect’s education, financial status, occupation or abuse, this
variable was coded as “missing.” High school and college students were only coded as “1” for
this measure if abuse or bullying was mentioned.
The variable, friend or family in movement, was coded as “1” = any evidence of friend or
family involvement in the far-right movement and “0” = no evidence of friend or family
involvement in the far-right movement found. Engaging in social activities with other farrightists, such as socializing in a DFR’s home, was used as evidence of having friendship ties.
Statements by the police, media or court about extremist friends / family members, were also
used as evidence of having friendship ties in the movement. Committing an unplanned crime
with non-group members who were extremists was also taken as evidence of having friendship
ties to extremists, since this suggests the crime occurred in the midst of social activities.
However, being with a fellow group member at the behest of the group leader to commit a
retaliatory crime was not considered as evidence of friendship ties to the movement.
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Variable
Dependent variables
1. Membership in
extremist group
2. Commitment to
extremism
3. Crime committed

Independent
variables
1. Gender
2. Race
3. Domestic FarRightist
4. Individual level
stressors
 Education
 Income level
 Occupation
 Abuse
5. Friend / Family
involvement in
movement
6. Prior negative
Interactions with
government officials
 Civil action by
government
 Prior arrests
 Prior charges
 Outcome of
priors

Table 5: Description of variables
Description of variable
On or before the time of the offence, was the individual a member of an
extremist group, i.e., an organization, with a name and command
structure and at least 2 extremist members? (0=no; 1=yes)
Level of commitment to extremist cause on or before the time of the
offence, measured as a scale comprising 6 factors.
What type of crime did the suspect commit?
 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically
motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial
scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme.
 1 = homicide; 2 = financial crime.
What was the individual’s gender? (0=male; 1=female)
What was the individual’s race? (0=non-white; 1=white)
Was the individual a Domestic Far-Rightist? (0=non far-rightist;
1=DFR i.e. any one pro indicator listed in Table 3)
(Proxy variable) Binary variable consisting of any one the following
elements
Was the individual older than 18 and had less than a high school
education?
Was the individual homeless, incarcerated or in financial debt at the
time of the offense?
Was the individual unemployed or casually employed at the time of the
offense?
Was abuse mentioned as a mitigating factor in court?
Did the individual have a family member, friend or acquaintance that
was involved in the movement, on or before the time of the offence?
(0=no; 1=one or more friend/family member/acquaintance in
movement)
(Proxy variable) Binary variable consisting of any one the following
elements.

Was civil action (e.g. lien, preliminary or permanent injunction) taken
against the suspects by a government agency or department prior to the
act?
Was the individual arrested prior to committing this offense?
Was the individual charged with a crime prior to committing this
offense? Was the individual convicted of a criminal offense prior to
committing this offense?
The independent variable, prior negative interactions with government officials, was

operationalized as a proxy variable. This included: (1) prior civil actions, (such as an injunction
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or lien filed by a government department or agency against the individual and protection orders
filed by a spouse); (2) prior arrests; (3) prior criminal charges; and (4) prior convictions. The
date of the offense coded in the dataset was used to distinguish between prior and subsequent
criminal / civil offending behavior. This variable was coded as: “1” = at least one prior civil
order, crime, arrest, or conviction before the start date of the current offense; and “0” = no
evidence of prior negative interactions with government officials. Statements by the media or
judge about a criminal record or civil injunction, a record on the state / federal prison website or
a criminal history record on the pay per view website was coded as “1.” When the media or
judge said the person did not have a criminal / civil record, no record was found on the state /
federal website or the pay per view website uncovered no record, this variable was coded as “0.”
If the suspect was not found on the pay per view website and no mention was made in the open
source about priors, this variable was coded as missing.
To describe the sample, individual level variables – gender, race and DFR status – were
also included. Gender was coded as a binary variable: “0” = male and “1” female. Race was also
coded as binary: “0” = non-white and “1” = white. DFR status was coded as: “0” = non-extremist
collaborators and “1” = member of an extremist group or evidence of commitment to DFR
ideology. Categories coded as “0” were used as the reference category in the statistical models.
A detailed description of the study’s independent and dependent variables can be found in Table
5.

5.4. Data Analysis
Each research question required a different statistical analysis technique. The first
research question, which assessed membership in extremist groups, was evaluated using logistic
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regression models. According to Agresti (2007) and Field (2013) these types of models should
be used to determine the effects of continuous and /or categorical independent variables on a
binary dependent variable (DV) e.g., membership in a formal or informal extremist group.
Multiple independent variables (IVs) and interaction effects (i.e., moderation) between IVs
(Field, 2013; Hamilton, 2009) were included in the logistic regression models for research
questions 1 and 2.
Logistic regression models were used to predict the probability of a dependent variable,
y, occurring, given observed values of 1 (or more) IV. The logistic regression equation used to
predict the probability of y when there was one predictor variable was:
P(Y) =

1
1+𝑒

−(𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑋1 +𝜀𝑖 )

where е was the base of natural logarithms; b0 was the constant; b1 was the weight of the
predictor variable (X1); and ε was a residual term (Field, 2005). When the model included more
than one predictor variable, the logistic regression equation was:
P(Y) =

1
1+𝑒

−(𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑋1 +𝑏2 𝑋2 +…+𝑏𝑛 𝑋𝑛 +𝜀𝑖 )

where weights or coefficients were added for each additional predictor variable (Field, 2005).
Logistic regression was used to find a model that best fit the observations in the data,
with the use of maximum-likelihood estimation. First, a baseline was determined, which
estimated the parameter for the constant and assessed the fit of the model, i.e., how well the
model predicted the observed outcomes (Field, 2005). The measure of the fit of the model was
the log-likelihood; a large log-likelihood indicated that the model did a poor job predicting the
dependent variable i.e., the model misclassified a greater number of outcomes.
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IVs were entered into the model, and compared against the baseline model. If the log
likelihood (LL) for the research model was lower than the baseline model, this was taken as
evidence in support of the research model. The log likelihood for the model was used as a
badness-of-fit measure, in that the higher the LL, the worse the model fitted the data. The chi2
result and its associated probability were used to determine if the entire logistic model was
significant. If the probability of obtaining the chi2 result by chance was small, i.e., less than or
equal to 0.05, this indicated that the model was a significant predictor of the dependent variable.
Further, logistic models provided an estimate of the model’s strength in the prediction of the
dependent variable or Pseudo R2 e.g., Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic, Cox and Snell measure or
Nagelkerke, termed goodness-of-fit measures (Field, 2005). Larger values indicated a stronger or
better model specification (Hamilton, 2009).
Logistic models also allow the researcher to determine if individual IVs were significant
predictors of the DV through interpretation of the Wald statistic. The Wald statistic was used to
test the null hypothesis that the b-coefficient of the predictor variable = 0 (Field, 2005, p. 224). If
the probability of obtaining a specific Wald statistic was small, i.e., less than or equal to 0.05,
this indicated that the independent variable was a significant predictor of the dependent variable.
However, since the Wald statistic was calculated by the regression coefficient divided by its
𝑏

standard error (i.e., Wald statistic = 𝑆𝐸), standard errors tended to be inflated when the Wald
statistic is large, and there was a risk of making a type II error (i.e., falsely rejecting a significant
predictor). Another issue with the Wald statistic was, since referred to the natural log of the IV
associated with a one unit change in the DV, it was more difficult to understand (Agresti, 2007;
Field, 2005). Odds ratios are more easily understood. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicated that as
the predictor increases, the odds of the dependent variable occurring also increases; while an
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odds ratio less than 1 indicated that as the predictor variable increases, the odds of the dependent
variable decreases (Field, 2005). Therefore, odds ratios were reported when available (see
findings section). Significant p-values were denoted by asterisks, with a key directly below the
table. Goodness of fit measures were placed below the table. A summary of the procedure for
interpreting these statistics can be found in Appendix A.
The model with lowest log likelihood was considered to have been the best-fitted model.
The classification table or plot and several diagnostic tests were used to confirm the best fitted
model. The classification table, a contingency table which provided the count and percentage of
correct predictions based on the model, was used to identify the observations that were correctly
(and incorrectly) predicted by the model (Field, 2005). Similar to the classification table,
classification plots were used to identify the correctly and incorrectly predicted cases, but in a
graphical form (Field, 2005). Models with the most correctly identified/predicted cases were
considered to have been better fitted. However, diagnostic tests, such as Cook’s Distance,9
Leverage,10 DFBeta,11 Studentized Residual, Standardized Residual and Deviance,12 were
created and reviewed to ensure than no observation or case has undue influence on the
coefficients i.e., the coefficients were accurate (Field, 2005). These residuals were also graphed
against predicted probabilities, since diagrams were easier to interpret than columns of figures
(Menard, 2002).
Cook’s D gave the change in the coefficient when an observation/case was dropped from the analysis. Similar to
other residuals, Cook’s D was calculated for each case (Field, 2005; Menard, 2002). Individual Cook’s D values
were reviewed in the data window of SPSS and graphed against predicted probabilities to easily identify cases that
exceed 1. There were no issues with Cook’s D values.
𝑘+1
10
Leverage values for cases were compared to
, where k was the number of predictors and N was the sample size.
𝑁
No case had excessive influence on the models, i.e., leverage values were ≤ 3 times the calculated value (Field,
2005).
11
DFBetas (i.e., the standardized Cook’s statistics) were < 1. This indicated that there were no outliers (Field, 2005;
Menard, 2002).
12
Studentized Residuals, Standardized Residuals and Deviance Residuals were normally distributed.
9
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Variables were then tested for multicollinearity, by analyzing tolerance, VIF, eigenvalues
and variance proportions. Collinearity between independent variables was identified by a
tolerance value less than .1 and VIF value greater than 10 (Field, 2005). Eigenvalues and
condition indexes for dimensions in the model, found in the collinearity diagnostics table, also
needed to be close in value. Large eigenvalues and condition indexes were taken as evidence that
the model coefficients were greatly affected by small changes in the IVs, which would mean that
the model specifications were not stable (Field, 2005). There were no issues with eigenvalues
and condition indexes in this study. Finally, the variance proportions in the collinearity
diagnostics table were interpreted. Variance proportions on small eigenvalue were small, which
indicated that the study did not have problems with collinearity. A summary table of the
assumptions of logistic regression can be found in Appendix B.
The second research question assessed the effects of several categorical IVs on
commitment to rightwing extremism. Since commitment to rightwing extremism was
operationalized using indicators to create a factor scale and the scale was skewed, a regression
analysis was the appropriate technique for examining the effects of IVs on commitment to
rightwing extremism. A regression analysis was used to determine whether the research model
was significant, the strength of the model, the strength of IVs, and interaction effects (Field,
2013). Interaction effects were then estimated and compared to determine the best fitted model.
Appendix C contains a summary table of the statistics and parameters estimated in regression
models.
However, these parameters would have been biased if the assumptions for the test were
violated. The DV needed to have a linear relationship with the IVs or the model would have been
invalid (Field, 2013). Errors were independent, i.e., the Durbin-Watson statistic was between 1
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and 3. If this assumption was violated, a robust regression would have been used instead (Field,
2013). Residuals were consistent at each level of the IV, which indicated that there was no
problem with homoscedasticity. Although continuous IVs did not need to be normally
distributed, if the errors were skewed, the confidence intervals and significance levels would be
affected in small samples only (Field, 2013). The current sample size was 305, so this did not
cause a problem. Finally, there were no outliers of influential cases (Field, 2013). These
assumptions are summarized in Appendix D.
The third research question required several multinomial logistic regression models and
logistic regression models, previously described, to be fully tested. For this model, membership
in an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were independent variables, and
criminal behavior was the dependent variable. As criminal behavior was measured as four
distinct and unordered categories (1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically
motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically
motivated financial scheme), a multinomial logistic regression model was the appropriate
statistical test (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009; Long & Freese, 2005).
Multinomial logistic regression treated the DV as a nominal variable and calculated
parameter estimates, i.e., B, SE, Wald and Exp(B), in comparison to a specified baseline
category of the DV (Field, 2009). The baseline was the first category. Multinomial logistic
regression determined statistical significance of categorical IVs, continuous IVs, interaction
effects between IVs, the strength of the entire model, and if this effect was different for people
with different levels of commitment to extremism (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009). This type of
model was very similar to logistic regression models. IVs were entered in a block (at the same
time), since the study aimed to test theories and research models. Interactions affects were
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created in SPSS by specifying a custom model: the IVs were entered, along with the interaction
terms to determine if the observed effects were due to the IVs (i.e., main effects) or the
interaction terms (Field, 2009; Garson, 2012).
Multinomial logistic regression models were interpreted similarly to logistic regression:
(1) significant Chi2 statistics identify which models, IVs and interactions effects were
statistically significant; (2) pseudo R2 measures, such as Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke, specified
the effect size of the model; (3) goodness-of-fit measures (e.g., Pearson Chi2 statistic,13 AIC and
BIC)14 and classification tables15 were used to determine which models were the best fit of the
data; (4) and the log likelihood ratio indicated how much variability in the data was not
explained by the model (Field, 2009).
However, for these statistics to be accurate, certain assumptions must have been satisfied.
Cells with low counts, or over dispersion, could have resulted in contradictory results in the
Pearson Chi2 statistic, in comparison to the AIC and BIC values (Field, 2009). Over dispersion
was not a problem. Over dispersion was identified by a dispersion parameter, ϕ Pearson =
𝜒2 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
𝑑𝑓

, that was close to 2 (Field, 2009). A summary of the statistics estimated by

multinomial regression models can be found in Appendix E.
The full model included individual level stressors, extremist significant others and
interactions with government officials as explanatory/independent variables. Membership in an
extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were hypothesized as mediator
13

Pearson Chi2 was used to test whether the predicted values of the model were significantly different from the
observed values (Field, 2009). Non-significant results indicate a better-fitted model.
14
AIC was an acronym for Akaike’s information criterion and BIC was an acronym for Schwarz’s Bayesian
information criterion. The model with the lower AIC and BIC values was deemed the better-fitted model (Field,
2009).
15
Classification tables were interpreted similarly to those found in logistic regression analysis, except predicted
probabilities was termed ‘estimated response probabilities’ and predicted group membership was termed ‘predicted
category’ (Field, 2009).
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(indirect) variables in the full model. Several statistical techniques could have been used to test
for mediator effects on a categorical DV. The Sobel test could have been used when there is only
one significant mediator variable (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). A large sample size (greater than
50) was required for the Sobel test to be accurate. The Sobel test can be calculated as follows:
a *b / √ (b2*sa2 + a2*sb2)
where a was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator, b
was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between the mediator, the DV,
sa was the standard error of a, and sb was the standard error of b (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2012).
However, if both hypothesized mediator variables are found to be significant predictors of
criminal behavior of DFRs, Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommended the bootstrap method be
used instead of the Sobel test. The authors argued that the bootstrap method produce less biased
estimates when there were multiple mediators in a model, and is suitable for dichotomous DVs.
Unfortunately, since multiple imputation was used to fill in missing values; neither the Sobel test
not the bootstrap method could have been used. It is likely that future versions of Stata would
allow for the calculation of mediation effects on multiple imputed data.
More complex iterations with interaction terms / moderators were computed and
compared to test whether Differential Opportunity Theory modified the effect of strain. To
determine if different predictors or IVs explained violent as compared to financial crimes and
ideological as compared to non-ideological crimes, the variable criminal behavior was re-coded
as a dichotomous variable and logistic regression models (described in the analysis plan for the
first research question) were utilized to fit the data. Depictions of the hypothesized relationships
for the study’s three research questions, as well as a summary of the statistical methods used to
tests these relationships, can be found in Appendix F.
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5.5. Missing Data and Multiple Imputation
Missing data was problematic, since this study utilized secondary data analysis. Six
variables in the study contained missing values. Race, strain and negative interactions with law
enforcement all contained missing values. Several interaction effects – strain X extreme others;
extreme others X negative interactions with law enforcement; and strain X negative interactions
with government officials – also contained missing values. Table 6, below, summarizes the
percentage in missing values.
Allison (2002) recommended using multivariate normal models to impute missing values.
The multivariate normal model assumes the variables in the model are normally distributed, has
a linear relationship with other variables, and has error terms that were normally distributed
(Allison, 2002).16 Many of the variables in this study were categorical, which violated the
normality assumptions for multiple imputations (MI). However, Allison (2002) argued that MI is
also valid for categorical variables.
Table 6: Summary of Missing Data
Variable
Race
Strain
Convicted
Prior negative interactions with government officials
Strain X Extreme others
Extreme Others X Prior negative interactions with
government officials
Strain X Prior negative interactions with government
officials
16

Coded
251 (82%)
199 (65%)
299 (98%)
279 (91%)
199 (65%)
279 (91%)

Missing
54 (18%)
106 (35%)
6 (2%)
26 (9%)
106 (35%)
26 (9%)

Total
305
305
305
305
305
305

180 (59%)

125 (41%)

305

Continuous variables that were not normally distributed may have been normalized via a log transformation and
the antilog taken after the missing values have been imputed (Allison, 2002). Skewed distributions could have been
normalized by applying a square root transformation. After missing values were imputed, the values must have been
squared to reverse the transformation and return the values to their original scale. Rounding (values > 0.5, round up;
values < 0.5, round down; if there were no negative values in the original measurement scales, negative values round
to 0) may also have been necessary, especially for continuous variables that were discrete, i.e., could have only take
the form of a whole number (Allison, 2002).
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Several assumptions must have been met for MI to produce unbiased estimators: the data
needed to have been missing at random (MAR), the regression models must have been correctly
specified, the correct imputation method must have been selected and an adequate number of
datasets must have been imputed (Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008; Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.;
White, Royston & Wood, 2011). MAR is defined as when the probability that value was missing
depended on another variable. However, within each category of the variable with missing
values the probability of missingness is not related to another variable (Allison, 2002; White,
Royston & Wood, 2011). This assumption would have been fulfilled if, for example, the
probability of missing values for race was related to membership in extremist group, but the
probability of missing for non-whites (and whites) was unrelated to membership in extremist
group. It was impossible to test whether this condition was satisfied because the values of the
missing data were unknown (Allison, 2002).
Correct specification of the MI model meant that the IVs provided a reasonable
explanation of the DV. The correct regression model (logistic, regression, multinomial logistic,
etc.) was then selected. Correct specification of the model was assessed by conducting the
regression analysis on the original dataset with the missing values (Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.).
In addition, all the variables – independent, dependent and interaction effects – was included in
the MI impute command. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), interactions effects
must have been treated as “just another variable” and included in the imputation or one would
obtain biased parameter estimates.
The imputation method selected was based on number of variables with missing values
(univariate / single variable or multivariate / multiple variables), the pattern of missingness
(monotone or arbitrary) and level of measurement of the variables. MI should produce unbiased
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parameter estimates if an infinite number of datasets are created. Standard errors tend to be
biased upwards if few datasets are estimated and there is a high percentage of missing values.
Allison (2002) suggested researchers use Rubin’s (1987) formula to calculate the number of
datasets needed to ensure accurate standard errors and parameter estimates:
1
1 + 𝐹/𝑀
where F was the fraction of the missing values and M was the number of datasets to have been
computed. In other words, according to Rubin’s (1987) formula, 10 imputed datasets should
result in 95% accurate standard errors and parameter estimates. However, Allison (2012) later
revised his recommendation based on the tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy. Allison
(2012) cautioned that while 10 datasets may have been most efficient when faced with limited
computer processing speed, accurate standard errors would require the number of imputed
datasets to have been equivalent or similar to the variable with the largest percent of missing
values. Thus, based on Table 6 and Allison’s (2012) recommendation, 41 datasets would have
been adequate. Since there was no issue with processing speed, 50 datasets were imputed.
Version 13 of Stata, a statistical program, allows users to impute missing values for
continuous, binary, unordered categorical and ordered categorical variables using the mi impute
command (“Multiple Imputation in Stata” n.d.; White, Royston & Wood, 2011). First, the
regression models were calculated using the original datasets to verify the model specification
(this was described in the data analysis section). The logistic model that predicted membership in
extremist groups was correctly specified: the model Chi-square was significant, Nagelkerke R2 =
.331, the Hosmer and Lemshow Test was non-significant, the classification table was 67.6%
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accurate, there was no evidence of complete separation, and the residuals were normal (for
details on interpreting logistic models, see Appendix A and Appendix B).
The regression model assessing commitment to extremism was non-significant but
correctly specified: the Durbin-Watson Statistic was close to 2, which indicated that the errors
were independent; the VIF was close to 1 and Tolerance was higher than 0.2, which indicated
that there was no problem with multicollinearity; Cook’s distance did not exceed 1, Mahalanobis
distance averaged close to 6 and the standardized residuals were normally distributed, which
indicated that the normality assumption was fulfilled; and the correlation matrix indicated that
there the IVs were not correlated (for details on interpreting regression models, see: Appendix D
and Field, 2013).
The multinomial logistic model comparing the four types of crimes was also a good fit:
the likelihood ratio test was significant, which indicated that the model with the IVs was
significantly better than the null model; the Goodness of fit statistics gave inconsistent results,
probably due to the missing data problem; the Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 were
greater than 0.5, which indicated that the model was strong; and the classification table listed that
the model correctly predicted 63% of the observations (for details on interpreting multinomial
logistic models, see: Appendix E).
MI was then attempted using chained equations (since 6 variables contain missing values)
with the logit method (because the variables were binary). However, the models did not
converge, and predictive mean matching (PMM) was used instead of the logit method.
According to Harrell (n.d.) PMM can be used to impute missing values for continuous variables,
binary and categorical data. Chained equations with the PMM method resulted in imputations
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similar to the observed data (i.e., rates of 0 and 1 were relatively consistent across the 50
datasets).
Stata 13 was used to calculate the Monte Carlo error (MCE) for MI regression analyses,
which assessed the adequacy of the imputed data. MCE are listed for the regression models,
discussed in the next chapter. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), the following
criteria should be used to determine if sufficient datasets were imputed:
1. the MCE of a coefficient should have been approximately 10% of its standard error
2. the MCE of a coefficient’s T-statistic should have been approximately 0.1
3. if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE of a coefficient’s p-value should have been
approximately 0.01; if the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of a coefficient’s p-value should
have been approximately 0.02
Stata 13 was used to fit regression models with the mi estimate: command. Regression
models could have been fitted for binary, count, ordered categorical, unordered categorical,
continuous, panel data and time series data (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual:
Release 13, n.d.). However, the mi estimate: logit command does not run a logistic regression
and the mi estimate: reg command does not run a regression. Instead, the mi estimate: command
was used to compute the specified regression on each imputed dataset and to combine the results
according to Rubin’s (1987) rules. Therefore, the output of mi estimate: commands are different
from regression analyses conducted on complete datasets (i.e., datasets with no missing values)
and have their own rules of interpretation.
The average relative variance (RVI) is the variance in the estimates across the
coefficients due to missing data. Thus, the closer the RVI is to zero, the lower the effect of the
missing data on the parameter estimates. The largest FMI is used to determine whether the
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number of imputations is sufficient to provide unbiased parameter estimates. The number of
imputations should be at least 100 * FMI. The model F statistic tested whether all the
coefficients for the IVs are significantly different from zero; if the p-value of the F statistic was
≤ 0.05, the model is said to be a significant predictor of the DV. P-values are also provided for
individual IVs: if the p-value of the t statistic is ≤ 0.05, the IV is said to be a significant predictor
of the DV (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual: Release 13, n.d.). Finally, the mi test:
command is used to assess whether specific coefficients are significantly different from zero.
This command is interpreted similarly to log-likelihood statistics when comparing different
blocks when predicting a specific DV: significant mi test results means the IVs significantly
improved the model. The mi test: command is used to assess the block model and interaction
effects; non-significant mi test results indicate that the IV or interaction effect did not improve
the model. These rules for interpreting MI models are summarized in Appendix G.
Unfortunately, Stata 13 did not provide a means to assess mediation effects on imputed data.
The next chapter will present the study’s results. First, the descriptive statistics for the
sample will be presented. Next, the factor analysis used to create the commitment to extremism
variable and the results of the factor analysis will be described. Finally, the results of the models
assessing group membership, commitment to extremism and crime committed will be presented.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
6.1. Descriptive analysis
The study consisted of 305 DFR (N = 245; 80.33%) and their co-offenders (N = 60;
19.67%) who committed a financial scheme or homicide during the 5 year period, 2006 to 2010.
More than fifty percent (N = 170; 55.74%) were members of formal extremist groups. Most of
the sample was male (N = 261; 85.57%) and white (N = 223, 73.11%). Less than a quarter of the
sample experienced at least one form of strain (N = 64; 20.98%), while no evidence of strain was
found for close to forty-five percent of the sample (N = 135; 44.26%).
Many subjects had at least one friend or family with extremist beliefs (N = 268; 87.87%)
and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 175; 57.38%). Close to eightyfive percent (N = 259; 84.92%) were convicted. Indicted suspects who were not convicted (N =
40; 13.11%) were included in the sample to ensure adequate sample size for accurate statistical
analysis. Of those people who were not convicted, 13 were killed by the police during a crime
spree or committed suicide immediately after the homicide incident. About half of the nonconvicted suspects (N = 21) were acquitted or the prosecutor dropped the charges, usually in
exchange for testimony against a codefendant. Six suspects absconded or were awaiting trial at
the time of the data analysis. The analyses presented in this chapter retained the non-convicted
persons to maximize statistical power but controlled for non-convicted subjects when possible.
Open source documents were unable to definitively verify the experience of strain
indicators for several subjects. There were high percentages of missing values for education (N =
55, 18%), income (N = 115; 37.58%) and occupation (N = 182; 59.50%). However, when the
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strain measure was coded as any one indicator = “1,” the percentage of missing values dropped
to acceptable levels (N = 106; 34.75%) and resulted in a more reliable measure.
Table 7: Summary of variables
Variables
Group member
Yes
No
Crime committed
Ideological homicide
Non-ideological homicide
Ideological financial scheme
Non-ideological financial scheme
Convicted
Yes
No
Missing (imputed)
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Non-white
Missing (imputed)
Strain
Yes
No
Missing (imputed)
Extreme others
Yes
No
Negative interactions with government officials
Yes
No
Missing (imputed)
Domestic Far Right
Yes
No

N

Percentage

135
170

44.26%
55.74%

96
74
91
44

31.48%
24.26%
29.84%
14.43%

259
40
6

84.92%
13.11%
1.97%

261
44

85.57%
14.43%

223
28
54

73.11%
9.18%
17.70%

64
135
106

20.98%
44.26%
34.75%

268
37

87.87%
12.13%

175
104
26

57.38%
34.10%
8.52%

245
60

80.33%
19.67%

A similar problem occurred with the indicators for prior negative interactions with
government officials. There were high percentages of missing values for prior civil charges (N =
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282, 92.16%), prior arrest (N = 157; 51.31%), prior criminal charges (N = 186; 60.78%) and
prior criminal conviction (N = 140; 45.75%). However, when the multiple indicators were
merged to create prior negative interactions with government officials, the rate of missing values
fell to acceptable levels (N = 26, 8.52%). Multiple imputations were then used to fill in these
missing values for conviction status (N = 6; 1.97%), race (N = 26; 8.52%), strain (N = 106;
34.75%) and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 26, 8.52%). Missing
values for interaction terms were also imputed. (See Chapter 5 for detailed explanation of the
multiple imputation procedure used in this study).
The study’s descriptive statistics were presented in Table 7 above. The factor analysis
used to create the commitment to extremism variable will be presented in the next section. The
inferential tests used to assess the study’s dependent variables will then presented.

6.2. Commitment to ideology factor
6.2.1. Creating the Commitment to ideology scale
One of the key variables used in this study was commitment to extremism. This variable
was used as the dependent variable in the second research question and an independent variable
in the third research question. Commitment to extremism was conceptualized as a latent variable,
i.e., multiple indicators were used to capture this construct. When there are many facets to a
construct or latent variable, Field (2013) suggested using a factor analysis to (1) understand the
structure of the latent variable, (2) create a more reliable instrument / questionnaire to measure
the latent variable and (3) reduce the data to a more manageable level. In other words, factor
analysis was used to determine which indicators were valid measures of the commitment to
extremism construct. This can be measured by an eigenvalue > 1 (Kaiser’s recommendation, as
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cited by Field, 2013) or eigenvalue > 0.7 (Jolliffe’s recommendation, as cited by Field, 2013).
Indicators that combine to form a factor with an eigenvalue < .07 were deemed invalid and
dropped from the construct measurement. Factor analysis was used to establish which indicators
(previously described in chapter 5 and summarized in Table 3) contributed the most to the scale
(Field, 2013). Jolliffe’s recommendation (eigenvalue > 0.7) was used to identify the number of
factors that contributed to the commitment to extremism construct. The raw scores were tallied
to create each factor. The factors were then tallied to create a commitment to extremism scale.
Although the factor analysis empirically creates a valid scale, it is considered to be the first step
in designing a valid and reliable scale (Field, 2013). Since the study’s commitment to extremism
scale has not been previously tested, factor analysis is the appropriate technique to create a valid
scale. The steps used to create the commitment to extremism scale will be described below.
A principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the 9 items with equamax rotation.
This process involved estimating the communalities between the indicators listed in Table 3, and
replacing the diagonals of the correlation matrix with the estimated communalities (Field, 2013).
The eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix were then computed to determine the
substantive importance of the factors and how many factors to retain (Field, 2013). An equamax
rotation was then conducted to make the factors easier to interpret.
The correlation matrix revealed no problems with multicollinearity (i.e., none of the
Pearson’s r were greater than 0.9). According to Field (2013), a sample size of 300 or larger
should have provided a stable factor solution. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy was in the “okay” range (KMO = .648); larger than 0.79 is considered to be
ideal.
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Table 8: Commitment to ideology scale

Item

Evidence of
conspiratorial
beliefs
Evidence of
antigovernment
beliefs
Evidence of
anti-tax-beliefs
Evidence of
survivalist
beliefs
Evidence that
the suspect was
anti-gun
control
Movement
related tattoo
Evidence of
racist / general
hate beliefs
Evidence of
participation in
movement
activities
Claim to have
been a farrightist
Denial of farrightist beliefs
Eigenvalues
% of variance
Cronbach’s α

Rotated Factor Loadings
Socializer
Proud Denier
farrightist
.118
.091
-.053

Conspiracy
Theorist

Survivalist

Proud
Supremacist

.880

.185

-.151

.832

.209

-.105

.209

-.072

-.091

.690

-.225

-.242

.176

.328

-.006

.064

.891

-.020

.099

.146

-.035

.098

.883

.067

-.042

-.014

-.001

-.058

-.067

.841

-.238

.192

.064

-.194

.118

.800

.268

-.069

.080

.159

.007

.015

.936

.116

.042

.028

.108

.096

.098

.948

.007

-.038

-.012

.067

.037

.005

.995

2.709
27.089
.81

1.797
17.969
.74

1.364
13.639
.57

.964
9.636

.839
8.387

.770
7.703

The six factors fulfilled Jolliffe’s criteria, i.e., had eigenvalues > 0.7 – Conspiracy
Theorist, Survivalist, Proud Supremacist, Socializer, Proud far-rightist and Denier. Together
these factors explained 84.42% of the variance in commitment to extremism. The scree plot also
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showed six points of inflection (where the slope changed drastically), which also suggested that
six factors should be extracted. Rather than using the factor scores, individuals’ raw scores were
tallied for each indicator of the variable. These were then summed to create individuals’ overall
score for commitment to extremism (M = 1.57; SD = 1.54). The items that clustered into the 6
factors are depicted in Table 8 above, along with their factor loadings (Eigenvalues).
Two factors, Conspiracy Theorist and Survivalist, had high reliability (Cronbach’s α >
0.7). However, Proud Supremacists had a low reliability (Cronbach’s α > 0.57). Reliability
measures could not be calculated for Socializers, Proud far-rightists and Deniers as only one item
was used to create each of those factors. However, when four or five factors were extracted, too
many residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05; with the six-factor scale, only 28% of
residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05. Thus, the six-factor scale was retained.
The percentage of variance for each factor provided a measure to assess the relative
importance of the indicators to overall commitment to extremism. As expected, general
conspiratorial beliefs, anti-government beliefs and anti-tax beliefs carried the most weight, and
measured one overarching aspect of the commitment to extremism construct. When combined,
these indicators formed the Conspiracy Theorist factor and explained 27% of the variance in
individuals’ commitment to extremism levels. Survivalist beliefs and anti-gun control beliefs
also measured one aspect of commitment to extremism, i.e., formed a cohesive factor,
Survivalist. This factor explained close to 18% of the variance in commitment to extremism.
People who subscribed to general hate (anti-minority, anti-LBGT, anti-Semitic) beliefs also
tended to have tattoos. These two indicators were used to create the Proud Supremacist factor,
which explained approximately 14% of the variance in commitment to extremism. Participation
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in movement activities (approx. 10%), claiming to have been a DFR (8%) and denying affiliation
with the movement (approx. 8%) were also valid measures of commitment to extremism.
6.2.2. Interpreting the Commitment to ideology factors: subtypes in the American FR
Factors in the commitment to extremism scale can also be conceptualized as sub-types
among the DFR movement. One model of DFR subtypes was described by Kaplan (1995a).
According to Kaplan (1995a), the domestic far-right movement can be divided into the following
sub-types: Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazi, reconstructed traditions/Odinism, idiosyncratic
sectarians, single issue constituencies (e.g., tax protestors) and knuckle draggers
galore/skinheads. Klan members traditionally engage in racist violence. However, racist violence
by Klan groups has been declining largely due to the result of infiltration by government
informants (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Simi & Futrell, 2010) or perhaps due to
the need to reframe their ideology to reduce the stigma associated with Klan groups (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2006). Membership in Klan groups has been found to cut across class boundaries
(Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Christian Identity or the belief in two seedlines, which evolved from British Israelism,
asserts that whites were descendants of Adam and Eve and were the true Lost Tribes of Israel
and Jews are the children of Eve and Satan (Dobratz, 2001; Durham, 2008; Ezekiel, 1995;
Kaplan, 1995a; Sharp, 2000). Similar to Christian Identity groups, neo-Nazi groups are
xenophobic. According to Kaplan (1995a), some neo-Nazi groups dream of overthrowing the
ZOG and creating a new order, while others hope to create white utopian communities.
Kaplan (1995a) classified reconstructed traditions/Odinism as the fourth sub-type of the
American FR. He described Odinism as “an imaginative blend of ritual magic, ceremonial forms
of fraternal fellowship, and an ideological flexibility which allows for a remarkable degree of
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syncretism in adopting elements of other white supremacist appeals - Nazism and, remarkably,
Christian Identity” (p. 60).
According to Kaplan (1995a), the fifth sub-type among the American FR is idiosyncratic
sectarians, e.g. the Church of the Creator and Survivalists (Kaplan, 1995a). Survivalists and
Militia members are associated with complex conspiracy theories, anti-government beliefs and
an intense need to be prepared to defend their rights (especially to own guns or be free from
unconstitutional federal taxes) and liberty (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996;
Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).
Finally, the seventh FR sub-type identified by Kaplan (1995a) is knuckle draggers galore
/ skinheads. Skinheads or ‘knuckle draggers galore’ are extremely racist, generally engage in
opportunistic violence against racial minorities and commit crimes with other group members
(Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Sprinzak, 1995). Hamm (1993) described skinheads as
“remarkably violent” and motivated to “fight for the survival of [the white] race” (p. 109).
Limited empirical support was found for Kaplan’s (1995a) classification of the DFR.
Rather than being distinct sub-types, idiosyncratic sectarians and single-issue constituencies
formed factor 1, Conspiracy Theorist. Idiosyncratic sectarians also described factor 2,
Survivalist. In other words, rather than being one distinct group, some idiosyncratic sectarians
(i.e., believers of conspiracy theories) scored highly on the Conspiracy Theorist factor, while
others scored highly on the Survivalist factor.
According to the factor analysis, Klan, neo-Nazis and skinheads formed factor 3, Proud
Supremacist. Characteristics of the Christian Identity movement and reconstructed traditions /
Odinism were not apparent in the factor analysis. In addition, factors 4 (i.e., Socializer) and 5
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(Proud far-Rightist) were not described by Kaplan (1995a) as a distinct sub-type of the American
FR movement.
This section described the process used to create the commitment to extremism scale and
used Kaplan’s (1995a) typology as a framework to interpret the six factors extracted from the
factor analysis. Some empirical support was found for Kaplan’s (1995a) typology. Next,
differences between DFRs and their non-extremist collaborators will be explored. This will be
followed by the inferential models used to assess covariates of membership in extremist groups,
commitment to extremism and crimes committed by far-rightists and non-extremist
collaborators.

6.3. Covariates of Membership in Far-Right Extremist Group
The results for the first research question of the study – among DFRs and non-extremist
collaborators, what effect did individual level stressors, significant others and negative
interactions with government officials have on membership in far-right groups – are presented in
this section. As this study was specifically concerned about the criminal behavior of DFR, the
models presented in this section offset the conviction variable, that is, conviction status was set
to “1” or yes. This technique allows the study to retain the individuals who were not convicted
(i.e., retain the entire sample) but all the coefficients reported are based on the additional
constraint of conviction = 1. That is, the odds ratios should be interpreted as the effect of the IV
on the DV, if the suspect was convicted.
Members of extremist groups were significantly less likely to have been non-white.
Specifically, non-whites were approximately 0.31 times less likely than whites to join a far-right
extremist group (exp(B) = 0.31, p < 0.05). This was expected, as the FR movement has been
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found in previous studies to attract mostly white members (Gruenewald, et al., 2013a; 2013b).
Members of extremist groups were close to 8 times (exp(B) = 7.95, p < 0.001) more likely to
have at least one extremist friend or relative, which supported DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960)
and previous research findings (e.g., Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993). However, because
open source documents were used in this study, it was unknown if these friendships developed
prior or subsequent to joining the group.
Group members were significantly more likely to have had prior negative interactions
with government officials (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01). This supported GST (Agnew, 2005) and
DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), which argued that negative stimuli, such as a criminal record or
civil charges, would increase feelings or strain and alienation. Furthermore, to alleviate these
feelings, strained individuals may join a deviant sub-cultural group. However, these conclusions
are tentative. Due to the limitations of open source documents, it is unknown whether these
interactions occurred prior or subsequent to joining the group.
However, it was possible to determine whether these negative interactions with
government officials occurred prior to the individual committing a homicide or financial scheme.
Prison and arrest records typically contain an arrest or conviction date. This was then compared
to the start date of the analyzed offense to determine whether the negative interactions with
government officials occurred prior to the offense. Occasionally the precise date of the prior
civil/criminal charge could not have been ascertained. However, in such events the news
documents or court documents normally mentioned a criminal history record. When no statement
was made about the civil or criminal record of the suspect and no actual record was found, the
data was assumed to have been missing. The imputation process was described in Chapter 5 and
the covariates of DFRs criminal behavior will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Table 9: Models assessing covariates of membership in far-right extremist group,
offset conviction
Independent Variables
(when convicted = yes)
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Negative interactions with
government officials ψ
Domestic Far Right ψ
Commitment to extremism
Strain X Extreme Others
Strain X Negative interactions with
government officials
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model 1
Odds Ratio (SE)
0.99 (0.46)
0.31 (0.18)*
0.98 (0.36)
7.95 (3.82)***
3.33 (1.25)**

Model 2
Odds Ratio (SE)
1.02 (0.47)
0.31 (0.17)*
2.01 (1.96)
12.56 (9.62)**
3.57 (1.37)**

Model 3
Odds Ratio (SE)
0.96 (0.45)
0.31 (0.17)*
0.50 (0.56)
7.65 (3.72)***
2.95 (1.25)*

91.61 (62.39)***
0.56 (0.06)***
-

94.72 (64.64)***
0.55 (0.06)***
0.42 (0.45)
-

88.21 (60.22)***
0.56 (0.06)***
2.20 (2.73)

0.00 (0.00)***
50
305
0.06
0.18
9.66***

0.00 (0.00)***
50
305
0.08
0.18
8.34***

0.01 (0.01)***
50
305
0.12
0.35
7.95***

Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable for all models, which indicated that 50 imputed datasets were
adequate. This was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 35 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been
adequate to ensure accurate parameter estimates.
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model. All
the IVs in model 1 significantly improved the null model. Model 1 was the better model.
Note 5: The RVI was close to zero, which indicated that the missing data had little effect on the variance of the
estimates.

Members of far-right groups were significantly more likely to have been a far-rightist
(exp(B) = 91.61, p < 0.001). However, group members had significantly lower commitment to
extremism scores (exp(B) = 0.56, p < 0.001) than non-members, that is, lone wolves and people
with informal links to the movement had higher commitment to extremism scores. This
suggested that membership could have been motivated by factors other than strong commitment
to extremism (e.g., the need to join a hate gang in prison for protection, or the influence of
extremist loved ones). It was interesting that lone wolves tended score more highly on
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commitment to extremism, in comparison to group members. This supported McCauley and
Moskalenko’s (2011) claim that group members were more loyal to other members, than they
were to the actual cause.
Strain was not significantly associated with membership in far-right extremist groups
(exp(B) = 0.98, p > 0.05). In other words, similar rates of strain were found among group
members and non-members. This was consistent with previous findings by Gruenewald, et al.
(2013a), in which similar rates of unemployment were found among lone wolves and other
DFRs. However, this finding contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin,
1960). It was possible that since the sample consisted of people charged with a homicide or
financial scheme, different rates of strain would have been found among DFRs who lead law
abiding lives and it was not group membership per se that was influenced by strain.
Next, two interactions effects – strain X extreme others and strain X prior negative
interactions with government officials – were individually added, which are presented in models
2 and 3 above. The effect of race on membership in extremist groups remained unchanged: nonwhites were significantly less likely than whites to join a far-right extremist group (exp(B) =
0.31, p < 0.05). The effect of commitment to extremism on group membership also was
unchanged: group members had significantly lower commitment to extremism scores than nonmembers. When strain was absent, friend / family ties increased the odds of group membership
12.56 times. Individuals appeared to have joined the group because of their ties to other
extremists, rather than to the experience of strain. Furthermore, there was no interaction effect
between extreme others and strain. These findings contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) but supported studies on the far-right (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 1996). Studies by Aho (1990) and Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1996) found evidence of
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people with extremist referent others joining FR groups but no evidence of strain among group
members.
In addition, the interaction effect of prior negative interactions with government officials
X strain was not significant. However, when strain was absent prior negative interactions with
government officials increased the odds of membership in extremist groups by 2.95 times
(exp(B) = 2.95, p < 0.05). Based on Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) DOT, a significant interaction
between strain and negative interactions with government officials was expected. Thus, the
former finding contradicted DOT. However, this latter finding, a reduction in the effect of
negative interactions with government officials when strain was absent, supported DOT
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), a deviant or criminal label by
law enforcement becomes crucial after the initial strain experience triggers an incentive to join a
deviant subcultural group.
All the models presented in Table 9 were significant and did not unduly suffer from the
imputation procedure (the RVI for both models were close to 0). Adequate datasets were
imputed (M = 50) to ensure accurate coefficients and standard errors (the Monte Carlo errors
were all acceptable and the largest FMI indicated that 35 imputed datasets would have resulted in
unbiased coefficients). However, Model 1 was the best-fitted model, since the results of mi test
indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model.

6.4. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators
DFRs (N = 245; 80.33%) and non-extremist collaborators (N = 60; 19.67%) are
compared in this section. DFR was defined as someone coded as “1” for at least one far-right
indicator listed in Table 8. People for whom no evidence of extremist beliefs was found were
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classified as non-extremist collaborators. A logistic model was used to compare DFRs and nonextremist collaborators. These results were described below and depicted in Table 9.
As noted previously, for logistic models, odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that as the
predictor increases, the odds of the dependent variable occurring also increased; while an odds
ratio less than 1 indicate that as the predictor variable increased, the odds of the dependent
variable decreased (Field, 2005). The results presented used fifty (50) multiple imputed datasets.
Results for each dataset were calculated and combined according to Rubin’s (1987) rules in Stata
13, to ensure unbiased standard errors and coefficients. However, since the imputed data
contained a degree of randomness, odds ratios changed slightly depending on the seed number
used in the imputation procedure. Significant effects were consistent, irrespective of the seed
number. Therefore, the results presented focused primarily on statistical significance, as odds
ratios should be interpreted as approximations.
Females were 0.30 times less likely to have been a Domestic Far-Rightist, i.e., females
were more likely to have been non-extremist collaborators (exp(B) = 0.30, p < 0.01). Sample
members with at least one extremist friend or family member were significantly less likely to
have been DFR (exp(B) = 0.08, p < 0.05). In other words, non-extremist collaborators were more
likely to have extremist friends / family members, when compared to DFRs. This was
unexpected, since extremist friends / family members were associated with membership in
extremist groups. However, group members were 23.35 times more likely than non-members to
have been DFR (exp(B) = 23.35, p < 0.001). This finding indicated that although social
connections were important in individuals’ decision to join an extremist group, their belief
system was influenced by socialization from group interactions. This supported the socialization
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effect of referent others among subcultural groups hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin,
1960) and free spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
Table 10: logistic model comparing DFR and non-extremists
Independent Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Negative interactions with government officials ψ
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model 1
Odds Ratio (SE)
0.30 (0.12)**
0.91 (0.47)
1.58 (0.70)
0.08 (0.08)*
23.35 (14.44)***
0.97 (0.39)
25.35 (30.16)**
50
305
0.07
0.20
6.52***

Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable, which indicate that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This was
verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 20 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been adequate.
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicate that all the IVs significantly improved the fit of the model.

Interestingly, there was no difference in strain between DFRs and non-extremists (exp(B)
= 1.58, p > 0.05). Therefore, not only did strain not predict group membership, it also did not
predict DFR beliefs. This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin (1960), which argued that the
experience of strain would initially incentivize individuals to join deviant subcultural groups
(provided they had access to deviant opportunity structures, such as friends in the group) and
contribute to the subsequent socialization process (i.e., increase commitment to extremist
values).
These results are depicted in Table 10, above. The model was significant and the IVs
significantly improved the fit of the model, as evidenced by the significant mi test result. The
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Monte Carlo errors verified that adequate datasets were imputed (M = 50). This was supported
by the largest FMI, which suggested that .20 x 100 or 20 datasets would result in unbiased
estimates. There were no issues due to the imputed data, as evidenced by the average RVI being
close to 0.

6.5. Covariates of Commitment to Extremism
The results for the second research question – what effect did individual level stressors,
extremist friends / family, membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with
government officials have on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism – are
presented in this section. None of the IVs had a significant effect on commitment to extremism.
The non-significant results from the commitment to extremism scale could have been due to the
fact that the variable was not normally distributed. Another possibility could have been that
levels of extremism may have been less relevant than which extremist belief one is committed to,
i.e., the factor an individual scored highly on was more important than his / her overall score on
the commitment to extremism scale. To test this hypothesis, logistic models were fitted for the
six factors – Conspiracy Theorists, Survivalists, Proud Supremacists, Socializers, Proud farrightists and Deniers. Significant results were obtained for two factors, Conspiracy Theorists and
Proud Supremacists, which were presented in the next section. Models assessing the covariates
of the commitment to extremism scale and the other four factors – Survivalists, Socializers,
Proud Far-Rightists and Deniers – were non-significant and are not presented.
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6.5.1. Covariates of “Conspiracy Theorists”
The factor, Conspiracy Theorists, had high factor loadings for belief in conspiracy
theories, anti-government belief and anti-tax belief. Logistic models were fitted to assess
covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, with conviction set to “1” or yes and without conviction
offset. The results were consistent with and without the offset variable. For simplicity sake, only
the results of the conviction offset models are presented in Table 11, below.
Table 11: Models assessing Conspiracy Theorists, conviction offset
Independent Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Prior negative interactions with
government officials (GO) ψ
Strain X Extreme Others
Strain X Prior negative
interactions with GO
Extreme Others X Prior negative
interactions with GO
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model 1
Odds Ratio
(SE)
1.00
(0.37)
3.33
(1.52)**
0.40
(0.13)**
0.68
(0.27)
0.99
(0.27)
0.58
(0.18)†

Model 2
Odds Ratio
(SE)
1.01
(0.38)
3.31
(1.51)**
0.49
(0.38)
0.75
(0.45)
0.99
(0.27)
0.59
(0.18)†
0.80
(0.69)

Model 3
Odds Ratio
(SE)
1.01
(0.37)
3.39
(1.58)**
0.53
(0.34)
0.70
(0.28)
1.01
(0.28)
0.62
(0.21)

Model 4
Odds Ratio
(SE)
1.09
(0.40)
3.32
(1.53)*
0.36
(0.12)**
0.14
(0.13)*
1.01
(0.28)
0.09
(0.10)*

0.72
(0.54)

0.20
(0.13)
50
305
0.08
0.19
4.41***

0.18
(0.14)*
50
305
0.10
0.18
3.73***

0.18
(0.12)*
50
305
0.12
0.27
3.64***

7.63
(8.17)†
0.86
(0.87)
50
305
0.08
0.19
4.09***

Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable for both models, which indicate that 50 imputed datasets were
adequate.

105

In the basic model without interaction effects, non-whites were significantly more likely
to have been Conspiracy Theorists, when compared to whites (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01). This
supported Barkun’s (1996) argument that some conspiracy groups accepted non-white members.
This relationship was relatively consistent when the interaction effects were added to the basic
model. Interestingly, Conspiracy Theorists were 0.04 times less likely to experience strain, when
compared to non-Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 0.40, p < 0.01).
Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others, strain X prior negative interactions
with government officials, and extreme others X prior negative interactions with government
officials – were individually added into the model. According to Model 2, strain became nonsignificant when extreme others were absent (exp(B) = 0.49, p > 0.05). As depicted in Model 3,
strain also became non-significant when negative interactions with law enforcement were absent
(exp(B) = 0.53, p > 0.05). Thus, the experience of strain significantly reduced the likelihood that
an individual would become a Conspiracy Theorist only when the effects of other variables were
controlled (exp(B) = 0.4, p < 0.001).
According to Model 3, the interaction effect of strain X prior negative interactions with
government officials did not have a significant effect on Conspiracy Theorists (exp(b) = 0.72, p
> 0.05). Prior negative interactions with law enforcement was not significant when strain was
absent (exp(b) = 0.62, p > 0.05). However, prior negative interactions with government officials
became significant when the interaction effect extreme others X negative interactions with law
enforcement was added to the model. Specifically, people who did not have extreme referent
others but had prior negative interactions with government officials were 0.09 times less likely to
have been Conspiracy Theorists (exp(b) = 0.09, p < 0.05). This contradicted Kaplan’s (1995b)
findings and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).
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No evidence of a socialization / radicalization effect of extremist groups (exp(b) = 0.99, p
> 0.05) or extreme referent others (exp(b) = 0.68, p > 0.05) was found for Conspiracy Theorists.
Furthermore, Conspiracy Theorists were not radicalized by the experience of strain (exp(B) =
0.40, p < 0.01). Therefore, neither GST (Agnew (2005), nor DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960)
predicted Conspiracy Theorists. Tentative support was found for the socialization / radicalization
effect of free spaces and friendship ties among people who experienced alienation from negative
interactions with government officials. The interactions effects of negative interactions with
government officials X extremist referent others was not quite significant (exp(B) = 7.63, p <
0.1).
This section discussed the covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, one of the factors used to
create the commitment to extremism scale. None of the interactions effects were significant at
the 0.05 level. Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction
effects did not significantly improve Model 1. The covariates of Proud Supremacists are
presented in the next section. The factor, Proud Supremacists, was also used to create the
commitment to extremism scale. The differences between Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy
Theorists are also highlighted in the next section.
6.5.2. Covariates of “Proud Supremacists”
The factor, Proud Supremacists, had high factor loadings for two commitment indicators:
movement related tattoos and general hate / bias beliefs (i.e., bias based on race, gender,
nationality or sexual orientation). Logistic models were fitted with the entire sample; then
conviction was set to “1” or yes. The results were consistent for both models. Therefore, only the
results for the offset models are presented in this section. First, the results for the models

107

comparing Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists will be discussed. Next, the effects of
interaction effects on Proud Supremacists will be discussed in more detail.
In the basic model without interactions effects, females were significantly less likely to
be Proud Supremacists, when compared to males (exp(B) = 0.16, p < 0.01). However, there were
no significant gender differences between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists
(exp(b) = 1.00, p > 0.05). Interestingly, non-whites were 0.24 times less likely to have been
Proud Supremacists (exp(B) = 0.24, p < 0.05), while non-whites were 3.33 times more likely to
have been Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01).
Table 12: Models comparing Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists
Independent Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Negative interactions with government
officials ψ
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Conspiracy Theorists
Odds Ratio (SE)
1.00 (0.37)
3.33 (1.52)**
0.40 (0.13)**
0.68 (0.27)
0.99 (0.27)
0.58 (0.18)†

Proud Supremacists
Odds Ratio (SE)
0.16 (0.10)**
0.24 (0.16)*
2.88 (1.12)**
0.47 (0.19)†
0.96 (0.29)
1.74 (0.65)

0.20 (0.13)
50
305
0.08
0.19
4.41***

1.91 (1.54)
50
305
0.16
0.44
6.09***

Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The largest FMI indicated that 44 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been adequate to ensure unbiased
estimates.
Note 4: The basic model in Tables 10 and 12, without interaction effects, were presented here to illustrate the
differences between the two types of extremist ideologies.

People who experienced strain were significantly more likely to have been Proud
Supremacists (exp(B) = 2.88, p < 0.01), which was consistent with GST (Agnew, 2005) and
DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). The reverse was true for Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 0.40, p
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< 0.01): strain reduced the likelihood that a DFR would have been a Conspiracy Theorists (see
Table 12).
Table 13: Models assessing Proud Supremacists, conviction offset
Independent Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ

Model 1
Odds Ratio
(SE)
0.16 (0.10)**
0.24
(0.16)*
2.88 (1.12)**
0.47
(0.19)†
0.96
(0.29)
1.74
(0.65)

Prior negative interactions with
government officials (GO) ψ
Strain X Extreme Others
Strain X Prior negative
interactions with GO
Extreme Others X prior
negative interactions with GO
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model 2
Odds Ratio
(SE)
0.15
(0.10)**
0.27
(0.18)*
5.54
(5.66)
0.65
(0.52)
0.98
(0.31)
1.87
(0.72)
0.51
(0.56)

Model 3
Odds Ratio
(SE)
0.13
(0.09)**
0.30
(0.20)
9.52
(7.15)**
0.50
(0.21)
1.03
(0.32)
2.70
(1.26)*

Model 4
Odds Ratio
(SE)
0.14
(0.09)**
0.27
(0.18)†
3.31
(1.40)**
0.82
(0.73)
0.97
(0.30)
3.55
(3.26)

0.23
(.021)
1.91
(1.54)

50
305
0.16
0.44
6.09***

0.49
(0.50)
50
305
0.23
0.43
4.84***

0.43
(.038)
50
305
0.21
0.37
5.13***

0.44
(0.45)
0.40
(0.44)
50
305
0.15
0.45
5.23

Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for Model 1. However, since the Monte Carlo error for
the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 45 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been
adequate.

Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions
with government officials and; extreme others X prior negative interactions with government
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officials – were added individually into the model assessing Proud Supremacists. These results
are summarized in Table 13. When the interaction effect of strain X extreme others was added,
strain became non-significant (exp(B) = 5.54, p > 0.05), i.e., strain was non-significant when
extreme others were absent. However, people who did not have any prior negative interactions
with government officials but experienced strain were 9.52 times more likely to have been Proud
Supremacists (exp(B) = 9.52, p < 0.01).
According to Model 1, prior negative interactions with government officials had a nonsignificant influence on Proud Supremacists when all other IVs were controlled (exp(B) = 1.74, p
> 0.05), which contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). In other words, there was no
evidence of an alienation effect from having a criminal record or civil charges among Proud
Supremacists.
According to Model 3, prior negative interactions with government officials also had no
significant influence on Proud Supremacists when strain was present (exp(B) = 0.23, p > 0.05),
i.e., there was no interaction effect between prior negative interactions with government officials
and strain on Proud Supremacists. However, individuals who had prior negative interactions with
government officials and did not experience strain were 2.7 times more likely to have been Proud
Supremacists, compared to those who did not have any prior negative contact with government
officials (see Model 3). This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Furthermore,
according to Model 4, the effect of prior negative interactions with government officials was
non-significant for people with extremist referent others (exp(B) = 0.44, p > 0.05), which also
contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Therefore, GST (Agnew, 2005) did a better job
predicting Proud Supremacists, when compared to DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).
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The models were all correctly specified. The average RVI for the models were close to 0,
which indicated that the imputation process did not unduly influence the estimates. The largest
FMI indicted that the 50 imputed datasets were sufficient to ensure unbiased standard errors.
Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction effects did not
significantly improve Model 1 and none of the interaction effects were significant at the 0.05
level.

6.6. Covariates of Crime Committed
6.6.1. Covariates of Crime Committed: any crime type
The results for the third research question of the study – what effect did individual level
stressors, significant others, membership in an extremist group, negative interactions with
government officials and an individual’s commitment to far-right extremism have on his/her
criminal behavior – are presented in this section. First, the covariates of the four categories of
crime (ideological homicide, non-ideological homicide, ideology financial scheme and nonideological financial scheme) will be presented. Next, the covariates of homicide and financial
schemes will be compared. Finally, the influence of the commitment to extremism factors on
homicide and financial perpetrators will be explored.
Since crime category was measured as four nominal categories, a multinomial logistic
model was used to evaluate the differences between the four crime categories (see Table 14).
Conviction status could not have been set to “1” or yes with the mi estimate: mlogit command.
Ideological homicide was used as the base comparison group. Therefore, the coefficients
provided in Table 14 should be interpreted in comparison to ideological homicide perpetrators. A
negative coefficient means the likelihood of IV occurring for the current crime category was less
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than the likelihood of it occurring for ideological homicide. A positive coefficient means the
likelihood of IV occurring for the current crime category was greater than the likelihood of it
occurring for ideological homicide.
Table 14: Multinomial Logic Regression model comparing the 4 crime types
Variables
(coefficients relative to ideological
homicide)
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Prior negative interactions with
government officials ψ
Domestic Far-right ψ
Commitment to far-right extremism
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Non-Ideological
homicide
Coef (SE)
-0.47 (0.70)
-0.65 (0.65)
-0.44 (0.49)
-0.34 (0.48)
-0.67 (0.46)
2.00 (0.59)**

Ideological
Financial
Coef (SE)
1.81 (0.72)*
1.04 (0.64)
-3.36 (0.63)***
0.15 ( 0.69)
0.23 (0.48)
-1.06 (0.47)*

Non-Ideological
Financial
Coef (SE)
1.30 (0.76)
-1.24 (1.13)
-3.05 (0.74)***
-0.23 (0.75)
-0.56 (0.58)
-0.49 (0.52)

-0.65 (0.68)
-0.26 (0.15)
0.59 (1.07)
50
305
0.10
0.39
4.47***

-1.23 (0.74)
0.82 (0.18)***
-0.50 (1.14)

-1.61 (0.77)*
0.21 (0.22)
3.03 (1.52)*

Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: ideological homicide was the base comparison group.
Note 4: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for ideological financial crime. However, since the
Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were
adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 39 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would
have been adequate.
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interactions effects did not improve the model. They were not reported

There were few significant differences between people charged with ideological and nonideological homicides, i.e., individuals charged with homicides had similar levels of strain (B = 0.44, p > 0.05), extremist referent others (B = -0.34, p > 0.05), membership in extremist groups
(B = -0.67, p > 0.05) and levels of commitment to extremism (B = -0.26, p > 0.05). However,
people charged with a non-ideological homicide were more likely to have prior negative
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interactions with government officials, compared to those charged with an ideological homicide
(B = 2.00, p < 0.05). Thus, rather than prior negative interactions with government officials
having a radicalization effect that subsequently resulted in the commission of an ideologically
motivated homicide, these negative interactions increased the risk of having a violent criminal
career. In other words, negative interactions with government officials did not alienate
individuals and further entrench them in an extremist sub-culture. This contradicted DOT
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1996). Instead, evidence was found supporting GST (Agnew, 2005). Prior
negative interactions with government officials reduced individuals’ ability to engage in legal
coping measures, possibly due to difficulties in finding employment subsequent to incarceration,
which increased the risk of future violent offending behavior.
There were several significant differences between individuals charged with ideological
financial crime, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide. Overall, there were
more males involved in the four crime categories (261 males vs. 44 females). However,
individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly more likely to have
been female, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = 1.81, p < 0.05). In
other words, females who offended were mostly likely to commit an ideological financial crime.
Individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly less likely to
experience strain, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = -3.36, p <
0.001). In other words, strain increased the risk that an individual would commit an ideological
homicide only, rather than any ideological crime. Individuals charged with an ideological
financial crime were significantly less likely to have prior negative interactions with government
officials, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = -1.06, p < 0.05).
Therefore, priors increased the risk that individuals would commit an ideologically motivated
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homicide but decreased the risk that they would commit an ideological motivated financial
scheme.
Instead, individuals who committed an ideological financial crime appeared to have been
motivated primarily by their commitment to extremism. Ideological financial perpetrators had
significantly higher committed to extremism scores, when compared to ideological homicide
perpetrators (B = 0.82, p < 0.001). Neither GST, nor DOT explained ideological financial
criminal behavior: strain, extremist friends/ family and negative interactions with government
officials were not associated with ideological financial crimes. Rather, ideological financial
crimes appeared to have been committed as an expression of individual’s extremist beliefs. It
was possible that greed also contributed to ideological financial offending behavior, since many
individuals who committed ideologically motivated financial crimes were non-extremist
collaborators.
DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a non-ideological financial crime
were significantly less likely to experience strain, when compared to those charged with an
ideological homicide (B = -3.05, p < 0.001). Non-extremist collaborators were more likely to
commit a non-ideological financial crime, while DFRs were more likely to commit an
ideological homicide (B = -1.61, p < 0.05). Therefore, perpetrators of non-ideological financial
schemes were not motivated by the experience of strain, prior negative interactions with law
enforcement or their extremist beliefs; instead, the likely motivator was greed.

6.6.2. Covariates of Crime Committed: homicide vs. financial crime
This section compares DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide, to
those charged with committing a financial scheme. The mi estimate: logistic command could not
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be executed. Instead, the mi estimate: mlogit command was used to compared homicide and
financial perpetrators. Homicide was used as the base category. Therefore, the coefficients
should be interpreted in reference to the base category (homicide).
The basic model without interaction effects was first fitted (see Table 15 – Model 1,
below). Females were significantly more likely to commit financial crimes, compared to males
(B = 1.87, p < 0.01). This was not surprising, based on previous findings by Gruenewald (2011)
and Belli (2011). In Gruenewald’s (2011) study, which examined far-rightists who committed a
homicide between 1990 and 2006, close to 98% were male. In contrast, among the FR
perpetrators of financial schemes analyzed by Belli (2011), only 70% were male. Therefore, one
would expect to have found significantly more females engaging in financial crimes.
Financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have experienced strain than the
homicide perpetrators (B = -3.13, p < 0.001), which indicated that strain was not a motivator for
committing financial schemes. Financial perpetrators were also significantly less likely to have
had some form of prior negative interactions with government officials (B = -1.63, p < 0.001).
Therefore, strain and negative interactions with government officials did not increase the risk of
a DFR committing a financial scheme. However, commitment to the cause increased the risk of
committing a financial scheme. People charged with financial crimes were more committed to
extremism, when compared to those who were charged with a homicide (B = 0.76, p < 0.001).
Greed also increased the risk of non-extremists committing financial schemes. Non-extremist
offenders were more likely to have been involved in financial crimes, i.e., DFRs less likely to
have been involved in financial crimes (B = -1.28, p < 0.05). Thus, financial perpetrators did not
appear to have been motivated by strain, extremist referent others or prior negative interactions
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with government officials. Instead, financial perpetrators were motivated by commitment to
extremism, and possibly also by greed.
Table 15: Multinomial logit Regression model comparing homicide and financial crime
Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain ψ
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Negative interactions
with GO ψ
Domestic Far-right ψ
Commitment to farright extremism
Strain X extreme
others
Extreme others X GO
Strain X GO
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model 1
Coef (SE)
1.87 (0.67)**
0.59 (0.58)
-3.13 (0.55)***
0.23 (0.58)
0.16 (0.43)
-1.63 0.37)***

Model 2
Coef (SE)
1.75 (0.67)**
0.64 (0.59)
-4.43 (1.43)**
-0.19 (0.75)
0.20 (0.43)
-1.72 (0.38)***

Model 3
Coef (SE)
1.88 (0.68)**
0.58 (0.58)
-3.14 (0.56)***
0.04 (1.09)
0.16 (0.43)
-1.84 (1.19)

Model 4
Coef (SE)
1.89 (0.67)**
0.58 (0.58)
-3.20 (0.82)***
0.21 (0.59)
0.17 (0.43)
-1.66 (0.44)***

-1.28 (0.60)*
0.76 (0.17)***

-1.35 (0.60)*
0.78 (0.17)***

-1.27 (0.60)*
0.76 (0.17)***

-1.30 (0.61)
0.76 (0.17)***

-

-

0.41 (0.94)
50
305
0.15
.31
8.06***

1.49 (1.51)
0.81 (1.03)
50
305
0.17
0.22
6.99***

0.24 (1.28)
0.59 (1.31)
50
305
0.16
0.33
7.12***

0.10 (0.94)
0.46 (0.98)
50
305
0.18
0.28
7.02***

Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the
Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 33 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been
adequate.
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interaction effects did not improve the model

Next, each interaction term – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions
with government officials and; extreme others X prior negative interactions with government
officials – was added individually into the model (see Table 15 – Model 2-4, below). Normally,
the reported coefficients related to the effect of an IV when all other variables were controlled.
116

However, when an interaction effect is added a model, the coefficient provides the effect of the
IV when the other element of the interactions effect is absent or “0.”
According to Model 2, people charged with financial crimes were less likely to
experience strain when extreme others were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and extreme others = 0),
compared to those charged with a violent crime (B = -4.43, p < 0.01). Furthermore, people
charged with financial crimes were less likely to experience strain when prior negative
interactions with government officials were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and prior negative interactions
with government officials = 0), compared to those charged with a violent crime (B = -3.20, p <
0.001). Therefore, people who experienced strain had a higher risk of subsequent violent
criminal behavior, without the radicalization / socialization effect of extremist friends or the
alienating effect of prior civil or criminal charges.
DFRs that experienced the alienating effect of prior negative interactions with
government officials had a higher risk of being charged with a subsequent homicide, but a lower
risk of being charged with a subsequent financial crime. The significant effect of prior negative
interactions with government officials was present when all other IVs were controlled (B = -1.63,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, the alienating and radicalizing effect of prior negative interactions with
government officials occurred even when strain was absent (B = -1.66, p < 0.001). Thus, even
without any conditions of strain, prior negative interactions with government officials increased
the risk of a DFR committing a subsequent homicide, but decreased the risk of committing a
subsequent financial crime. However, this effect became non-significant for people who did not
have any friends / family in the movement (B = -1.84, p > 0.05).
Interestingly, while the effects of gender, strain and commitment to extremism remained
consistent for all the models presented in Table 15, the significant effect of DFR status
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disappeared when the strain X prior negative interactions with government officials effect was
included (-1.30, p > 0.05). This was likely caused by the loss of predictive power due to the
increase in degrees of freedom in Model 4.
Table 16: Multinomial logit Regression model exploring differences in extremism between
homicide and financial crime offenders
Variables
Gender ᵞ
Race š
Strain [problematic mcerr for ttest only]
Extreme others ψ
Group ψ
Negative interactions with law enforcement ψ
Domestic Far-right ψ
Commitment to extremism
Proud Supremacists ψ
Conspiracy Theorists ψ
Survivalists ψ
Socializers ψ
Proud far-rightists ψ
Deniers ψ
Constant
Imputations
N
Average RVI
Largest FMI
F

Model with
commitment scale
Coef (SE)
1.87 (0.67)**
0.59 (0.58)
-3.13 (0.55)***
0.23 (0.58)
0.16 (0.43)
-1.63 0.37)***
-1.28 (0.60)*
0.76 (0.17)***
0.41 (0.94)
50
305
0.15
.31
8.06***

Model with
commitment factors
Coef (SE)
1.61 (0.94)†
-1.26 (0.82)
-3.50 (0.97)***
1.09 (1.13)
-1.05 (0.89)
-2.10 (0.65)**
0.35 (1.19)
-6.20 (1.47)***
3.51 (1.02)**
-6.23 (1.55)***
2.33 (1.18)*
1.55 (1.03)
0.62 (1.52)
2.14 (1.50)
50
305
0.12
0.34
3.66***

Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the
Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 34 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been
adequate.

To deconstruct the effects of the commitment to extremism factors on criminal behavior,
a final model was fitted with the IVs and the six commitments to extremism factors. For ease of
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interpretation, models with commitment to extremism (previously presented in Table 15 – Model
1) and the six factors were presented in Table 16.
The effects of strain (B = -3.50, p <0.001) and prior negative interactions with
government officials remain significant (B = -2.10, p < 0.01), when the commitment factors were
entered in the model. However, the significant effects of gender (B = 1.61, p > 0.05) and DFR
status (B = 0.35, p > 0.05) appear to have been eroded. This was likely caused by the loss of
predictive power due to the increase in degrees of freedom due to the increased number of IVs in
the model.
Further analysis of the commitment factor revealed that the financial perpetrators were
more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that challenged government authority and
participate in movement activities. In other words, Conspiracy Theorists (B = 3.51, p < 0.01) and
Socializers (B = 2.33, p < 0.05) were more likely to have been charged with a financial crime,
rather than a homicide. However, financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have
been concerned about race (i.e. scored low in the Proud Supremacist dimension of the
commitment to far-right extremism factor) or to have survivalist beliefs. Specifically, Proud
Supremacists (B = -6.20, p < 0.001) and Survivalists (B = -6.23, p < 0.001) were significantly
less likely to have been charged with a financial crime and more likely to have been charged
with a homicide. There were no significant differences in crimes committed by Proud FarRightists and Deniers. This was expected, since these two factors had lower factor loadings (less
than 1) than the other factors.
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Table 17: Summary of Findings

1

2a

2b

3a

3b

4

5

6

HYPOTHESIS
DFRs who experienced individual level
stressors were more likely to join a farrightist group, compared to those who did
not experience these stressors.
DFRs who had significant others who were
far-rightists were more likely to join a farrightist group, when compared to those who
lacked such access to extremist opportunity
structures.
There was an interaction effect between
strain and extremist friends / family on
membership in extremist groups.
DFRs that experienced negative
interactions with government officials (GO)
were more likely to join a rightwing
extremist group, when compared to those
who did not have these interactions.
DFRs who had both negative interactions
with government officials and extremist
friends/family were more likely than those
that did not to join an extremist group.
DFRs who experienced individual level
stressors had higher levels of commitment
to extremist ideology, when compared to
people who did not experience such
stressors.
DFRs with significant others who were farrightists had higher levels of commitment
to extremist ideology, when compared to
people without extremist friends or family
members.
Members of formal extremist groups had
higher levels of commitment to extremist
ideology, when compared to non-members.
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RESULTS
Non-Significant, see: Table 9
Strain had no effect on group membership.

Significant, see: Table 9.
Extremist friends/ family members were
significantly associated with membership in
an extremist group.
Non-Significant, see: Table 9
The interaction effect was not significant.
Significant, see: Table 9.
Negative interactions with GO were
significantly associated with membership in
an extremist group.
Could not calculate confidence intervals or
SE for this interaction effect.

The commitment model was nonsignificant. No significant differences were
found between non-extremist collaborators
and DFRs. However, Conspiracy Theorists
were less likely than Proud Supremacists to
experience strain. See Table 12.
The commitment model was nonsignificant. However, DFRs were more
likely to have extremist others, when
compared to non-extremist collaborators.
See Table 10
The commitment model was nonsignificant. However, DFRs were more
likely to have been a member of an
extremist group, when compared to nonextremist collaborators. See Table 10

Table 17: Summary of Findings continued…

7a

7b

8a

8b

9

10

11a

11b

12

HYPOTHESIS
DFRs who experienced negative
interactions with GO had higher levels of
commitment to extremist ideology, when
compared to those who have not had such
experiences.
There was an interaction effect between
extremist friends / family and negative
interactions with GO on commitment to
extremism.

RESULTS
The commitment model was nonsignificant. No significant differences were
found between non-extremist collaborators
and DFRs in terms of negative interactions
with GO. See Table 10
The commitment model was nonsignificant. No significant differences were
found between non-extremist collaborators
and DFRs for this interaction effect. See
Table 10
People with strong extremist beliefs were
Partially supported: more committed
more likely than people with lower levels of individuals were more likely to commit
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically ideological financial crimes, compared to
motivated crime.
ideological violent crimes. See Table 14.
People with lower levels of extremist belief Partially supported: DFRs were
were more likely than people with strong
significantly less likely to commit a nonextremist beliefs to engage in routine (non- ideological financial crime, when compared
ideological) crimes.
to an ideological homicide. See Table 14.
DFRs that experienced individual level
Partially supported: DFRs and nonstressors were more likely than those who
extremist collaborators who experienced
had not experienced individual level
strain were more likely to commit a
stressors to commit an ideologically
homicide. See Table 15.
motivated crime.
DFRs who had extremist family/friends
Non-Significant, see: Table 14.
were more likely to commit an
Extremist friends / family had no effect on
ideologically motivated crime, compared to crime committed.
those who did not.
DFRs who belonged to an extremist group
Non-Significant, see: Table 14.
were more likely than lone wolves to
Group membership had no effect on crime
commit violent crimes.
committed.
Lone wolves were more likely than
Non-Significant, see: Table 14.
extremist group members to commit nonGroup membership had no effect on crime
violent/financial crimes.
committed.
DFRs who had negative interactions with
Negative interactions with GO had no
GO became more commitment to rightwing effect on commitment to extremism. See
extremism and consequently were more
Table 10. People who had negative
likely than DFRs who had not had such
interactions with GO were more likely to
interactions to commit an ideological crime commit a non-ideological homicide,
compared to an ideological homicide. They
were also less likely to commit an
ideological financial scheme, compared to
an ideological homicide.
121

The current chapter described the creation of the commitment to extremism factor and
presented the results for the study’s three research questions: (1) what effect did individual level
stressors, significant others and prior negative interactions with government officials have on
membership in far-right group; (2) what effect did individual level stressors, significant others,
membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with government officials have
on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) what effect did an individual’s
commitment to far-right extremism and membership in extremist groups have on his / her
criminal behavior? These results are summarized in Table 17 and will be discussed in the next
chapter, within the context of the study’s theoretical framework – General Strain Theory (GST),
Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) and free / movement spaces.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
7.1. Discussion
This study used General Strain Theory (GST), Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT)
and free / movement space as a theoretical framework to examine covariates of membership in
extremist groups, commitment to extremism and type of crime committed among DFRs and nonextremist collaborators. The sample was drawn from the five year period, 2006 to 2010. The
ensuing discussion is generalizable to current DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged or
convicted of a homicide or financial scheme (e.g., money laundering, tax evasion, pyramid
scheme). The results are not applicable to DFRs that have been charged with other types of crime
or lead law abiding lives.

7.1.1. Discussion of factors associated with membership in DFR groups
Members of FR extremist groups tended to have been white persons with extremist
friends / family. This was consistent with previous studies, which found that people tended to
join extremist groups with loved ones or friends (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008,
2011). Another possibility was that the friendships developed subsequent to joining the group.
Group members were more likely to have negative interactions with government officials than
non-members. This was consistent with previous research by Aho (1990). However, it
contradicted the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study, which found that non-group members (loners)
had higher rates of prior arrests (64.1%) than group members who offended alone (57.7%) or
with others (54.8%). This discrepancy could have been attributed to the different definitions of
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priors used in the current study (civil charge, criminal charge, arrest, or conviction), compared to
the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study (prior arrest).
Thus, both access to extremist opportunity structures and the alienating effect of negative
interactions with government officials appeared to have been motivating factors among DFRs
who chose to join a FR group. In contrast, non-group members tended to have been non-white
loners. Non-group members were also less likely to have prior negative interactions with
government officials, when compared to group members. As noted previously, this contradicted
findings by Gruenewald, et al. (2013b). However, non-group members in this study included
both lone wolves and non-extremist collaborators, which could have accounted for the
contradictory results.
GST did not successfully predict membership in extremist groups: no support was found
for strain as a precursor to membership in far-right extremist groups. This contradicted several
earlier studies on the FR (Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994; Wooden & Blazak, 2001)
but supported Aho’s (1990) work. Since this study used open source documents, establishing
leadership status was difficult. It was possible that since both leaders and group members were
assessed together, the different patterns of strain were lost. Leaders tended to have been more
highly educated than followers in a movement (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990), which suggested
that movement leaders could have been motivated by factors other than strain (Blee, 2002;
Blazak, 2001). Ezekiel (1995) also noted that movement leaders tended to be intelligent,
manipulative and cynical, which was supported by Blazak’s (2001) study. Blazak (2001)
contrasted recruiters in the skinhead movement to his research with Wooden (2001) on skinhead
members. Blazak (2001) noted that although strain was one of the variables that contributed to
youths’ decision to join a skinhead gang, recruiters tended to perceive themselves as “rescuing
124

the cultural underdogs in a heroic, macho fashion” from Jewish capitalism, minority gangs and
multiculturalism (p. 991). Although these recruiters did not perceive themselves as victims of
strain conditions, Blazak (2001) found that they expressed an awareness of the effects of strain
and how those experiences and feelings of victimization could have been manipulated to draw
strained individuals into the movement. Thus, the exclusion of a variable assessing leadership
status could have accounted for the non-significant effect of strain on group membership.
While the study did not find support for GST as a predictor of group membership,
support was found for DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Group membership was associated with
having extremist friends and family and prior negative interactions with government officials.
Thus, the key elements to group membership appeared to have been access to extremist
opportunity structures via from extremist friends / family and prison gangs (see also Aho, 1990;
Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blazak, 2009; Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Simi & Futrell,
2010; Strentz, 1990) and feelings of alienation caused by prior negative interactions with
government officials (see also: Aho, 1990; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). These results were valid
both for DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who were merely charged, as well as those who
were convicted of a homicide or financial scheme.
7.1.2. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators
DFRs were more likely than non-extremist collaborators to join an extremist group. The
study was unable to determine whether the belief occurred first, or whether the individual joined
an extremist group and was subsequently socialized into the extremist subculture. Nevertheless,
this finding tentatively supported both DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and movement / frees
paces (Simi & Futrell, 2010). There was an association between membership in extremist groups
and any FR extremist beliefs. However, there was no relationship between group membership
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and levels of commitment. As suggested by McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), members could
have joined the extremist group for multiple reasons. However, they may have chosen to stay in
the group because of loyalty to group members. One would therefore not have expected to find a
relationship between levels of commitment and group membership.
There were no differences in strain experienced between DFRs and non-extremist
collaborators. This was unexpected since DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) hypothesized that strain
would have been the initial condition that propelled individuals into deviant subcultures. Instead,
similar rates of stain were experienced by DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This supported
GST (Agnew, 2005), which argued that the presence of strain and lack of legal coping
mechanisms would increase the risk of criminal offending. Thus, strain contributed to criminal
behavior, but not to DFR beliefs or membership in extremist groups.
Also unexpected: there were no differences in prior negative interactions with
government officials among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. In other words, similar rates
of prior negative interactions with government officials were found among DFRs and nonextremist collaborators. This finding suggested that negative interactions with government
officials had a greater impact on future offending behavior (since the sample consisted of people
charged with a homicide or financial scheme), than it did on DFR beliefs. The effect of negative
interactions with government officials on offending behavior was explored later in this chapter.
7.1.3. Discussion of factors associated with commitment to extremism
None of the variables (strain, extremist friends / family, negative interactions with
government officials or group membership) influenced levels of commitment to extremism.
Rather, differences were found based on type of extremist beliefs, i.e., the factors used to create
the commitment to extremism scale. The experience of strain, tied to extremist friends / family
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and being a white male increased the risk that a DFR would have general hate beliefs (Ezekiel,
1995; Hamm, 1993). This suggested that feelings of powerlessness, identity and masculinity may
have provided the impetus for DFRs to become Proud Supremacists (see Arena & Arrigo, 2000;
Hamm, 1993).
Thus, while GST had no influence on membership in extremist group, it did affect
commitment to general hate beliefs. This supported Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) DOT. However,
although both strain and extremist loved ones were associated with general hate beliefs (Ezekiel,
1995; Hamm, 1993), there was no evidence of an amplification or interaction effect. This lack of
an interaction effects contradicted DOT. Thus, in terms of commitment to general hate beliefs,
support was found for GST and limited support was found for DOT. A possible reason for the
lack of support for an interaction effect between strain and ties to extremist friends / family could
have been due to the use of secondary data sources. It was possible that a type II error was made
and supplemental data in the form of interviews or self-administered surveys would have
unearthed a connection between the variables.
Interestingly, those who believed in conspiracy theories were quite different from the
individuals who held general hate beliefs. While strain, tied to extremist friends / family and
being a white male increased the risk of being a Proud Supremacist, being non-white and not
experiencing strain increased the risk of a DFR being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar to Blee’s
(2002) and Aho’s (1990) findings, DFRs in the current study had diverse backgrounds: some
were unemployed or homeless, while others had graduate degrees or were extremely wealthy.
Furthermore, when strain was absent, the influence of extremist friends / family on Conspiracy
Theorists was amplified. Prior negative interactions with government officials also increased the
risk of a DFR becoming a Conspiracy Theorist, both in the absence and presence of extremist
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friends / family. Therefore, DFRs who had a steady job or average (or higher) income and was
charged / arrested / convicted with a civil or criminal offense, tended to ascribe to elaborate
conspiracy theory – possibly to explain or justify their conviction status, similar to the Christian
Patriots described by Aho (1990).
Individuals who had an average or higher income and extremist friends / family had a
higher risk of believing in conspiracy theories, even if they did not have any prior negative
interactions with government officials. This was an interesting finding, as it suggested group
identification increased commitment to extremism (Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960;
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011), even in the absence of feelings of helplessness and loss
of power (caused by inadequate access to wealth / resources and negative interactions with
government officials). Thus, individuals appeared to have been socialized into extremist beliefs
(Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007), specifically
beliefs in elaborate conspiracy theories.
Furthermore, informal and personal ties were more closely associated with group
identification and commitment, when compared to formal group ties, i.e., Conspiracy Theorists
tended to have extremist friends / family but did not belong to extremist groups. Thus, the
socialization of subcultural gangs hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) was not
supported. One possible explanation for the lack of support for group socialization into extremist
beliefs may have been self-selection bias. If individuals with a propensity towards violence selfselected into violent skinhead groups and people with anti-gun control beliefs self-selected into a
militia group, the socialization due to group membership would not have been readily apparent
in a study which used a cross-sectional design and secondary data.
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In short, unemployed white males with prior negative interactions with government
officials or extremist referent others were more likely to blame other people (become Proud
Supremacists). In contrast, employed non-whites with no prior negative interactions with
government officials and extremist friends / family were more likely to blame the government /
IRS / NWO / ZOG (become Conspiracy Theorists). On their own, civil / criminal priors and
extremist referent others reduced the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist, but when both
were present the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist increased. It was possible that both
Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy Theorists interpreted their negative interactions with
government officials as a challenge to their sense of power and authority and the choice of whom
to blame was influenced by personal characteristics (race and experience of strain) and
friendship ties (Arena & Arrigo, 2000). Thus, the key elements that predicted whether an
individual would become a Proud Supremacist or Conspiracy Theorist were race and strain,
while the socializing element for both was in informal free or movement spaces (i.e., via
extremist referent others, rather than formal group interactions).
As noted in the previous section, GST was not associated with group membership. Nor
was GST associated with individual’s level of commitment to extremism. Instead, GST was
associated with type of extremism beliefs. The actual group a DFR joined was predicted by
DOT: they joined groups they had access to, either via extremist referent others or prison
(subsequent to negative interactions with law enforcement). Finally, the socialization into
extremism culture was predicted by free or movement spaces by the presence of extremist
friends / family.
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7.1.4. Discussion of factors associated with crime committed
There were several differences among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged
with financial crimes, compared to those charged with a homicide. Female DFRs and nonextremist collaborators who engaged in criminal behavior were more likely to commit financial
crimes. A possible explanation of this was that females were usually not considered members of
violent hate groups. Rather, they were normally considered associates, based on a romantic
connection to a male group member. The group may have been unwilling to involve someone
who was not a member in a homicide, especially one that was motivated by a desire to protect
the group’s interests. A more likely explanation was prosecutors’ legal strategy included
attempts to flip female co-offenders, i.e., female co-offenders could have been offered deals to
testify against the male group members, whom the prosecutors considered to have been the
larger threat.
The experience of strain was also quite different between the two types of criminal
offenders. DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with homicides were more likely to
experience strain and had prior negative interactions with government officials, in comparison to
those charged with financial crimes. Furthermore, homicide suspects were more likely to
experience strain, when compared to financial suspects: (1) when all other factors were
controlled; (2) there were no known extremist friends or family; and (3) there were no prior
negative interactions with government officials. Thus, while GST did not explain membership in
extremist groups, it did explain differences between the types of extremist beliefs held (i.e.,
Conspiracy Theorists vs Proud Supremacists) and risks of subsequently committing a homicide.
Further evidence was obtained for the connection between GST and risk of violent
offending behavior when prior negative interactions with government officials were considered.
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According to Agnew, loss of legal avenues to cope (e.g., difficulty finding work due to a prior
connection) should have increased the risk of criminal behavior when strain was present (e.g.,
financial debt, homelessness). Limited support was found for DOT. Having extremist friends had
no effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a homicide
(contradicts DOT), but prior negative interactions with government officials increased the risk of
a DFR or non-extremist collaborator committing a homicide (supports DOT).
There was no evidence of GST among financial offenders. Further, there was little
evidence of DOT as an impetus to financial offending behavior: having extremist friends had no
effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a financial
crime. Rather, financial offending behavior among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators was
influenced by gender (i.e., females were more likely to commit a financial crime and less likely
to commit a homicide), overall commitment to extremism score (i.e., DFRs and non-extremist
collaborators who committed financial crimes had significantly higher commitment to extremism
scores), and the absence of prior negative interactions with government officials.
Interestingly, while levels of commitment to extremism were higher among people
charged with a financial crime, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have been
charged with a financial crime. In other words, financial schemes had more non-extremist
collaborators, and homicides tended to have been committed by group members and affiliates.
This was logical; since non-DFRs would not have been motivated to commit homicide for a
cause they did not personally believe in. However, the penalties for financial crimes could have
been minor and the rewards more tangible (i.e., wealth), which may have been the motivating
factors for non-extremist collaborators.
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A possible explanation for the finding that DFRs were more likely to commit a homicide
but people who committed a financial crime had higher levels of commit to extremism was that
DFRs who committed homicides were more committed to the group, while DFRs who
committed financial crimes were more committed to the cause. Another possible explanation for
this apparent relationship was the use of court documents in the study. Homicide suspects in this
study tended to have been defended by attorneys, who would raise a legal defense (e.g., insanity,
self-defense), while people accused of financial crimes, such as tax evasion, tended to have been
pro se defendants. The suspects who chose to represent themselves in court did not generally
follow legal defenses. Instead, they raised common tax protestor arguments – e.g., questioned the
constitutionality of federal tax laws or the right of the federal government to asses taxes;
suggested federal taxation was a ploy by the ZOG to achieve world domination; claimed that
only non-resident aliens and people residing in the District of Columbia were subject to taxation
– which increased their commitment to extremism score. Thus, based on the reliance of court and
open source documents, the level of commitment among homicide suspects could not have been
apparent with this type of research design.
Another interesting finding was the absence of a significant relationship between group
membership and criminal behavior of DFRs in the model comparing homicide and financial
crime. In other words, there were similar rates of group membership among homicide suspects
and financial suspects. Furthermore, group members were equally as likely to commit
ideological or non-ideological violent and financial crimes. This suggested that not only were
groups engaging in ideological financial schemes as an expression of their DFR beliefs or to
fund their movement activities, they were also engaging in financial crimes for profit.
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However, although group members were not more likely to commit a homicide, DFRs
were more likely than non-extremists to commit a homicide. In a study examining homicide
incidents by far-rightists at the county level, Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich
(2014) found that counties with hate groups were more likely to have ideologically motivated
homicides. Taken together, these findings suggested an upsurge in leaderless resistance. Group
messages of hate may have carried weight among the movement as a whole and may not have
been as apparent among group members.
7.1.5. Summary of evidence supporting GST, DOT and movement / free spaces
This section discussed the findings of the current study. Group membership was not
predicted by the presence of strain, i.e., there was no support for GST as a predictor of group
membership. Instead, membership in far-right extremist groups was predicted by access and a
possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs: those with access to groups via
extremist friends / family or access to prison gangs and held extremist beliefs were more likely to
join an extremist group. Thus, DOT was a better predictor of group membership than GST.
Neither GST, nor DOT predicted levels of commitment to extremism. Free or movement
spaces theory was the best predictor of any commitment to extremism. When non-extremist
collaborators and DFRs were analyzed as a binary variable, people who belonged to a group
were more likely to have been committed to the cause. However, non-extremist collaborators
were more likely than DFRs to have been female and have extremist friends / family members.
Interestingly, similar rates of strain and negative interactions with government officials were
found among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This suggested that strain and negative
interactions with government officials had a greater impact on overall criminal behavior, since
the sample comprised people charged with a homicide or financial crime.
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None of the theories (GST, DOT, or movement spaces) explained levels of commitment.
Instead, differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud
Supremacists. The presence of extremist others and prior negative interactions with government
officials, reduced the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist, which contradicted DOT. A viable
anti-crime program for Conspiracy Theorists could have been an increase in fines for criminal
behavior. This was logical since prior negative interactions with government officials reduced
the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist and Conspiracy Theorist tended to commit financial
crimes.
Similarly, GST did not predict Conspiracy Theorists: an absence of strain was associated
with a higher risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar rates of extremist friends / family
members were found between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists, i.e., all DFRs
had similar rates of extremist friends / family members. However, the presence of extremist
others and negative interactions with government officials were higher among Conspiracy
Theorists. Therefore, someone who had extremist friends / family members and at least 1
negative interaction with government officials had a significantly higher risk of becoming a
Conspiracy Theorist.
GST (i.e., the presence of strain) and DOT (i.e., presence of extremist others and prior
negative interactions with government officials) were associated with a DFR becoming a Proud
Supremacist. When other variables were controlled, negative interactions with government
officials had no effect on Proud Supremacists. Interestingly, the effects of strain and negative
interactions with government officials amplified when the other variable was absent. In other
words, the effect of negative interactions with government officials on Proud Supremacist was
greater when they did not experience strain. This finding suggested that strain may act as a
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protective factor (rather than a risk factor) among Proud Supremacists who have negative
interactions with government officials.
White males who experienced strain were also more likely to become Proud
Supremacists. This indicted that concepts of gender, masculinity and power should have been
explored among Proud Supremacists (Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Blee, 2002; Kimmel & Ferber,
2000). Doing gender theory may also shed light on the behavior of Proud Supremacists.
According to Miller (2002, p. 434), “men and women ‘do gender’ in response to situated
normative beliefs about masculinity and femininity…the performance of gender is both an
indication of and a reproduction of gendered (as well as raced, classed, generational, and sexed)
social hierarchies.” Therefore, people do not merely respond to societal expectations based on
one’s gender, race, class and sex. Instead, individuals make conscious decisions based on the
prevailing social structures and social settings. Thus, agency was a key element of doing gender
theory.
Proud Supremacists tended to have been white males who experienced conditions of
strain. Proud Supremacists were also more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime.
These findings supported Gruenewald’s (2012) argument that young, white males without
legitimate opportunities to accomplish masculinity (i.e., do gender) may resort to violence.
Interestingly, the risk of becoming a Proud Supremacist was reduced when strained individuals
did not have extremist friends / family members. This also supported doing gender theory: the
performance of masculinity through violence would have been moot in the absence of positive
feedback from extremist friends / family members (Gruenewald, 2012).
GST (i.e., the presence of strain and possible inability to find employment to a prior
prison record) was associated with violent criminal behavior of DFRs. Limited support was
135

found for DOT: violent offending behavior was associated with strain and negative interactions
with government officials. Interestingly, violent behavior patterns were more closely tied to type
of extremist belief, rather than levels of commitment to extremism. Proud Supremacists and
Survivalists were more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime. Furthermore, lower
levels of commitment to extremism were associated with a higher risk of violent offending
behavior. Therefore, doing gender theory, GST and DOT together provided the strongest
theoretical framework for interpreting DFRs’ violent offending behavior.
High levels of commitment to extremism, females, and people who did not experience
strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have a prior criminal / civil record) were associated with
an increased risk of financial offending behavior. Conspiracy Theorists and Socializers were also
more likely to commit a financial crime, than a homicide. Individuals who did not experience
strain and did not have prior negative interactions with government officials were also more
likely to commit a financial crime than a homicide. Thus, financial perpetrators were not
motivated by need. They did not become disillusioned from the experience of strain or negative
interactions with government officials; they were motivated by their level of commitment to FR
extremism and greed. However, there were some caveats and limitations of these findings, which
were explored in the next section. Suggestions on how to address these limitations were also
covered in the next section.

7.2. Limitations of the Data and Suggestions for Future Research
There were several possible limitations of this study. To create a reliable measure of
strain, the variable was operationalized as objective strain only. Subjective strain and subjective
interpretation of objective strain were excluded from the analysis, which increased the risk of a
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type II error (not identifying significance). Thus, a certain degree of validity was sacrificed for
reliability.
Another limitation of the study was the use of secondary data sources, namely, open
source documents, such as appellate court documents, news reports, accounts of personal
statements made to the media or in court and accounts on blogs / articles by friends /
acquaintances of the suspects included in the sample. Although this technique was relatively
quick, inexpensive and resulted in a more representation sample compared to interviews or selfreport surveys, context and personal justifications for behavior were sacrificed.
As noted in the methods chapter, consistent with the Weberian approach to
conceptualizing motives and action (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998) and the FBI’s method for
determining if a hate crime occurred, commitment to far-right extremism could have been used
under specific circumstances to ascertain motive for a crime (Flanagan & O’Brien, 2003;
Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009). The intent was “to give a correct causal interpretation of a
particular action …[by interpreting] the outward course of the action and its motive as
appropriate and at the same time as related to each other in a way whose meaning can be
understood” (Weber, 1998, p. 15). However, there was a risk of conflating the behavior of
interest (ideological vs. non-ideologically motivated crime) with one of the risk factors, namely,
commitment to far-right extremism. Nonetheless, to not attempt to deconstruct out these two
concepts would have been to risk unmeasured errors, since DFRs’ criminal behavior could have
also have been motivated by greed or revenge.
This study contained DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide or
financial crime. It would have been beneficial to explore the experience of strain, extremist
friends / family and prior criminal / civil record among non-criminal DFRs and non-extremist
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collaborators. This would help shed light on which variables propel some extremists to offend,
while others lead law-abiding lives. However, such a study was likely to have been difficult to
implement, due to issues of access to extremist groups.
Group members in the current study tended to have been a DFR. However, non-group
members had higher commitment to extremism scores. This indicated that some of the non-group
members were non-extremist collaborators, while most were lone wolves with high commitment
to extremism scores. An interesting follow-up study would have been to compare the nonextremist collaborators, lone wolves and group members. Differences may have been found in
strain experienced, negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends / family
members. Such a design would allow the research to determine whether the experience of strain
was different among non-extremist collaborators and group members. One would also have been
able to assess whether lone wolves and group members differed in their experiences with
government officials.
Another useful comparison group would have been a matching sample on non-DFR
offenders, similar to Gruenewald’s (2011) study but with both violent and financial nonextremist perpetrators. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) would have been a valuable source of
a matching group of violent and financial non-extremist perpetrators. Differences between the
four types of perpetrators (violent extremist, financial extremist, violent non-extremist and
financial non-extremist) would have been extremely useful in identifying differences between
extremist and non-extremist offenders and designing evidence-based anti-crime polices specific
to the offender type.
It would have been useful to apply the commitment to extremism scale to a wider sample.
Since the scale was found to have been valid (it explained close to 85% of the variance in
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commitment to extremism), the next logical step was to assess (1) the relative weights of the six
factors identified from the factor analysis and (2) the reliability of the scale. A larger sample of
extremist would have been required to achieve these two goals. In addition, the data should have
been analyzed using item response theory (IRT), which was also referred to as latent trait theory.
The subsequent scale would have a high degree of reliability and more precise commitment to
extremism scores could have been obtained. These scores could have then have been combined
with other IVs to more accurately assess risks and patterns of criminal offending behavior among
extremists.
The sample was limited to the American FR movements. Another possible avenue for
research was extending this analysis to FR movements in other countries. This would allow the
researcher to determine whether the American have FR was unique or share similar
characteristics with other countries. South Africa, Australia, Scandinavian countries and
European Union countries have FR movements. The models used in the current study may have
been applicable to other countries, or historical and social factors in specific countries could
provide more valid explanations of the criminal behavior patterns of far-rightists.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This study assessed the influence of Agnew’s (2005) General Strain Theory, Cloward and
Ohlin’s (1960) Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free or
movement spaces on membership in extremist groups, commitment to extremism and criminal
offending behavior of DFRs. DOT was most successful at explaining membership in extremist
groups, while GST was not associated with membership in extremist groups. Factors predicting
levels of commitment were more complex: none of the variables in the study were associated
with levels of commitment. However, strain increased the risk of an individual becoming a Proud
Supremacist, but reduced the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist.
Surprisingly, having extremist friends or family was not associated with levels of
commitment to extremism or any of the sub-types identified via factor analysis. More
surprisingly, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have extremist friends or family
members, when compared to DFRs. This suggested that many of the non-extremist collaborators
sampled were sympathetic to FR extremist beliefs, i.e., Seekers. Conspiracy Theorists tended to
have been loners; having extremist referent others reduced the risk of a DFR becoming a
Conspiracy Theorist. Another interesting finding was that higher levels of commitment were not
associated with an increased risk of criminal offending. Instead, the type of extremist belief was
associated with risk of criminal offending: Proud Supremacists were more likely than non-Proud
Supremacists to commit a homicide (ideological or non-ideological) and Conspiracy Theorists
were more likely than non- Conspiracy Theorists to commit a financial crime (ideological or
non-ideological).
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GST was associated with a higher risk of an individual becoming a Proud Supremacist,
and also with a Proud Supremacist committing a homicide. DOT also explained some of the risk
of individuals becoming a Proud Supremacist: individuals who did not experience strain but had
negative interactions with government officials had a higher risk of becoming a Proud
Supremacist. This was perhaps because people serving a prison sentence who had never
experienced individual level stressors may have been less able to protect themselves and needed
to join a prison gang to survive life inside.
The study faced several limitations. Firstly, some degree of validity was sacrificed to
obtain a reliable measure of strain. More intangible measures of strain, such as the effects of
parental divorce or the effects of bulling in school on the younger offenders, were excluded. This
increased the risk of making a type II error or failing to identify significant effects associated
with the experience of strain. There was also some risk of conflating ideology of the offender
with motive for the crime. Attempts were made to minimize this risk by using claims made by
the suspect and defense or prosecuting attorneys to establish motive for the crime.
The study’s research design was sound. The use of open-source documents, pay-per-view
websites with arrest records and Multiple Imputation facilitated the creation of a large N dataset
with sufficient statistical enough power to assess the independent variables in the study. In
addition, because of the use of multiple open-source documents and MI, these results were
generalizable to DFRs who have committed a homicide or financial scheme. Furthermore, the
use of factor-analyses resulted in an empirically sound and valid measure of commitment to FR
extremism that moves beyond current binary measures of extremism.

141

CHAPTER 9
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Interpreting Logistic Regression Models
Output/statistic
Purpose
How interpreted
Omnibus test; compared 2
Significant results indicated that
Model Chi2 statistic
models of the same data - was
the 2nd model was a significantly
the current research model
better fit of the data than the 1st
significantly better than the
model. Not a measure of effect
previous model?
size.
2
Measure of model effect size
Larger pseudo R-squares
Pseudo R (Cox and
indicated stronger models
Snell, or Nagelkerke,)
Omnibus test; to determine if the Non-significant results indicated
Hosmer-Lemeshow
observed data were significantly the model was doing a good job
Test
different from the predicted
of predicting the data.
2
values. Alternative to model Chi
Interpret Wald statistics that were
Wald statistic (B/S.E.). Were the IV significant
predictors of DV? Which IV was significant (p≤ .05). IV with the
B was the
the strongest predictor?
largest significant Wald was the
unstandardized
strongest predictor of the DV.
coefficient.
Effect of IV on DV; measure of
Interpreted in comparison to
Odds Ratios, also
reference category, while holding
referred to as Exp(b) or effect size for individual IV,
standardized coefficient while holding other IVs constant. all other factors at their reference
Only reported if Wald was
category and covariates
significant.
(continuous IVs) constant.
Contingency table that identified A higher percentage of correct
Classification table
counts and percentages of correct predictions indicated a better(and incorrect) predictions.
fitted model.
Measure of effect size
Graph of observed groups and
Observations should have
Classification plot
predicted probabilities. Used to
clustered to the ends of the
identify the correct predictions
graph, i.e., had a U-shaped
made by the model and complete distribution. Observations in the
separation
middle represented incorrect
predictions.
To ensure no case had excessive These were reviewed in the
Influence Statistics
influence on the coefficient, i.e., original tabular form in the SPSS
(Cook’s D, Leverage
to determine which of the
data screen or graphed against
Values, & DfBeta
models, including IVs and
predicted probabilities for easier
interactions effects, were
interpretation. See footnotes 49correctly specified.
52 for additional details.
Source: Field, 2013
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Appendix B: Logistic Regression Models – Assumptions summary table
Assumptions
Output/statistic
How interpreted
Remedy
N/A
Independent sample or
Independent error N/A
use a conditional logit
terms
model instead of a
logistic model
Missing at random,
List wise deletion if
Low measurement
didn’t require missing there were nonrandom
error and no
completely at random. missing values in DV
missing cases
Generally resulted in
or IV. If too many
unbiased estimates,
individuals had been
standard errors and
omitted from the
statistics
analysis, multiple
imputations (MI) were
used instead.
Box-Tidwell
For continuous IVs,
Linear relationship
recoded into
between log odds of transformation test for
categories; for ordinal
DV and continuous continuous IVs; logic
step test for ordinal or
IVs, collapsed into
IVs
continuous IVs
fewer categories
Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance > .1 and
Used factor analysis to
Absence of
(Tolerance, VIF);
VIF < 10 indicate no
merge the collinear
multicollinearity
Collinearity
problems with
variables; dropped one
Diagnostics
collinearity.
variable from the
(condition index,
Eigenvalues &
model
eigenvalue, variance
condition indexes need
proportions);
to be close in value.
Pearson’s correlation
Should have had small
variance proportions
on small eigenvalues.
Residuals (studentized Residuals: 5% of the
Outliers could have
No outliers
residual, standardized cases between ±1.96,
been omitted from the
residual, deviance
1% between ±2.58;
analysis, but this was
statistic) and Case
Case wise listing of
controversial.
wise listing of
residuals < 2SD
residuals
N/A
Number of cases in
Adequate sample
smaller binary
size
outcome / number of
predictors ≥ 20
80% of cells should
Biased goodness or fit
Sampling adequacy Crosstabulation
have had a count of at measures
least 5, no cells should
have had a zero count
Source: Field, 2013
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Output/statistic
Change statistics

F-Ratio

R2

T-statistic

Standardized Beta
value

Appendix C: Interpreting Regression Models
Purpose
How interpreted
Difference between each research A significant F-statistic indicated
block – did the new variables
that the new variables significantly
significantly improve the model?
improved the model
Tested fit of the model: difference Significant results indicated that
between the improvements in
the IVs improved our ability to
prediction from adding the
predict the DV.
variables to the model
Measure of model effect size; the
Larger R-squares indicated
proportion of the variance in the
stronger models
DV explained by the entire model
Were the IV significant predictors Interpreted T-statistics that were
of DV, i.e., was the parameter
significant (p≤ .05).
significantly different from 0?
Which IV was the strongest
Higher absolute standardized beta
predictor?
values indicated that the IV was a
stronger predictor of the DV,
compared to the other IVs

Source: Field, 2013
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Appendix D: Regression Models – Assumptions summary table
Assumptions
How tested in SPSS
Consequence
Remedy
1. Additivity and
The DV should have
Invalid Model
- Transformed IV to
had a linear
make the relationship
linearity
relationship with the
linear
predictors (IVs)
- Ran a robust
Regression
Durbin-Watson
Invalid Model
- Ran a robust
2. Independent errors
statistic should have
Regression
or no autocorrelation
been between 1-3.
Residuals should have Invalid confidence
- Weighed least
3. Homoscedasticity
been consistent at each intervals and
squares regression
level of the predictor
significance test
variable (IV)
Errors should have had Invalid confidence
- Bootstrapped
4. Normally
a
mean
of
0.
Created
intervals
and
confidence intervals
distributed errors
normal probability plot significance test in
or histogram of
small samples only
residuals
N/A
N/A
N/A
5. Continuous and
unbound DV; binary
or continuous IVs
VIF values from
Biased parameter
- Ran a robust
6. No perfect
Coefficients table <
estimates
Regression
collinearity
10; average VIF
values should not have
been much greater
than 1
IVs must vary
7. Non-zero variance
8. No outliers or
influential cases

Standardized
Residuals: 5% of the
cases between ±1.96,
1% between ±2.58;
Case wise listing of
residuals < 3SD
indicated a problem.
Cook’s D >1 indicated
a problem.
DfBeta >1 indicated a
problem

Source: Field, 2013
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Biased parameter
estimates

Appendix E: Interpreting Multinomial Regression Models
Output/statistic
Purpose
How interpreted
Likelihood ratio test, Omnibus test; compared 2 models Significant results indicated that
of the same data, i.e., was the
the 2nd model was a significantly
also referred to as
current research model
better fit of the data than the 1st
the log-likelihood
significantly better than the
model. Not a measure of effect
test
previous model? Also used to test size.
for interaction effects
Goodness of fit statistics;
Significant results indicated the
Pearson Chi2 &
2
compared researcher’s model to
researcher’s model was
Deviance Chi
intercept-only model. Alternative
significantly better. Conflicting
to the likelihood ratio test
results indicated a weak model.
Non-significant results indicated
Hosmer-Lemeshow’s Omnibus test; to determine if the
the model was doing a good job of
Goodness of fit index observed data were significantly
different from the predicted
predicting the data.
values. Alternative to model Chi2
Pseudo R2 (Cox and Measure of model effect size, not a Larger pseudo R-squares indicated
stronger models; used with the
Snell R2, Nagelkerke goodness-of-fit measure.
2
classification table.
R , and McFadden’s
R2)
Were the IV significant predictors Interpret Wald statistics that were
Wald statistic
of DV? Which IV was the
significant (p≤ .05). IV with the
strongest predictor?
largest significant Wald was the
strongest predictor of the DV.
Effect
of
IV
on
DV;
measure
of
Interpreted in comparison to
Odds ratio
effect size for individual IV, while reference category, while holding
holding other IVs constant. Only
all other factors at their reference
reported if Wald was significant.
category and covariates
(continuous IVs) constant.
Contingency table of predicted and A higher percentage of correct
Classification table
observed category probabilities.
predictions (hit rate) indicated a
better-fitted model.
Used to determine which research The model with the lower AIC and
AIC and BIC (only
model was the best fit of data for
BIC values would have been the
in multinomial
non-nested models.
better-fitted model.
logistic models)
Source: Field, 2009; Garson, 2012
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Appendix F: Research questions and models
Research question 1: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and
negative interactions with government officials have on membership in a rightwing extremist
groups? Note: the ECDB uses group membership as an indicator of extremism, thus, people
coded as DFR=0 could not have been members of an extremist group. However, not all DFRs
belonged to extremist groups.
Statistical test: logistic regression. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and
individual IV’s effect on membership in a far-right extremist group.
DFR
(0=no; 1 = yes)
Individual level
stressors

Membership in
extremist group
(0=no; 1=yes)

(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Extremist significant
others

(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Negative interaction
with government
officials
(0=no; 1= at least 1)

To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise
method:
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials
Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials
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Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and
negative interactions with government officials have on individual’s commitment to rightwing
extremism?
Statistical test: regression analysis. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and the
individual IV’s effect on each level of commitment to extremist ideology.

Individual level
stressors
(0=no; 1= at least 1)

Extremist significant
others
(0=no; 1= at least 1)

commitment
to rightwing
extremism

Membership in
extremist group
(0=no; 1=yes)

Negative interaction
with government
officials
(0=no; 1= at least 1))

To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise
method:
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials
Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials
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Research question 3: What effect, if any, did an individual’s commitment to far-right
extremism, membership in an extremist group, individual level stressors, significant others, and
negative interactions with government officials have on his/her criminal behavior?
Statistical test: 1) Multinomial logistic regression model (when criminal behavior was measured
as: 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically motivated homicide; 3 =
ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme);
2) Logistic regression model when crime was measured as 1= homicide; 2 = financial scheme.

Levels of commitment
to extremism

Individual level
stressors
(0=no; 1= at least 1)

Criminal behavior
(1= ideological homicide; 2 =
non-ideological homicide; 3
= ideological financial
scheme; 4 = non-ideological
financial scheme)

Extremist
significant others
(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Membership in
extremist group
(0=no; 1=yes)
Negative interaction
with government
officials
(0=no; 1= at least 1)

To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise
method:
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials
Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials
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Output/statistic
Average relative
variance (RVI)
Largest FMI
Model F-statistic

T-statistic

mi test

Monte Carlo Error

Appendix G: Interpreting MI Regression Models
Purpose
How interpreted
To assess the variance in the
RVI close to 0 meant the missing
estimates across the coefficients
data did not unduly influence the
due to missing data
parameter estimates
To determine if adequate datasets
The imputed datasets, M > 100 *
were imputed
FMI
To determine if the coefficients
Significant results indicated the
were significantly different from 0. model was doing a good job of
predicting the data.
Was the IV or interaction effect a
If the p-value for the t-statistic <
significant predictor of the DV?
0.05, the variable had a significant
effect on the DV
Were the IVs listed in the
Non-significant mi test results
command significantly different
indicate the IV or interaction
from 0?
effect should have been dropped;
significant results indicated the IV
or interaction effect significantly
improved the model.
Same as largest FMI: to assess
The MCE of a coefficient was
whether adequate datasets were
approximately 10% of its standard
imputed based on the sample size
error; the MCE of a coefficient’s
and number of IVs
T-statistic was approximately 0.1;
if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE
of a coefficient’s p-value should
have been approximately 0.01; if
the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of
a coefficient’s p-value should
have been approximately 0.02

Source: “Multiple Imputation in Stata,” n.d.
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